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Introduction 
  The United Nations‘ Partition Plan of 1947 has given the legal legitimacy to the creation 
of an Israeli state on parts of what was previously a British-mandated territory. At the same time, 
the Arabs‘ loss of the 1948 War has made the boundaries of Israel become defined by the 
armistice lines of 1949, rather than by those envisioned by the Partition Plan (See Index for 
Map).
1
 This fact was iterated by U.N. Security Council resolution 242, which calls for a 
complete Israeli withdrawal from the territories it has occupied as a result of the 1967 War with 
its neighboring Arab states. Under those provisions, UNSC resolution 242 has also marked the 
future boundaries of a Palestinian state within Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem and the West Bank. 
Therefore, the recent application for full U.N. membership of a Palestinian state is built on the 
provisions of UNSC resolution 242, as well as on those of the Partition Plan, in order to enforce 
the call for a two-state resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
2
 
  The Middle East Peace Process has been an attempt to resolve that conflict outside the 
chambers of United Nations, while using the particularity of UNSC resolution 242 as the main 
framework for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Giving the United States‘ close ties to the Middle 
East and its status as the world‘s leading superpower; the Peace Process has been led by the U.S. 
since the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference ―almost to the exclusion of all other parties.‖3 As 
highlighted the former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N, Arthur Goldberg, in 2005, ―only the United 
States could act as an intermediary and…all the parties involved have to accept resolution 242.‖4  
 However, as scholars as diverse as John Mearsheimer, Noam Chomsky and Steven Walt 
observe, U.S. approach to the general Israeli-Palestinian conflict has favored Israel almost 100% 
of the time.
5
 The U.S. has vetoed more than 35 UNSC resolutions that condemn Israel; it 
continues to supply Israel with nearly $6 billion/year in direct and indirect military and 
economic aid; and it has avoided placing any political or economic pressure on Israel during the 
latter‘s peace negotiations with the Palestinians.6 In The Israeli Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, 
Mearsheimer and Walt argue that the Israeli lobby in the U.S. is the main reason behind such 
U.S. bias. And in the eyes of attentive observers around the world, the influence of the lobby and 
its allies within the American evangelical Christian community has had the effect of 
undermining U.S. role as the main facilitator of the Peace Process.  
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 Thus, this thesis carefully follows the progress of the Peace Process under the current and 
last three White House administrations, and it highlights the influence of pro-Israel U.S. interest 
groups on U.S. role as the main mediator between the Israelis and the Palestinians. This author 
points out that the end-result of the Peace Process has been to create a Palestinian administrative 
entity in Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank, rather than a viable and independent Palestinian 
state. I will try to show that the support of evangelical Christian and Jewish-American U.S. 
special interest groups of Israeli policies aimed at maintaining such status-quo has undermined 
U.S. credibility as the main facilitator of the two-state resolution. It has resulted in the 
Palestinian Authority‘s application for full U.N. membership of a Palestinian state based on the 
1967 borders, which has also brought the issue of Palestinian statehood back to the international 
community to resolve. The slogan of such Palestinian efforts has been: ―Recognize Palestine—a 
New Path for Peace.‖7 
This thesis is meant as a contribution to resolving the puzzle regarding the actual clout of 
pro-Israel U.S. special interest groups by studying their influence in relation to the Middle East 
Peace Process. This author builds on his first hand experiences of living in Palestine and the 
U.S., and analytical tools he has acquired by studying the role of United Nations in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict as well as U.S. history, politics and society. This study combines a 
qualitative analysis of U.S. official policies toward the Peace Process from 1991-2011, with a 
quantitative investigation of the Peace Process-related activities of pro-Israel U.S. special 
interest. The quantitative data is collected from public opinion polls, the Congressional Record, 
government documents, the reports of the Federal Election Commission, and the monthly 
publications of the non-partisan Washington Report on Middle East Affairs from 1989-2011. The 
qualitative data is based on experts‘ and scholarly reflections about the Peace Process and the 
influence of special interest groups on the making of U.S. foreign policy. 
Special attention is given to the influence of those groups over the presidential elections 
of the current and last three U.S. administrations; the Peace Process-related congressional 
resolutions and legislations that they have helped enact through their campaign contributions to 
congressmen and congressional candidates; and to other activities of those groups with 
significant impacts on the Peace Process, such as their facilitation of Israeli settlement projects 
in the West Bank. At the same time, in order to place the Peace Process-related activities of 
those groups in their appropriate historical and political contexts, this study divides the Peace 
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Process into three main stages and it investigates the influence of pro-Israel special interest 
groups on U.S. involvement in the Peace Process during each of those three stages. Additionally, 
the effects of external other factors on the Peace Process are taken into consideration, which 
include focus events such as the 9/11 attacks, Palestinian domestic politics, the divisions within 
the Jewish-American community on issues relating to Israel, as well as the Israeli subtle art of 
diplomacy. The strategic value of Israel-U.S. alliance is not discussed herewith, and the 
influence of pro-Israel interest groups on i.e. U.S. policies towards Iraq and Iran is only briefly 
referenced.  
During the first stage of the Peace Process (1991-2000), the U.S. was actively involved as 
a mediator between the Israelis and the Palestinians. With President Clinton‘s help, the Oslo 
Accords for Palestinian self-governance were signed, resulting in the establishment of the 
Palestinian Authority as an administrative body of civilian affairs in parts of Gaza Strip and the 
West Bank. However, Israel has continued to confiscate Palestinian land for building 
settlements, and being restrained by the power of the Israeli lobby has prevented the Clinton 
administration from applying any constructive measures to enforce Israel‘s adherence to the 
land-for-peace formula of UNSC resolution 242. In fact, U.S. aid to Israel during this as well as 
later stages of the Peace Process has even subsidized the completion of Israeli settlement 
projects. 
 Towards the end of the Clinton administration‘s second term in office, the ―final-status‖ 
negotiations between Israel and the PA were held at the Camp David Summit to decide on the 
borders and security of the future Palestinian state, the status of Jerusalem, and the fate of more 
than four million Palestinian refugees living abroad.
8
 However, that summit failed because the 
Palestinians demanded an independent and viable Palestinian state on all of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, while the Israelis continued to offer them a sub-administrative entity that has no 
control over its borders or security affairs. Moreover, soon after the failure of the Camp David 
Summit to deliver a Palestinian state, the second Palestinian Intifada broke out and pessimism 
ushered in the second stage of the Peace Process (2001-2008). 
 The George W. Bush administration joined the E.U., Russia and the U.N. in launching 
the Madrid Quartet for Middle East Peace in 2002 in order to revive the Peace Process; however, 
the Quartet was unable to reconcile the dire consequences that the 9/11 terrorist attacks brought 
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to the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, and to U.S. role as the main mediator between the two 
sides. At the same time, the creation of the Quartet has ushered in a greater involvement from 
the international community in mediating between the Israelis and the Palestinians. 
 Nevertheless, during the Bush administration, the stagnating Peace Process continued to 
be led primarily by the U.S., as the Bush administration pursued a policy of advantageous 
involvement in the Peace Process. Soon after the 9/11 attacks, President Bush approached the 
Peace Process as a means towards the end of winning the hearts and minds of people in the 
Middle East and reaching regional stability for his agenda regarding Iraq and Iran.
9
 Meanwhile, 
the 9/11 attacks were used as a tool by pro-Israel U.S. interest groups to make the second 
Palestinian Intifada looked at by the Bush administration through the lens of combating 
terrorism, which gave legitimacy to Israeli actions to putdown this popular uprising, and to 
Israel‘s occupation of Palestinian land. In effect, reaching the goal of establishing a Palestinian 
state became a secondary objective for the U.S., and during President Bush‘s last months in 
office, Israel launched an all-out war on the Gaza Strip with U.S. support. 
 Additionally, even as the policies of the Bush administration started to fadeout with 
Barak Obama‘s winning of the 2008 U.S. presidential elections, the Peace Process remained 
ineffective; due to the influence of the Israeli lobby, the Obama administration became hesitant 
and unable to pressure Israel to stop building settlements in the West Bank. During this third 
stage of the Peace Process (2009-2011), Israel has continued its settlement-building activities, 
thereby leaving the Palestinians in control of merely 45% of the 22% of Mandate Palestine that 
is allocated to them by UNSC resolution 242. Thus, with the events of the Arab Spring calling 
for a regional geopolitical change, the Palestinian Authority submitted in September, 2011 its 
application for full U.N. membership of a Palestinian state. Further, the Obama administration‘s 
promise to veto that application has given greater credibility to other members of the Quartet 
such as the E.U. and the U.N. in facilitating future Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. 
The influence of pro-Israel U.S. special interest groups has made U.S. foreign policy 
toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict path-dependent in its unconditional support of Israel, 
thereby convincing the Palestinian leadership of U.S. inability to be the enforcer of a two-state 
resolution. Such path-dependency has been primarily acquired by the success of those groups in 
shaping U.S. public opinion and using the U.S. electoral system to further their interests. It is a 
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―self-enforcing‖ and a ―positive feedback‖ process that has made the monopoly of those groups 
over U.S. policies relating to Israel harder to break without a reform in the U.S. electoral system. 
It is backed by laws and the coercive economic and political clout of the world‘s main 
superpower. The relative benefits that U.S. politicians and congressmen currently gain from 
unconditionally supporting Israel are high, while the costs of switching to i.e. previously 
plausible political campaign strategies are significant.
10
 Coupled with the fact that the centuries-
old U.S. electoral system itself was built to resist change; U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle 
East has been locked in its current direction of unconditionally supporting Israel.
11
  
As Hamilton Jordan asserts, ―It is even questionable whether a major shift in American 
public opinion on the issue of Israel would be sufficient to effectively counter the political clout 
of AIPAC,‖ the American Israel Public Affairs Committee.12 In particular, ―mistaken 
understandings‖ on such a direction-locked path do not usually get corrected, they rather become 
enforced and ―susceptible to path dependence.‖13 The Israeli lobby and its allied interest groups 
―have tended to believe that any gains for the Palestinians or the Arabs would mean a loss for 
Israel, as opposed to a positive sum game...‖14 They have acted ―not only as an advocate for 
Israel, but also as an anti-Palestinian and [anti] Arab force.‖15  
This study proceeds in the following manner. Chapter one (Special Interest Groups and 
the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy) provides a theoretical and a theological explanation to the 
function of pro-Israel special interest groups. Part one of this chapter explains the executive vs. 
legislative foreign policy roles. Part two gives a case study of AIPAC, which illustrates three of 
the main tools, strategies and techniques used by most interest groups: campaign contributions, 
voting, and influencing the media. Part three highlights the theological reasoning behind the 
evangelical Christians‘ support of Israel and places it within the broader context of making U.S. 
foreign policy towards the Peace Process. Lastly, part four provides an explanation for the 
weakness of Arab-American groups in comparison to the pro-Israel evangelical Christian and 
Jewish-American special interest groups.  
The remaining three chapters then follow the progress of the Middle East Peace Process 
during each of the above mentioned three stages, and highlight the activities of pro-Israel U.S. 
domestic groups in relation to U.S. role as the main facilitator of Israeli-Palestinian peace 
negotiations. Chapter Two (Active Involvement) provides a short illustration of their reactions to 
  
6 
 
the peace efforts of the first Bush administration, whose assertiveness against the clout of those 
groups planted the seeds of the Peace Process and the hopes for mutuality in U.S. role as the 
main peace facilitator. Thereafter, the main focus of this chapter, the active involvement of the 
Clinton administration in the Peace Process, is studied through taking into account the Israeli 
ideology of Greater Israel and Palestinian domestic Politics, as well as highlighting the influence 
of and reactions of pro-Israel U.S. interest groups on/to the Clinton administration‘s official 
policy towards the Peace Process.  
Subsequently, Chapter Three (Advantageous Involvement) explains the impacts of 9/11 
attacks on the involvement of the second Bush administration in the Peace Process and the 
general Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This chapter also illustrates how the attacks were used as a 
tool by pro-Israel U.S. interest groups to restrain George W. Bush‘s outreach to the Peace 
Process, to make the Israeli crackdown on the popular Palestinian Intifada looked at by the U.S. 
as part of the War on Terror, and to further suppress the viability of the two-state resolution. 
Lastly, Chapter Four (Hesitant Involvement) looks at the activities of pro-Israel U.S. 
interest groups during the first three years of the Obama administration, and offers a brief, but 
hopeful, look into the future of U.S.-Israel relations and the path-dependency of U.S. 
unconditional support of Israel. The conclusion gives a summary of how pro-Israel U.S. interest 
groups have undermined the viability and endurance of the Peace Process, and offers an outlook 
into the future of the two-state resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict following the 
Palestinian‘s U.N. application.  
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Chapter One 
 Special Interest Groups and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy 
 
I. The Executive vs. the Legislative Foreign Policy Roles 
 Special interest groups are coalitions of individuals, organizations, and Political Action 
Committees (PACs) that are actively lobbying to advance the interest of their respective groups, 
rather than the ―public‖ interest that organizations such as the Environmental Protection Agency 
tend to promote. Their interest could be political, ethnic, racial, religious, or economic and they 
work to ensure that politicians and government officials see it as part the national interest. They 
generally apply their influence on U.S. Congress; however, the outcomes of their actions often 
bring lasting impacts on the domestic and the foreign policymaking of the different White House 
administrations. In particular, the groups that are ―well funded and have large numbers 
nationally, heavy concentrations in particular areas of the country, or positions of power in 
society,‖ can become very powerful foreign policy actors.16  
This is largely due to the special relationship between U.S. Congress and Presidency. 
Former Representative Lee Hamilton argues that the founders‘ intent for the legislative and the 
executive branches of U.S. government ―is neither for one branch to dominate the other nor for 
there to be an identity of views between them. Rather, the founders wisely sought to encourage a 
creative tension between the president and U.S. Congress that would produce policies that 
advance national interest and reflect the views of the American people [emphasis added].‖17 In 
other words, the Constitutional Convention of 1787 ―created a government marked less by 
separation of powers than, in political scientist Richard Neustadt apt phrase, by ‗separated 
institutions sharing powers.‘‖18 
A Constitutional interpretation of the foreign policy roles of the executive and the 
legislative branches was given in the Supreme Court case United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export 
Corp (1936), when Justice Sutherland declared that ―[i]n the vast external realm with its 
important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to 
speak or listen as a representative of the nation.‖19 At the same time, as Associate Justice Robert 
Jackson remarked in the 1952 case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, ―‗The president 
might act in external affairs without congressional authority, but not that he might act contrary to 
an act of Congress.‘‖20 In the majority of cases, Congress formulates policy through enacting 
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legislations and the president implements them.
21
 In other words, the president is to generally 
―execute [the] law, not make it.‖22  
James Lindsay explains that ―The pendulum of power on foreign policy has shifted back 
and forth between Congress and the president many times over the course of American history. 
The reason for those ebbs and flows does not lie in the Constitution,‖ argues Lindsay; ―[r]ather, 
the answer lies in politics.‖23 Congress started to play a more assertive role in foreign policy in 
late 1960s and early 1970s. ―Its newfound assertiveness was fueled by frustration with executive 
branch secrecy and abuses by the administrations of Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon in 
Vietnam and elsewhere.‖24 Since then, this ―congressional assertiveness‖ tends to reach its 
highest levels in times of peace, while ―congressional deference to the president‖ is more notable 
in times of war.
25
  For example, during the decade that followed the end of Cold War, the 
Clinton administration was particularly subjected to congressional oversight, while the attacks of 
9/11 made the Bush administration at a relative ease in pursuing its policies with little 
congressional opposition. At present, the Obama administration is again under intense 
congressional scrutiny.    
Lee Hamilton argues that there are three essential ingredients of foreign policy: 1) 
presidential leadership, 2) congressional partnership and oversight, and 3) sustained consultation 
between the branches.
26
 In particular, ―congressional oversight of foreign policy can help protect 
the country from imperial presidency and from bureaucratic arrogance,‖ notes Hamilton; ―It can 
make sure that foreign policy programs conform to congressional intent, are administered 
efficiently, are not subject to waste and abuse, and remain useful.‖27 However, as Hamilton 
points out, the partisan polarization of political elites in Congress has greatly affected the 
coherence of legislative and executive foreign policy roles;
28
 and representation in Congress has 
become more diverse and more reflective of ―widely varying American viewpoints, but…more 
chaotic and divided.‖29  
Additionally, while in the past ―[m]embership in Congress used to be considered a 
lifetime career,…many people join the institution [now] for just a few years. This greater 
transience brings many fresh voices into Congress, but it also reduces the number of members 
with a memory of history and a long-term perspective on foreign policy matters.‖30 Further, the 
shifting of power between Congress and the executive, and Congress‘ ―newfound‖ assertiveness 
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after the 1960s has given a ―window of opportunity‖ for interest groups to inter the policymaking 
process.  At present, members of Congress ―tend to be heavily influenced by special interests, 
ethnic groups prominent in their districts, and short-term objectives.‖31 And where those special 
interests coincide with a particular issue in the international arena, such as the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict, the actions of many members of Congress become directed more at soliciting the 
support of the relevant domestic interest group, in this case the Israeli lobby, rather than 
supporting the president‘s approach to the international issue being debated. 
The absence of ―an overriding global foe‖ during the decade following the Cold War 
made special ethnic lobbies ―better able to assert that their particular interest is also the national 
interest.‖32 During the 1990s, the Israeli, Irish, and Cuban lobbies, ―have had particular influence 
on congressional debates over their respective areas of interest, and have often prevailed, as 
national public opinion remains generally unmobilized [sec] or unmotivated by these issues.‖33In 
the case of Israel, U.S. support of it following WWII was pursued as a strategic instrument for 
countering the spread of communist influence in the Middle East; however, the absence of that 
―global foe‖ during the decade of the 1990s still gave the Israeli lobby the chance to further 
assert that supporting Israel remains the national interest. At the same time, in contrast to other 
ethnic groups, the Jewish-American community will always be active in relation to foreign 
policy. As Tony Smith explains, ―Irish-American activism with respect to foreign policy will 
become a subject for the history books, to join the stories of Italian-American and German-
American ethnic activism. In the case of these communities,‖ argues Smith, ―there are no 
conceivable foreign issues that might trigger an ethnic awakening...‖34  
Additionally, the 9/11 attacks have strengthened the Israeli lobby‘s position in arguing 
that its interest remains the U.S. national interest. As the attacks refocused U.S. foreign policy on 
a global foe, Islamic terrorism, the Israeli lobby has been successful at promoting the stance that 
Palestinian resistance to Israel‘s occupation of Gaza Strip and the West Bank should be included 
under the ―War on Terror‖ doctrine of the George W. Bush administration. This is explained by, 
among other factors, Lee Hamilton‘s assertion that ―The lobbying techniques of interest groups 
are increasingly sophisticated. Many of them are well organized, have large amounts of money, 
employ the media effectively, and know how to flood congressional offices with telephone calls, 
letters, faxes, and e-mail messages.‖35 Additionally, they have also been successful at 
manipulating the executive department‘s foreign policy apparatus.  
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Lee Hamilton points out that ―along with the general diffusion of foreign policy authority 
has come a greater concentration of power in the National Security Council (NSC),‖ which is 
currently ―the primary manager and coordinator of the various foreign policy activities 
conducted by the executive department.‖36 For Hamilton, this came about as a result of many 
factors, including the ―growing complexity of international issues, the weakening of the State 
Department, the need to manage the interagency process, the national security advisor‘s 
proximity to the president, and the politicization of many aspects of foreign policy.‖37 Therefore, 
by influencing who the president chooses to appoint to his NSC team, some interest groups such 
as the pro-Israel lobby have also become directly involved in the actual making of foreign policy. 
 
II. Gaining Access to Capitol Hill: The Case of AIPAC 
The Israeli Lobby Defined 
According to Steven Walt and John Mearsheimer, the Israeli lobby is ―a loose coalition 
of individuals and organizations that actively works to move U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israel 
direction…‖38This lobby is ―simply a powerful interest group, made up of both Jews and 
gentiles, whose acknowledged purpose is to press Israel‘s case within the United States and 
influence American foreign policy in ways that its members believe will benefit the Jewish 
state.‖39 The effectiveness of the lobby has been long viewed as ―the text book example of how 
an ethnic group successfully influences American foreign policy.‖40  
The lobby‘s organizational leadership is very unique and is a role-model for other interest 
groups on Capitol Hill. As Tony Smith asserts, ―no other American ethnicity has the 
organizational strength that the Jewish community enjoys.‖41 Its central organ, the American 
Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) ―is universally recognized to be exactly what it calls 
itself—‗the most powerful, best run, and effective foreign policy interest group in 
Washington.‘‖42 One of the main reasons behind this is that ―whatever its internal rivalries or the 
differences of opinion, they have usually been contained by a greater sense of purpose and 
weight of accumulated experience than the institutions leading any other ethnic community 
possess.‖43 This has been the case until late 1990s and early 2000s, when divisions among the 
views of Jewish-Americans and the leaders of their main organizations such as AIPAC have 
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became harder and harder to reconcile, especially in regards to the Middle East Peace Process 
(See Ch. 2 and 4).  
For Tony Smith, AIPAC generally has three main advantages. 1) It is a ―single issue‖ 
constituency with Israel being the group‘s primary focus, in contrast to i.e. the many countries 
and issues of debate that the Arab lobby tries to represent and influence.
44
 2) It represents ―a 
community of large revenues.‖45 AIPAC maintains that it is funded through membership fees 
and non-tax-deductable contributions from private donors and organizations, and since it has the 
reputation of being successful at delivering results, ―AIPAC‘s political clout has been enhanced 
by its members‘ generous financial support.‖46 3) Concerns about the security of Israel, ―when 
linked to the Holocaust act to impose a consensus—‗my country, right or wrong‘—that might 
otherwise be lacking,‖ within other ethnic groups.47  
AIPAC‘s strength also stems from its very institutional characteristics. As an 
organization, AIPAC is divided into multiple departments. Its executive division specifically 
lobbies the executive branch and the NSC to insure that legislations made in Congress and are 
favorable to its agenda, are being implemented in a similar fashion.
48
 AIPAC‘s most influential 
division, namely its legislative department, also actively and ―[v]igorously lobbies Congress to 
urge the president to retract perceived anti-Israel administration pronouncements or policies,‖49 
by i.e. drafting letters that congressmen sign and send to the officials of the executive branch. 
That department secures bipartisan support in Congress and maintains friendly relations with 
both parties.  
At the same time, AIPAC‘s research department daily monitors the Congressional Record 
and focuses the attention of the organization on any committee hearings that could directly 
impact Israel.
50
 As Howlett and Ramesh explain, ―‗[o]ne of the most important resources for 
interest groups is knowledge: specifically information that might not be available or less 
available to others.‘‖51 Therefore, groups such as AIPAC, which are ―‗most effective at 
channeling that information to bureaucrats and legislators,‖ argues Howlett and Ramesh, ―often 
have an advantage in ensuring that their definition of the problem, and the range of potential 
solutions, is taken into account.‘‖52 AIPAC‘s research department provides all members of 
Congress with position papers that are generally perceived as credible and undistorted, unlike 
those provided by AIPAC‘s counterparts such as the Arab Lobby.53  
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Most importantly, AIPAC‘s largest division, namely its political development 
department, involves the organization in grassroots lobbying with the help of its strategically 
spread-out regional offices in the U.S. AIPAC‘s additional office in Jerusalem also provides the 
organization with up-to-date information about the most pressing issues on the political agenda 
of the Israeli government. This grassroots lobbying is usually cultivated through ―provid[ing] 
information to congressional incumbents and challengers on Israeli issues; mobiliz[ing] 
constituent involvement; promot[ing] fundraising; provid[ing] training, and develop[ing] future 
leaders on colleges across the United States…‖54  
Further, AIPAC holds an annual Policy Making Conference ―to educate its members on 
political issues affecting Israel and to involve them in actual lobbying.‖55 It makes appointments 
on Capitol Hill for the attendants of those conferences and it ―strongly encourages them to lobby 
their Senate and House representatives,‖56 many of who are usually part of the audience to such 
conferences. At the same time, AIPAC uses a variety of tools, methods and techniques in 
collaboration with its associated groups, related Political Action Committees (PACs) and active 
Jewish-American individuals, to not only buy the loyalty of those members of Congress, but to 
also affect the broader public opinion in the U.S. towards issues relating to Israel. Those methods 
include: giving campaign contributions, mobilizing bloc voting, and influencing the media. 
 
Tools, Strategies and Techniques 
Campaign Contributions. As Thomas Birkland explains, spending money to promote or 
advocate for a position is ―a form of constitutionally protected free speech.‖57 According to the 
Center for Progressive Politics, ―the candidate who spent most in a House contest won 95 
percent of the time, in a Senate race 94 percent of the time.‖58 The most basic form of this idea 
holds that an interest group would meet with a member of Congress and say: ―if you vote with 
me, I will give you this campaign contribution.‖ 59 The other variant of this idea is the member of 
Congress saying: ―I will vote to promote your interest if you give me a campaign contribution.‖60 
The legal status of AIPAC prohibits it from contributing money to political campaigns, 
but its related PACs ―allow AIPAC‘s members and non-profit Jewish organizations affiliated 
with AIPAC to contribute.‖61 For example, in 1986 AIPAC mobilized more than seventy pro-
Israel PACs to contribute nearly $7 million to various congressional candidates and former-
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Senator Charles C. Percy is believed to have been defeated in part because of AIPAC‘s 
opposition.
62
 Jewish-Americans in general are regarded as the ―largest ethnic contributors‖ to 
congressional campaigns and they also give out 50 percent or more of the funds the Democratic 
Party receives during presidential elections.
63
 Those contributions have the effect of tying 
politicians to the interests of the donor group, and they make the political decisions of elected 
officials rather restrained.  
According to former Foreign Service officer, Richard Curtiss, there are four distinctive 
features of the AIPAC-affiliated pro-Israel PACs. First, they chose ―names that conceal,‖ and out 
of the more than 121 pro-Israel PACs that were incorporated from 1978 to early 1990s, only 
eight of them mentioned in their titles Israel, Zionism, Judaism, ―or anything connected to the 
Middle East.‖64 Over the years those few PACs with explanatory titles ―either changed their 
names or quietly closed down.‖65 At the same time, only three out of the 35 active pro-Israel 
PACs in recent years have self-explanatory titles (See Index-Ch.1 for List). Second, they are 
―virtually unopposed,‖66 and as Table-1 in Index-Ch.2 shows, they have always drastically 
outspent their Muslim/Arab-American opponents during election years.
 
 
Third, their ―most significant feature‖ according to Curtiss, is ―their demonstrated ability 
to coordinate donations.‖67 Electoral laws prohibit a single PAC from contributing more than 
$5,000 for the primary election and $5000 for the general election to any one candidate; 
however, when active pro-Israel PACs in a given election cycle coordinate their activities, ―they 
could provide whatever a candidate required.‖68 AIPAC instructs its employees ―to contact 
named PACs and tell them to give designated amounts to named candidates,‖ which in effect 
makes AIPAC and those PACs a single PAC ―circumventing the law.‖69 Groups of former U.S. 
government officials filed complaints to this effect with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) 
starting in 1989; but no counter measures or restriction on AIPAC were ever imposed.
70
  
Fourth, although such PACs lobby for a foreign government, they are not registered as 
foreign agents, ―on the technicality that their funds are raised in the United States rather than 
abroad.‖71 On the other hand, when compared to other PACs, the interest that AIPAC and its 
affiliated PACs represent ―puts Americans at odds with people who have no other grievance with 
the U.S. Every year some American military personnel, diplomats, businessmen or tourists die, 
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not because of U.S. actions,‖ argues Curtiss, ―but because the U.S. has become identified with 
brutal Israeli actions in the Third World.‖72 
 PACs were ―unleashed‖ following the 1976 Supreme Court case of Buckley v.s. Valeo.73 
The winners under such a system are the media, which treats congressional candidates ―like any 
other commercial advertisers,‖ while the losers are U.S. public, ―whose representatives in 
Congress are forced to choose between the special interests whose donations they need to be 
elected, and their constituents, whose votes are easily swayed by expensive and generally 
misleading advertising.‖74 For instance, because the ―uniquely non-descriptive names‖ of pro-
Israel PACs ―conceal their purpose;‖ argues Andrea Lorenz, ―a candidate can list their donations 
without alerting constituents or watchdog groups to the fact that the funding comes from a lobby 
working for a foreign power,‖75 and in many cases from out-of-state sources. 
As the former Representative and Senator Robert Torricelli said in 1997, the U.S. system 
of campaign finance ―‗is an invitation to any interest with a desire to compromise the policy of 
the United States to use money as a lever of power.‘‖76 Not all Jewish-Americans identify with 
AIPAC, and not all Jewish-Americans are in favor of giving the policies of the Israeli 
government unconditional support. However, the suffering that Jewish people underwent during 
the Holocaust makes the generous campaign contributions from the leaders of their Jewish-
American organizations reflective of their concerns for Israel. Interest groups theorist Tony 
Smith supports the arguments of Seymour M. Lipset as the latter explained that Jewish-
Americans have many concerns when they go to the booths on Election Day, but their number 
one preoccupation is ‗commitment to and activities in support of Israel.‘‖77  
Bloc Voting. In retrospect, voting is a second tool that is strategically used by the pro-
Israel lobby to influence the making of U.S. foreign policy, despite the fact that Jewish-
Americans make up only three percent of the U.S. population. As Smith explains, ―Ethnic voters 
do not have to make a decisive difference in national elections for their voice to be heard in 
Washington. It may be enough,‖ according to Smith, ―to be represented by well-placed members 
of Congress…whose duties give them a role in determining matters of significance to the ethnic 
community.‖78  
For instance, in 1992 Jewish-Americans made up nine percent of the population of New 
York and since they usually vote for the Democratic Party, they constituted around fifteen 
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percent of that state‘s Democratic voters.79 At the same time, ―Since they tend to vote at twice 
the levels of the state average, they may perhaps account for 30 percent of all of the votes cast in 
a Democratic primary in that state alone.‖80 Not all Jewish-Americans ―take their ethnic 
identities with them into the voting booths, and even when they do their opinions may vary 
greatly;‖ however, their concern for Israel remains ―real‖ and politicians act according to it.81 
Smith argues that ―Through their votes in New York State alone…Jews rather automatically 
have a place at the table in foreign policy deliberations in Washington.‖82 According to AIPAC‘s 
own estimates, ―if 7 percent of the New York Jewish population had switched and voted for 
President Bush in 1992, he would have won the state.‖83  
Other states where Jewish-Americans‘ population exceeds 5 percent, and where they 
constitute at least 15 percent of the Democratic vote, are Florida and New Jersey, while they also 
have ―electoral weight‖ in the Democratic primaries of Massachusetts, Maryland, California, and 
Pennsylvania.
84
 In addition to the network of pro-Israel PACs that reward congressmen for their 
support of Israel, such rewards are also automatically gained from congressmen‘s own 
constituents as Jewish-Americans have the highest percentage of voter-turnout from all ethnic 
groups in the U.S.
85
  
Due to the nature of the electorate college, the role played by the primaries in 
congressional elections, and the decentralized nature of Congress, ―voting pressure on Congress, 
especially on the House of Representatives, is a more likely source of access to decision making 
for ethnic lobbies.‖86 Such pressure from the local to the state level and from the state level to the 
national level cannot be ignored, and as Smith points out, not taking it into account by scholars 
such as A.F.K Organski, ―substantially underestimate the role of interest groups in shaping 
American foreign policy.‖87 At the same time, as Smith agrees, politicians ―actively solicit such 
support,‖ rather than ―passively reacting to social pressure.‖88  
Jewish Americans are very attentive to issues regarding Israel and congressmen always 
take this fact into consideration when i.e. sponsoring/cosponsoring resolutions relating to Israel 
in U.S. Congress. Congressmen generally favor particular policies because the effects of such 
policies are simply popular among and by their constituents—policies that Arnold Douglas calls 
―politically compelling.‖89 At the same time, because of the incentive of campaign contributions, 
issues relating to Israel are among the few that congressmen support even when a significant 
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Jewish-American constituency is not present in their districts. Generally speaking, congressmen 
are always concerned with their public ratings and they try to anticipate how their actions might 
affect those ratings, which could eventually be published by an interest group.
90
  
Despite the fact that AIPAC claims it does not provide endorsements of candidates, it 
―subtly‖ does so ―by providing its members with challengers‘ Israeli positions and incumbents‘ 
voting records on Israeli issues…[and] it urges its supporters to remember Israel‘s friends at the 
voting booth.‖91 Additionally, AIPAC gives those ratings to the members of approximately 75 
other Jewish-organizations, such as the American Jewish Congress and the Anti-Defamation 
League, in order to ―mobilize the support of the majority of Jewish-Americans on political issues 
relating to Israel.‖92 Morris Solomon characterizes this network of organizations and their 
members as ―sophisticated public-relations machinery,‖ which allows AIPAC to rapidly 
―disseminate information to the organizations‘ members and develop quick individual 
constituent responses reflecting a single voice on congressional issues affecting Israel.‖93 As a 
Capitol Hill staffer explained:  
―‗It‘s a remarkable system they have. If you vote with them, or make a public 
statement that they like, they get the word out fast through their own publications 
and through editors around the country who are sympathetic to their cause. It‘s an 
instantaneous reward with immediate positive feedback, where the senator‘s [and 
Representative‘s] name, attached to a proposal or idea, becomes the subject of 
laudatory editorial or news show comment. Of course, it works in reverse as well. 
If you say or do something they don‘t like, you can be denounced or censured 
through the same network. That kind of pressure is bound to affect Senators [and 
Representatives] thinking, especially if they are wavering or need support.‘‖94 
A former legislative director ―unanimously stated to a powerful Senator‖ that in short, 
―‗AIPAC has a near stranglehold over Capitol Hill policies relating to Israel.‘‖95 Whenever 
Israel‘s interests are being challenged at the Senate or the House, AIPAC instantaneously 
organizes a resolution that is sponsored by a pro-Israel congressman.
96
 Further, since it is often 
the case that congressmen are dependent on their aids to be their ―eyes and ears,‖ ―AIPAC 
actively recruits a portion of its staff members from political campaigns and from both parties in 
Congress.‖97 Furthermore, AIPAC sponsors congressional trips to Israel for freshmen House and 
Senate members, it ensures close consultation and coordination with key lay and Congressional 
supporters, it hosts dinners and meetings for key U.S. officials with their Israeli counterparts, and 
it cultivates the support of key media people.
98
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Influencing the Media. Parallel to the lobby‘s influence on Capitol Hill runs its clout 
over the general U.S. public opinion. As Thomas Birkland explains, ―Interest groups often try to 
‗arouse‘ or ‗provoke‘ the news media to devote greater scrutiny to an issue or a problem.‖99 This 
process works in the opposite direction as well, and one of the most effective tools that the pro-
Israel lobby uses in its public-relations campaign in the U.S. is to downplay the story of the 
Palestinian side, by controlling the very images and stories presented in U.S. media outlets. 
Birkland asserts that ―powerful groups retain power by working to keep the public and out-
groups unaware of underlying problems, alternative construction of problems, or alternatives to 
their solution.‖100 This in particular, has been the Israeli lobby‘s most effective tool at obtaining 
the support of the broader U.S. public opinion on issues relating to Israel. 
As Robert Jensen explains in Peace Propaganda and the Promised Land, ―in addition to 
the military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, Israel is also involved in an attempt to 
ideologically occupy the American media.‖101 Jensen points out that ―after the public relations 
disaster of Lebanon,‖ in 1982, when images of thousands of dead Palestinian and Lebanese 
civilians dramatically damaged the public reputation of Israel in Western Media, ―Israel decided 
to set up permanent institutional structures to control how Americans would think about the 
Middle East.‖102 Nowadays, there are ―scores of private American organizations, both Christian 
and Jewish, [which] reiterate the official line‖ of the Israeli government and organize ―grassroots 
opposition‖ to any media coverage that is considered ―unfavorable‖ to Israel; ―the most 
important of these is AIPAC.‖103  
In effect, the views of ―those progressive organizations opposing the Israeli government 
occupation policies, such as Jews Against Occupation and Americans for Peace Now, rarely 
make it through.‖104 And when they do surface, they become faced with ―a host of media 
watchdog groups that monitor and pressure journalists and media outlets, the most important of 
which is CAMERA,‖ The Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America.‖105 As 
Alisa Solomon notes, ―You have activist organizations from the…pro-Israeli right that very 
effectively harass journalists and their editors and try to make sure that the coverage is objective, 
by which they mean pro-Israel.‖106 Journalists such as Thomas Friedman do criticize the actions 
of the Israeli government in the occupied territories, but ―anything more than the mildest 
criticism of Israel is taboo in the mainstream media.‖107 
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Michael Lind explains ―the problem is that the Arab-Israeli conflict is presented in the 
absence of any historical or political context.‖108 Not only is the image presented in U.S. media 
outlets about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict simply distorted, but until recent years, the majority 
of them also never mentioned that most of the violence in Gaza and the West Bank during the 
last two decades has been taking place on occupied territories, or as a result of occupation.
109
 
Most media outlets in the U.S. represented the violence as if it has always been a result of Israel 
defending itself against Palestinian terrorism, thereby eluding the suffering of the Palestinians 
living under Israeli occupation. As Noam Chomsky asserts, ―you can‘t defend yourself when you 
are militarily occupying somebody else‘s land. That‘s not defense. Call it what you like, but it‘s 
not defense.‖110  
In Peace, Propaganda and the Promised Land, Robert Fisk explains another example of 
how the images and the stories presented in U.S. media outlets are simply distorted, as he 
narrates that during the first years of the second Intifada, ―CNN sent out a memorandum to its 
staff in the Middle East [saying]: in the future, Gilo [an Israeli settlement in East Jerusalem] is to 
be called a neighborhood.‖111 Not only did this distort the context of violence happening around 
Gilo, but it also presented Gilo as an actual part of Israel, as opposed to it being a settlement built 
on an occupied territory. Additionally, between 2001 and 2003 alone, Israel demolished 1123 
Palestinian homes in the occupied territories, making thousands of people homeless, but as 
Jensen explains, ―If you watch American coverage, Israel‘s demolishing of Palestinian homes is 
presented as simply enforcing of the law. What we don‘t see,‖ argues Jensen, ―is how the law is 
unequally applied in order to steal Palestinian land‖ and build settlements.112  
Such actions of the Israeli occupation forces are given a cover up in American media, 
which completely distorts the message they should otherwise be sending to their viewers. 
Meanwhile, along with its public-relations campaign, AIPAC has established and maintained 
coalitions with non-Jewish organizations and groups such as unions, the African-American 
community, scholars and fundamentalist Christians, through which it has secured a broad policy 
consensus on issues relating to Israel and a bipartisan congressional access.
113
 For example, if 
Jewish-Americans usually vote for Democrats, this bipartisan congressional access is secured 
through the Israeli lobby‘s alliance with evangelical Christians, who usually vote for republicans.  
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III. Evangelical and Fundamentalist Christians’ Support of Israel 
Indeed, one of AIPAC‘s strongest and most persistent allies are those with a system of 
believes known as Premillennialist Dispensationalism, despite the apocalyptic nature of this 
scheme. While the events of the Arab-Israeli conflict are generally looked at through the lens of 
their appropriate political and historical contexts, the premillennial dispensationalists usually 
think of them as happening according to a divine plan, and as part of a certain route that the 
human history is undertaking. They believe the future that awaits the Holly Land in the current 
―dispensation‖ is not one where peace and stability are enjoyed; rather, they foresee a future of 
wide-scale suffering that ends with the battle of Armageddon, before peace could finally be 
ushered in when Jesus comes back to establish his Millennium Kingdom.  
Premillennialist Dispensationalism originated with John Nelson Darby, a 19th-century 
English Bible teacher, who believed that Jesus‘ second coming would precede the establishment 
of the Millennium Kingdom. In the 1860s and 1870s, Darby visited the United States and 
gathered the support of renowned evangelical pastors and Bible teachers. By 1920 
Dispensationalism became widely endorsed in the U.S. by those who were already calling 
themselves fundamentalists.
114
 Premillennial Dispensationalists believe that ―when Jews rejected 
Jesus,‖ God ―postponed Jesus‘ return, started putting together a new people, the church, and 
unplugged the prophetic clock. Thus, for its entire history, the church has existed in a prophetic 
time wrap, what Dispensationalists call the ‗great parenthesis.‘‖115 They believe that Jesus‘ 
second return to establish his Millennium Kingdom would take place in two stages, ―[s]ince God 
had decided to work with only one group at a time;‖ the first group being his ―earthly‖ people of 
Israel, and the second group being his ―heavenly‖ people of the church.116  
In the first stage, the rapture of the church, Jesus would come to meet his saints of true 
believers in the air, thereby saving them from the horrors of what would be awaiting the human 
race. The prophetic clock would then start ―ticking‖ again.117 The second stage would start when 
Jesus arrives on earth with his saints to defeat the Antichrist and begin his millennium reign. In 
between the two stages would be the period of the Great Tribulation, which would last for seven 
years, or three years and a half according to Cyrus I. Scofield. For the Jews it would be ―the time 
of Jacob‘s trouble.‖118 References were made about this period in the Bible, which described it as 
―‗a period of unequalled trial, sorrow, and calamity (Danile 12:1; Matthew 24:21), spiritual 
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darkness and open wickedness (Luke 18:7, 2 Peter 3:2-4); It is the night of the world (John 9:41; 
Luke 17:34).‘‖119  
The Premillennialists, who interpret the Bible literally, believe that in our current 
dispensation of the ―great parenthesis,‖ special events would happen and be considered ―signs of 
the time.‖ In other words, their occurrence would pave the way for an imminent second return of 
Jesus. Leading up to the first stage of ―end-time‖ events in the Premillennial Dispensationalists‘ 
eschatology, the Jews would return to Palestine in ―unbelief‖ and they would establish there a 
state, rebuild the temple in Jerusalem, and reestablish the sacrificial service.
120
 At the same time, 
human civilization would decay with increasing rates of crimes, wars, drug addictions, and 
diminishing levels of morality and religion in our lives and daily interactions. They believe this 
would make the Antichrist appear, who would declare himself as the true Messiah and God, and 
would enforce his rule over the Jewish state by a reign of terror.
121
  
144,000 Jews would accept Jesus as their savior at the beginning of the Great Tribulation; 
―They would recognize the events that would occur at that time as proceeding according to the 
Christian predictions they had heard from missionaries or read in pamphlets.‖122 Those Jews 
would become ―apostles of the truth of the Christian message among their brethren and the 
nation,‖123 but they would be persecuted by the Antichrist. Accordingly, Dispensationalists insist 
on supporting Jewish people and spreading their message about the ―end-time‖ events among 
them, even if their ―converts‖ do not fully gentile and abandon their Jewish heritage. The period 
of the Great Tribulation would be characterized by ―famine, plagues, wars and natural disasters 
such as earthquakes.‖124 This would cause death in unprecedented numbers among the Jews; 
only one third of them would survive and the rest would perish.
125
 The Battle of Armageddon 
(named after Megiddo - a site in Northern Israel), puts an end to the Great Tribulation and its 
horrors as Jesus and his saints arrive on earth to destroy the forces of Antichrist and throw him 
into ―the lake of fire.‖126  
The Millennium would then begin as Jesus becomes the King and the peaceful ruler of 
the world for one thousand years, with Jerusalem as the capital of the world, and Satan would 
become ―bound and harmless.‖127 Jesus would then judge the nations, especially according to 
their behavior towards the Jewish people throughout history. The Jews who survive their ―time 
of Jacob‘s trouble‖ would declare Jesus their ―Lord and Savior‖ and they would ―turn into an 
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evangelizing nation that abandons its Jewish heritage and spreads the true belief in God among 
the nations of the earth.‖128 At the end of the thousand years of Jesus‘ reign, the world would 
again go through ―a metamorphosis.‖  Satan would be released and Jesus would crush him and 
his followers, who would be forever defeated.
129
 ―Cosmic changes would then take place. There 
would be ‗a new heaven and a new earth…‘ The dead would be resurrected and God would pass 
judgment upon them. The eternal Kingdom of God would thus be ushered in, to last for 
evermore.‖130 
 
Premillennial Dispensationalism
131
 and U.S. Foreign Policy  
From there, we can clearly see the centrality of the role that Jewish people are meant to 
be playing in the Premillennial Dispensationalists‘ ―end-time‖ scheme of believes. This is the 
outlook that is endorsed by millions of evangelical and fundamentalist Christians in the U.S. 
While ―most Dispensationalists are best classified as fundamentalists…,[and while] 
fundamentalists and evangelicals differ substantially in terms of style and openness to the 
culture,‖ argues Timothy Weber, ―they remain close theologically,‖132 especially with their 
literal interpretation of the Bible. 
Since the late 1800s, the two groups have been supporting the Jews and Israel passively 
and actively; passively through mostly publications and radio/television shows, and actively as 
they entered politics and started lobbying Congress on issues relating to Israel. The turning point 
took place after the Arab-Israeli 1967 war. For the Premillennialists, the territories acquired by 
Israel in 1967 made her map look more like the biblical map of Israel,
133
 and it thereby gave 
them reassurance that the end is near and that their eschatological hopes for the Second Return of 
Jesus are soon to be achieved; the results of the 1967 war became a ―sign of the time.‖ from as 
early as March 1977, they criticized Jimmy Carter‘s call for establishing a Palestinian ―entity,‖ 
which is believed to have had lost him their votes and led to the rise of the ―committed Christian 
Zionist,‖ Ronald Reagan.134 
 In an article that was published in the Jerusalem Post, Reagan was quoted telling Tom 
Dine, the former Executive Director of AIPAC, ―‗I turn back to your ancient prophets in the Old 
Testament and the signs foretelling Armageddon and I find myself wondering if we are the 
generation that is going to see that come about.‘‖135 Throughout the Reagan‘s era of 1980s, 
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organizations such as Moral Majority and Religious Roundtable spread the dispensationalists‘ 
eschatological scheme of beliefs to most corners of the U.S. This was facilitated by Jerry 
Falwell‘s TV Show, The Old Time Gospel Hour and his newsletter, the Moral Majority Report. 
Tim Lahay‘s Left behind Series also distributed the premillennialists‘ eschatological belief 
system throughout the following two decades as 32 million copies of them were sold by 2003.
136
  
Based on a recent Pew survey, ―evangelicals comprise the largest religious group in 
America [26.3% out of 51.3% protestants], with Catholics running a close second at 23.9 
percent.‖137 A 2008 study by Judy Baumgartner et al reports that 63 percent of evangelicals 
believe ―events in Israel are essential to fulfilling biblical prophecy,‖ and more than 21 percent 
of Americans cite ―religious beliefs‖ as the primary reason for their stances on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.
138
 This study also reports that ―Evangelical affiliation is the only religious 
indicator [besides Judaism] that consistently influences public opinion on foreign policy issues‖ 
and that ―Evangelical‘s foreign policy opinions transcend partisanship and tap into a larger 
religious effect.‖139 The significance of this group lies in the fact that they constitute more than 
twelve times the number of Jewish voters,
140
 and they proved very influential during the 
particular presidency of George W. Bush. 
Most of the renowned leaders of evangelical Protestants today, such as Jerry Falwell, Hal 
Lindsey, John Hagee, and Pat Robertson have expressed both ―in their writings and in live 
evangelical campaigns,‖ their approval of the return of Jews to Palestine and the holding of a 
Jewish ―commonwealth‖ there.141 They see the birth of Israel and its military victories as ―a sign 
of the time,‖ and they have attempted since the 1970s to use their influence on American politics 
to promote the cause of the Jewish state, and have thus far proven to be very influential; ―As the 
political potency of this segment of American Protestantism has increased dramatically, its voice 
is often heard when decision-makers in Washington make their choices.‖142 
 They rally public support for their Premillennialist message through their more than 200 
evangelical Christian television stations and the nearly 1500 Christian radio stations in the 
U.S.
143
 Further, they mobilize grassroots support through a long list of organizations such as the 
Christian Coalition of Pat Robertson and Ralph Reed; and the lobbying evangelical Christian 
organizations of Christians United for Israel (CUFI), the International Christian Embassy of 
Jerusalem (ICEJ), Bridges for Peace (BFP), The National Christian Leadership Council for Israel 
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(NCLCI), Christian Friends of Israeli Communities, The Unity Coalition for Israel, and the 
Christian‘s Israel Public Action Committee (CIPAC); all of which support the expansionist 
Israeli policies of building settlements, and coordinate with AIPAC lobbying activities on issues 
relating to Israel on Capitol Hill.  
 
IV. Weak Link: The Arab Lobby and its Interest Groups 
 Under those conditions, Jewish-American and evangelical Christian special interest 
groups have a monopoly over lobbying activities related to the Israelis and the Palestinians. To 
mobilize the support of the above highlighted forces of influence in the U.S., Israel has ―devoted 
considerable monetary and intellectual resources‖ since its establishment in 1948 ―to maintain 
institutes that study the role of public opinion polls, media, politics, and government in the 
United States.‖144 On the other hand, Arab leaders have rarely understood the way U.S. political 
system works. As Janice Terry points out, ―In the decades immediately following World War II, 
many Arab officials thought that lobbying was illegal and that all efforts should be directed 
solely through diplomatic channels.‖145  
Additionally, Arab governments have failed to ―coordinate‖ their strategies to promote 
their interests in the U.S., which ―has hindered their overall effectiveness.‖146 Until recently, 
Arab states have generally ―agreed to disagree‖ on finding a common strategy for addressing 
their social and political problems, and when Arab governments found out how complex the U.S. 
political system really is, ―they paid huge amounts to U.S. based public relation firms and 
professional lobbyists to design publicity campaigns or to influence politicians.‖147 They did not 
attempt to effectively mobilize Arab-Americans, their embassies in the U.S., or the office of the 
Arab League in Washington, D.C. Further, when such professional lobbyists were hired, ―they 
did not usually coordinate their efforts and they often even worked at cross-purposes with one 
another.‖148  
At the same time, when Arab-Americans mobilized their activism on their own, 
following the example of other ethnic groups in the U.S.; organizational problems, lack of 
funding, and lack of unity in addressing central issues in the Middle East such as the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, were three of their main weaknesses.
149
 The National Association of Arab-
Americans (NAAA) was established in 1972 to lobby U.S. Congress and write to the White 
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House ―on specific issues of important [sec] to Arab Americans and the Middle East.‖150 In 
1980, another lobbying organization, the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) 
was established, and it soon became ―the foremost advocate for Arab Americans.‖151 Other 
grassroots Arab-American organizations include the Arab American Institute (AAI); however, 
Arab-American organizations in general ―have never had a lobbying success,‖ 152 especially with 
regards to foreign policy. As Janice Terry assert, ―no other ethnic group has ever achieved 
anything close to the power of the Jewish-American lobby groups in influencing and fashioning 
U.S. foreign policy.‖153  
To be fair, Arab-American organizations have also been faced with aggressive opposition 
from the pro-Israel lobby, which sometimes turned violent. In 1985, ADC offices were bomb 
attacked, resulting in the murdering of ADC West Coast Director Alex Odeh. While the FBI 
suspected members of the Jewish Defense League (JDL), ―to date there have been no convictions 
for his murder.‖154 Such staunch opposition from pro-Israeli groups has aimed not only at 
silencing the emerging counterforce, but at also making ―politicians and advisers…reluctant to 
deal openly and/or directly with Arabs or Arab Americans.‖155 Janice Terry reports that 
congressmen have generally avoided accepting campaign contributions from pro-Arab 
organizations as they fear ―a political backlash from pro-Israeli forces.‖ According to Terry, 
―Candidates as diverse as George McGovern, Walter Mondale, and Mayor of Philadelphia, 
Wilson Goode, have all refused or returned donations from Arab Americans.‖156 As Washington 
Times correspondent Martin Sieff puts it; ―‗support for Israel brings a congressman opposition 
only from fringe groups, but giving strong support to the Arabs brings legislators powerful 
enemies.‘‖ 157 
In particular, the Israeli lobby in the U.S. has been engaged in ―politics of smear‖ against 
Arab-American elites and their supporters, which is what the Washington Report on Middle East 
Affairs has referred to as the ―new McCarthyism.‖ This is in reference to the false charges of 
collaboration with communists that were made by General McCarthy during the early years of 
the Cold War. While McCarthy prepared lists of ―alleged‖ communist-collaborators that affected 
the victims‘ socio-political standings; since the late 1980s, the charge has become supporting the 
PLO, being anti-Israel, anti-Semitic, or even supporting the terrorists. The victims of such 
―blacklisting‖ have included Arab-American leaders such as the President of the AAI, James 
Zogby, as well as public intellectuals, politicians, and journalists, among others.
158
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Former AIPAC employee, Gregory Slabodkin, reports that ―a covert section‖ within the 
research department of AIPAC ―monitors and keeps files on politicians, journalists, academics, 
Arab-American Activists, Jewish Liberals, and others it labels ‗anti-Israel,‘‖ in what has 
Slabodkin called ―an organized blacklisting operation.‖159 AIPAC and the Jewish Anti 
Defamation League (ADL) have been engaged in such activities since 1974, when they launched 
the ―truth squad‖ with the purpose of ―combat[ing] ‗pro-Arab propaganda‘ and the emerging 
‗Arab lobby.‘‖160 At the same time, following the negative public reactions to AIPAC‘s 
publication of The Campaign to Discredit Israel in 1983, where specific individuals, public 
intellectuals, and organizations were openly targeted for charges of ―Anti-Semitism;‖ AIPAC‘s 
―opposition research‖ became produced and published in Activities.161 AIPAC employees are not 
allowed to take Activities out of the office,‖ according to Slabodkin, nor to ―mention the 
existence of Activities outside AIPAC's walls.‖162 
Additionally, Slabodkin points out that this ―covert section‖ of AIPAC coordinates its 
efforts with the ADL and AIPAC‘s college liaison department, or with its Political Leadership 
Development Program. Noam Chomsky, who has been constantly accused of being ―anti-Israel‖ 
and a ―self-hating Jew,‖ has compared ADL‘s 150-page file on him to an FBI file. He said: it‘s 
full of ―clips from newspapers and inter-office memos saying I was going to show up at this or 
that place, surveillance of talks I have given, [and] characterization of what was said in the talks. 
All this material goes into a central source,‖ Chomsky explains, ―then when I give a talk 
somewhere, my file will be given to the appropriate local group,‖ to make defamatory statements 
and publish them in ―unsigned pamphlets.‖163 The information in Activities is also used by the 
National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council (NJCRAC), American Jewish Congress 
(AJC), The Zionist Organization of America (ZOA), CAMERA, The National Jewish Coalition 
(NJC), and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA).
164
  
In addition to being targeted for defamation by the Israeli lobby, the fact that most Arab-
Americans and their leaders ―detest and oppose‖ U.S. support of authoritarian regimes in the 
Middle East placed them in the past ―at a distinct disadvantage in dealing with the White House 
and Congress. Arab Americans often [found] themselves in an adversarial position vis-à-vis the 
U.S. government in marked contrast to the cordial relations enjoyed by Jewish Americans.‖165 
During the 1970s U.S. Presidents Ford and Carter often refused to meet Arab-American groups, 
and when they did meet with them, discussion of central issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian 
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conflict were always avoided.
166
 On the other hand, Jewish-American groups have their own 
liaison in the White House, whose job is to coordinate similar meetings.
167
 Additionally, ―in 
contrast to letters or meetings with other American domestic pressure groups, correspondence 
and meetings with Arab Americans and Arab American organizations are not in the public 
liaison files, but in…[the National Security Council] files and are dealt with by that office.‖168  
Following the first Persian Gulf War, President Clinton met with leaders of Arab-
American organizations more often than his predecessors, which showed ―recognition of the 
increased participation and impact of Arab American organizations.‖169 During the 2000 
presidential elections, Muslim/Arab-Americans also ―made their first major political mark in 
what turned out to be the closest presidential race in American history,‖ with a bloc vote for 
President Bush.
170
 However, such activism did not ―necessarily translate into impact on foreign 
policy,‖ as the 9/11 attacks and the passage of the U.S. PATRIOT ACT have made their efforts 
harder to undertake, ―just as they were becoming more active and involved.‖171  
 At the same time, a multiplicity of U.S. research institutes, think tanks, and associations 
passively advocate for the Palestinians‘ right to self-determination and the implementation of 
UNSC resolution 242. They include The Institute for Palestine Studies, The Middle East Policy 
Council, The Institute for Research: Middle Eastern Policy (IRMEP), The Association of Arab 
American University Graduates (AAUG), and The Middle East Institute. Additionally, The 
National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations (NCUSAR) attempts to create understanding of the 
Arab world and its culture through organizing a Model Arab League event for High School 
students in fifteen cities around the U.S., and an annual Policy Makers Conference in 
Washington, D.C. However, the activities of those organizations have not been focused on 
lobbying Congress or trying to affect the making foreign policy in Washington. 
 The most effective role played by such groups is channeling humanitarian aid to the 
Palestinian Territories. A variety of NGOs in Washington, D.C. deliver USAID assistance to 
Palestinians in Gaza Strip, West Bank, East Jerusalem, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Those 
include the American Near East Refugee Aid (ANERA), Islamic Relief, The Associate for Rural 
Development (ARD), and Tomorrow‘s Youth (TYO). Humanitarian assistance to the 
Palestinians is also channeled through Churches of other Christian denominations and 
community activist groups in the U.S. such as The Palestine Aid Society, United Holy Land 
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Fund, The Quakers, American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), ―the highly effective‖ 
Palestine Human Rights Campaign (PHRC), and Sabeel - the ―ecumenical grassroots 
organization.‖172  
 
This chapter has provided a theoretical and empirical illustration of the function and influence of 
pro-Israel interest groups in the U.S., with the goal of better explaining how those groups have 
undermined U.S. role as the facilitator of the Peace Process. Their clout overrides all other U.S. 
domestic groups on issues relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by manipulating 
congressional and presidential elections to their advantage, and rallying a wide-ranging national 
consensus for their unwavering support of Israel. Giving this, next chapter follows the progress 
of the Peace Process from early 1990s-2000; investigates the reactions and influence of such pro-
Israel U.S. domestic forces to/over the Peace Process; and points out the effects of Israeli 
domestic politics and Palestinian militant groups on issues relating to the Peace Process. 
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Chapter Two 
Active Involvement 
 
I. Planting the Seeds of the Middle East Peace Process  
After the first Gulf War, the Madrid Peace Conference of October 30, 1991 brought Arab 
and Israeli diplomats in one room for the first time. Self-governance for Palestinians in Gaza 
Strip and the West Bank was one of the main issues that delegates to that conference discussed in 
many rounds of negotiations held over the following two years. At the same time, fourteen 
rounds of secret negotiations between the Israeli Labor Party and the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) were carried out in Oslo. Once this second track of negotiations proof ruled, 
the Oslo I agreement (The Declaration of Principles) was signed in 1993 between the Israeli 
Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, and the PLO Chairman, Yasser Arafat, at the White House. 
An assertive U.S. executive attitude in the face of staunch opposition from ―Israel‘s 
friends in Congress‖173 was a necessity for starting the snow-ball effect of the Peace Process. It is 
the reason why Arafat stated in 1991: ―We have full confidence; we trust them [the U.S.] as an 
honest broker...‖174 The first Bush administration launched in 1989 the PLO-U.S. talks in 
Tunisia, where it became evident that the PLO was ―firmly committed to the peace process,‖ and 
that it renounced violence.
175
 In reaction to those U.S.-PLO talks, the Senate ―attempted to force 
on the Bush administration an amendment introduced by [Senator] Jesse Helms…and strongly 
backed by AIPAC and B'nai B'rith International that would have barred the U.S. from talking 
with any PLO official unless the administration could certify he had never been associated with 
terrorism.‖176  
Following AIPAC‘s attempt during the 1984 North Carolina senatorial campaign to 
unseat Jesse Helms, when AIPAC‘s PACs ―poured so much money into the campaign of Helms 
Democratic rival‖ to the extent that that campaign became ―the most expensive up to that time in 
Senate history,‖ Jesse Helms became ―determined never to risk AIPAC targeting again.‖177 
However, responding to demands from President Bush, ―a less restrictive measure was 
passed‖178 and S.763 bill required the State Department to report to Congress ―the extent of 
compliance by the PLO with its commitments to stop terrorist activities and to recognize Israel‘s 
right to exist.‖179  
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At the same time, in June, 1989 AIPAC ―elicited a letter from 95 senators endorsing 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's election proposal, even though Shamir had threatened to arrest 
any [Israeli] candidate who supported the PLO.‖180 While addressing ―Israel‘s friends in 
Congress,‖ then-Shamir‘s Deputy Foreign Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, pleaded: ―You have to 
‗tough it out‘ in the fight against the PLO…We need your help.‘‖181 When such attempts did not 
succeed in thwarting U.S.-PLO dialogue, congressional sanctions on the PLO were imposed in 
response to its application in 1989 for full membership of Palestine at the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and UNESCO. This was iterated by S.Res.875 and H.Res.2145, which 
―prohibit U.S. contributions to the United Nations if full membership as a state is granted to any 
organization…[in reference to the PLO] that does not have the internationally recognized 
attributes of statehood.‖182  
 In another bold move with lasting impacts on U.S. role as the facilitator of the Peace 
Process, the House and Senate passed a resolution in 1990 stating that ―‗Jerusalem is and should 
remain the [undivided] capital of the state of Israel.‘‖183 Israel has annexed Eastern Jerusalem in 
June, 1967 and it continues to build settlements in that part of the city in defiance of international 
law, and the land-for-peace formula of UNSC R.242. At the negotiation table, the Palestinians 
insist on having East Jerusalem as the capital of their future state, and from the 1967 Arab-Israeli 
war until the passage of this Jerusalem resolution, U.S. official policy considered East Jerusalem 
an Occupied Territory. Thus, this resolution has had the effect of undermining U.S. ability to 
fairly mediate between the Israelis and the Palestinians before the Peace Process even picked up 
its momentum.    
  Furthermore, in response to the first Palestinian Intifada of December 1987, Congress 
continuously condemned Palestinian attacks on Israel while remaining ―indifferent‖184 to Israeli 
violence against Palestinian civilians. Ignoring or under-emphasizing the severity of the Israeli 
treatment of Palestinians became a recurring-theme of the way Congress has viewed the Conflict 
since the late 1980s. Between December, 1987 and December, 1995 1418 Palestinians were 
killed by the Israeli Army in the Occupied Territories,
185
 and no resolution form Congress was 
passed to condemn such Israeli actions. At the same time, in contrast to the legislative one-
sidedness, the executive branch of the Bush administration demanded from the Israeli 
government a total freeze of its settlements building in the West Bank, before the U.S. 
considered an Israeli request in 1991 for $10 billion in loan guarantees.  
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 President Bush Sr. worried that Israel would use the loan guarantees to build more 
settlements in Gaza Strip and West Bank, thereby undermining his administration‘s sponsorship 
of the on-going peace negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. He famously said in 
September 1991, ―‗There are 1,000 lobbyists up on the Hill [for the loan guarantees] and I‘m 
only one little guy down here.‘‖186 When President Bush Sr. was asked if linking the loan 
guarantees to a settlement freeze was a smart strategy for his second-term presidential election 
campaign, he said: ―‗That is not the question, whether it is good 1992 politics. What is important 
is that we give this peace process a chance, and I don‘t care if I get one vote in next year‘s 
presidential election.‘‖187  
Reconciliation was only reached when the relatively moderate Labor Party of Yitzhak 
Rabin and Shimon Perez, which was carrying out the secret negotiations with the PLO in Oslo, 
won Israel‘s elections of June, 1992. H.R.5368 that gave Israel $10 billion in U.S. loan 
guarantees was passed and sent to the president for signing ―in the closing rush by both houses‖ 
of the 102
nd
 Congress (1991-1992).
188
 While the U.S. government could not monitor where Israel 
would spend those loan-guarantees, and while the Bush-Rabin terms of agreement still allowed 
Israel to complete the building of settlements under construction as well as their natural growth, 
the agreement stipulated that ―every dollar spent on settlements in the occupied territories 
(including East Jerusalem) after October 199[2] will be subject to deduction from the U.S. 
government-guaranteed loans.‖189 Those were given to Israel over a period of five years in $2 
billion installments, in addition to the annual $3 billion in direct U.S. aid that Israel receives.  
As Richard H. Curtiss points out, it was President Bush‘s pressure on Israel with regards 
to the settlements that made Israel participate in the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991, brought 
down the hard-line Likud government of Shamir, and helped bring back the Labor Party to 
power after 15 years of Likud rule (1977-1992).
190
 President Bush‘s conditions on the Israeli 
request for loan-guarantees in the face of congressional opposition, while the secret negotiations 
between the PLO and Israel‘s Labor Party were taking place in Oslo, has planted the seeds of the 
Peace Process and the hopes for mutuality in U.S. ability to mediate between the Israelis and the 
Palestinians. With the relative absence of such assertiveness and diplomatic maneuvering during 
the following three U.S. presidencies, the Israeli lobby has always been successful at defining the 
nature of U.S. involvement in the Peace Process. 
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II. The Peace Process and the Clinton Administration (1993-2000) 
 President Bush Sr. was not elected for a second term, despite the breakthrough that he 
accomplished in starting the Middle East Peace Process, and despite the major victory that his 
presidency achieved in leading an international coalition against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
The former Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, remarked soon after the 1992 U.S. 
presidential elections ―that Bush‘s defeat had put an end to American policies aimed at returning 
Israel to the pre-1967 line.‖191 Such words resonate with sounding clarity even 20 years later. At 
the minimum, the result of the 1992 elections drew a line-in-the-sand with regards to applying 
U.S. economic pressure on Israel—regardless of how much such pressure did in fact contribute 
to Bush Sr.‘s defeat. His defeat strengthened any pre-existing ―myths‖ about the power of the 
Israeli lobby.  
Not only did presidential candidate William Clinton publicly criticize Bush‘s approach to 
the Israeli loan-guarantees issue during the 1992 presidential elections, but he also vowed: ―If I 
ever let Israel down, God would never forgive me…I‘ll never let Israel down.‖192 Exit polls 
showed that 85 percent of Jewish-Americans voted for him in the 1992 presidential elections, 
and Clinton became the first incumbent U.S. president to ever speak at an AIPAC convention.
193
 
According to Tony Smith, around 60 percent of the money that Bill Clinton received for his 
campaign during the 1992 primary race came from Jewish groups and individuals.
194
 
Additionally, most of the ―friends of Israel…, who played pivotal media and funding roles‖ in 
Clinton‘s 1992 campaign were kept on board for his 1996 campaign, when Clinton spent $40-
$45 million, most of which was raised from private sources.
195
 The majority of those aids ―were 
strong supporters of the ―not-one-inch of land for peace‖ policies of Likud Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Shamir.‖196   
During his presidential elections, Bill Clinton did not only criticize Bush Sr.‘s pressure 
on Israel, but he also vowed to be more ―anti-Palestinian‖ than his predecessor. At the Sheraton 
Carlton Hotel Clinton told an audience of the Jewish Leadership Council on June 30, 1992 that 
―The Palestinians should have the right…to participate in the determination of their own future, 
but they do not have the right to determine Israel‘s future. And for that reason, I oppose the 
creation of an independent Palestinian state.‖197 This was also the 1992 campaign promise of 
former president George H.W. Bush, who said at the 1992 convention of the Jewish-American 
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B‘nai B‘rith organization, ―I still oppose a Palestinian state. I‘ve been consistent on that for a 
long, long time.‖ However, in contrast to Clinton‘s statement, Bush still added that he thought 
―the framework lies in successful step-by-step progress on these negotiations,‖198 while 
demonstrating during his first term the kind of pressure that is needed to facilitate them. During 
the Clinton administration there was no longer any pressure on Israel‘s expansion of settlements, 
and while previous administrations considered East Jerusalem an occupied territory, Clinton‘s 
administration spokesmen referred to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as ―disputed – not 
occupied‖ land and they did not designate Jerusalem as even a disputed territory.199 
 
The Israeli Vision  
Yitzhak Rabin explained in an interview with Israeli TV reporter Nasim Mish'al on Sept. 
6, 1995 that ―There is an ideological conflict between Greater Israel and a Jewish State that does 
not want to rule over another people, which means an agreement to create a Palestinian entity,‖ 
according to Rabin, would lead to ―something less than a state‖ that lives in peace with Israel.200 
Thus, even from the start of the Peace Process, Israel‘s goal was not establishing an independent 
and viable Palestinian state living in peace and harmony along its borders, but establishing a self-
governing entity that would not have its own independence. Giving the power asymmetry 
between Israel and the Palestinians, and the lack of pressure from the peace broker, it should not 
be surprising that this is the vision that eventually prevailed.  
Despite the signing of the Oslo agreement with the PLO in 1993, Rabin‘s government, as 
well as the governments of his successors, Shimon Peres, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Ehud Barak, 
carried out settlements building in the occupied territories.
201
 During his seven months in office, 
Shimon Peres ―continued lavish spending on Jewish West Bank Settlements and networks of by-
pass roads…[that] isolate West Bank Palestinian towns and villages from Jerusalem and from 
Each other.‖202 Additionally, from the beginning of Netanyahu‘s first term as Israel‘s Prime 
Minister (1996-1999), the Israeli government focused its settlement activities on East Jerusalem, 
while confiscating additional land from neighboring Palestinian towns of Bethlehem, Beith 
Sahour, Beit Jala and Um Tuba, to build the new settlement of Har Homa on Jabal Abu 
Ghneim.
203
 Between 1993-2000, the settler population in Gaza Strip and the West Bank reached 
380,000, which was a 72 percent increase over the pre-Oslo level.
204
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Instead of pressuring Israel to stop building settlements or attempting to enforce existing 
measures against building them, the Clinton administration even subsidized their construction. 
Building on State Department estimates, which indicated that Israel spent $437 million on 
settlements in 1993, and $311.8 in 1994, President Clinton reduced the loan guarantees to Israel 
for 1994 and 1995 accordingly.
205
 However, he ―arbitrarily added‖ $500 million to the $3 billion 
that Israel received in direct aid in 1994, while his administration was undergoing major budget 
cuts.
206
 Similarly, in 1995 ―U.S. investigators concluded that Israel had spent $300 million on 
Jewish settlements and provisions were made to deduct that amount from Israel‘s $2 billion in 
U.S. loan guarantees‖ for 1996.207 However, after the signing of Oslo II (The Interim 
Agreement) in 1995 President Clinton promised Israel $240 million, ―to facilitate the withdrawal 
of its troops‖ from parts of the West Bank.‖208 Responding to such generosity, the Rabin 
government authorized the construction of 1,833 housing units in the West Bank in 1994, and 
3,230 more in 1995.
209
  
In other words, as the Palestinian entity was being established under President Clinton‘s 
sponsorship, his administration was subsidizing the building of settlements on other parts of the 
Wes Bank, thereby enforcing the Israeli vision of limiting Palestinian self-governance to a sub-
administrative entity that takes charge of Palestinian civil affairs, while being militarily 
controlled by Israel. For FY‘1998, Congress also added $460 million in military aid to Israel in 
addition to the $3.1 billion Israel received in economic and military aid for that year, just as the 
last installment of $2 billion in loan guarantees was given to Israel in 1997.
210
  
With U.S. taxpayers‘ money Rabin launched the Sheves Plan, ―which cleverly obscures 
in ‗development‘ terminology plans for the construction of settlements, both government and 
private, and highways to serve them.‖211 However, if concealing the plans for building those 
settlements made it easier for Rabin to deal with international public opinion, he could not make 
the visionaries of Greater Israel among his electorate approve of his subtle art of diplomacy. 
Rabin was assassinated by a right-wing Israeli citizen at a peace rally soon after the signing of 
Oslo II Interim Agreement on September 28, 1995.  
At the same time, increased Palestinian suicide bombings in Israel in mid 1990s 
―precipitated a growing shift to the right in Israel,‖212 and indicated that the dreamers of Greater 
Palestine within the Palestinian population would become yet another obstacle. If the Israeli 
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version of the Peace Process aimed at creating a Palestinian entity, ―something less than a state,‖ 
the dreamers of Greater Palestine functioned as the best allies of their Israeli counter parts, the 
dreamers of Greater Israel, in making the Peace Process fail at creating even a functioning 
Palestinian entity. As Rabin himself pointed out in the above-highlighted 1995 interview, the 
extremists from both sides ―like to gloat over spilled blood. They do not condemn murderers, but 
instead help them attain their political goal.‖213 The political goal of extremists from both sides 
has been to bring down the Peace Process. 
 
Palestinian Domestic Politics 
After Rabin‘s assassination, Israel stopped to facilitate Arafat‘s efforts to stop the attacks 
by Hamas and other groups such as Islamic Jihad against Israeli targets. In one occasion, after 
Arafat reached an agreement with Hamas prior to the Palestinian elections of 1996 to suspend 
Hamas‘s attacks on Israel, Shimon Peres responded by assassinating one of Hamas‘ top leaders, 
Yahya Ayyash, which sabotaged Hamas-PLO dialogue that ―could have eventually developed 
into an agreement.‖214  Rabin‘s assassination made Perez afraid for his own life and prevented 
him from carrying out the Oslo Accords‘ provisions for security cooperation between the two 
sides.  
Furthermore, when Rabin‘s assassination led to four suicide bombings in Israel that killed 
63 innocent Israelis, Israel imposed a closure on the Gaza Strip. By 1996, the unemployment rate 
in the Palestinian territories reached 60 percent in Gaza Strip and 50 percent in the West Bank, 
largely due to ―ongoing closure – the sealing off of the territories.‖215 As Palestinian suicide 
bombings facilitated the winning of extremist Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel‘s 1996 elections, 
Israeli policies of closing down the Palestinian territories, and collaterally punishing the 
Palestinians, precipitated a growing resentment of the moderate Palestinian Authority within the 
Palestinian territories. Rather than being a state-building entity with the primary responsibility of 
improving the living standards of its constituents, during the second half of the 1990s, the PA 
became a tool for controlling the different Palestinian factions, while Hamas‘s social services 
became ―the only source of aid for many Palestinians.‖216  
Averaged polls conducted by the Center for Palestine Research and Studies (CPRS) from 
September, 1993 to December, 1994 on public support of the different political factions within 
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the Palestinian population indicated that Arafat‘s Fatah enjoyed a 41% support, while Hamas 
enjoyed 14.1% support.
217
 However, the PA‘s crackdown on religious extremists in Gaza Strip 
and the West Bank, while Israel was collaterally punishing the Palestinian population every time 
there was an attack in Israel, became increasingly seen by the Palestinians as an appeasement to 
the ―enemy.‖ Nine Palestinians were killed on the hands of PA forces from 1994-1996, either 
due to being tortured by interrogators, or as a result of fatal shootings against Palestinian 
demonstrators.
218
 In effect, this increased the Palestinians‘ sympathy for extremist groups and by 
December, 1997 Hamas enjoyed an increasing 35% support within the Palestinian territories.
219
 
The PA became caught between its constituents‘ disapproval of its focus on containing 
the different Islamic groups, while not working enough to improve their living conditions, and 
Netanyahu‘s insistence that it wasn‘t doing enough to stop terrorist attacks against Israel, while 
further undermining the terms of the Oslo agreement by building more settlements. As explained 
Yediot Ahronot’s reporter, Roni Shaked, Netanyahu demanded ―peace for peace,‖ while rejecting 
the land-for-peace formula of UN Resolution 242 and 338, which meant that ―the Palestinians 
would serve as a surrogate police force for Israel in the West Bank and Gaza, while Israel 
retained ultimate control.‖220 At the same time, through Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, 
the Clinton administration demanded that Arafat ―‗restrain Palestinians from further terrorist 
attacks,‘ [which] as The New York Times phrased it, showed little grasp of reality.‘‖221  
 
Benjamin Netanyahu’s First Term and the Peace Process 
By now, Oslo I agreement of 1993 (The Declaration of Principles) gave the Palestinians 
administrative and political control over Gaza City in the Gaza Strip and Jericho in the West 
Bank. Oslo II agreement of 1995 (The Interim Agreement) gave the Palestinian Authority a five-
year interim control over six more cities and 420 villages in Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and 
called for two additional Israeli withdrawals from the West Bank before the ―final status‖ 
negotiations were held five years later. However, after winning Israel‘s elections in 1996, 
Benjamin Netanyahu who ―vowed to give up ‗not one inch‘ of land for peace…,‖222 stated that 
―there would be no more territorial concessions. He also made it clear that the settlements that 
gradually are precluding such compromises would remain and expand,‖223 and during his 1996 
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electoral campaign he repeatedly said that ―the Palestinians will not have a state and will not 
have East Jerusalem as their capital.‖224  
Therefore, from his very first month as Israel‘s Prime Minister, Netanyahu took many 
steps that were aimed at thwarting the implementation of the Oslo Accords. He delayed for two 
years the implementation of Oslo II agreement, which divided the West Bank into three areas: 
area (A) under complete Palestinian control, area (B) under mixed Palestinian-Israeli 
administration, and area (C) under Israeli control (See Index-Ch.2 for Map). To gradually 
transfer the parts under Israeli control to the PA, this agreement called for two additional 
withdrawals (three in total) from the West Bank, aimed at increasing the size of Area (A), while 
decreasing the size of Area (B) and Area (C). However, Netanyahu even obstructed the 
completion of the first withdrawal from 4 cities and 420 villages in Gaza Strip and the West 
Bank, by delaying an agreement on the status of the city of Hebron and starting the construction 
of the Har Homa settlement in East Jerusalem. 
Meanwhile, in his book Fighting Terrorism, Netanyahu explains that Israel‘s ―war on 
terror‖ would ―continue into the indefinite future,‖225 without acknowledging the fact that his 
own vision of Greater Israel is one of the main reasons behind all the terrorist attacks against 
Israel. If the PA was able to deliver better results from the Peace Process to its own constituents, 
their support of Hamas and other radical groups would not have been on the rise. The PA‘s 
crackdown on those groups would have been seen by the Palestinian population as a necessity 
for improving their collective living standers. Poverty and economic hardships encourage 
radicalism. As David Hirst of the Guardian remarked in 1996, ―‗For Israel and the U.S. the ‗war 
on terror‘ is but a way of transferring the Arab-Israeli struggle from the moral and political 
grounds on which it probably belong to security ones.‘‖226  
However, the growing impatience of the Clinton Administration with Benjamin 
Netanyahu, because of i.e. his plans to build the new settlement of Har Homa, resulted in more 
―balanced‖ statements from Secretary of State Madeline Albright and more concrete steps by the 
Clinton administration to carry on the Peace Process. This made Netanyahu‘s rhetoric about 
Israel‘s ―war on terror‖ independent from official U.S. policy during the 1990s. In 1997 
Madeleine Albright denounced in a speech to Israeli high school students Netanyahu‘s settlement 
policies as ―provocative,‖ and urged the Israelis to take a ―time out‖ from expanding 
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settlement.
227
 Even though this ―suggest[ed] that Israel might resume what international law 
regards as an illegal activity when the time is right,‖ Netanyahu‘s spokesman, David Bar-Ilan, 
―immediately rejected her plea…[by] saying, ―‗We cannot freeze settlements any more than we 
can freeze life.‘‖228  
At the same time, under mounting diplomatic pressure from the Clinton Administration 
in 1998, which included a threat of ―going public‖229 with an American ―Peacemaking Package,‖ 
which ran counter to congressional demands of refraining from pressuring Bibi, Netanyahu and 
Arafat signed an agreement at Wye River in 1998 for a second Israeli withdrawal. The resulting 
Wye River Memorandum called for ―increasing the West Bank area under complete Palestinian 
control (Area A) from about 3 percent to almost 18 percent,‖ and reducing the area under joint 
Israeli-Palestinian control (Area B) from 27 percent to 25 percent, ―of which 3 percent [would] 
be a ‗nature reserve‘ which can be used by neither side.‖230  
The Wye Memorandum also called for opening a Palestinian airport in Gaza Strip; 
building an industrial zone on the Israeli-Palestinian border; opening two routes for ―safe 
passage‖ of the Palestinians between Gaza Strip and the West Bank; and releasing 750 of the 
more than 3,000 Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails.
231
 On the Palestinians side, the PA 
agreed ―to arrest and try 29 of 30 Palestinians the Israelis accuse of attacking Israeli citizens, to 
reduce the various Palestinian military and police forces; to confiscate excess arms in 
Palestinian-controlled areas, and to convene a meeting to rescind clauses in the Palestinian 
National Covenant calling for the destruction of Israel.‖232 Further, Clinton agreed on having the 
CIA as the verifier of the Palestinians‘ and the Israelis‘ commitments to the implementation of 
this Memorandum.
233
 Arafat also succeeded in keeping the bargaining chip of unilaterally 
declaring a Palestinian state on May 4, 1999 (five years after the establishment of the PA), if the 
frameworks for a third Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the ―final status negotiations‖ 
were not agreed upon by that date.  
However, Netanyahu‘s government withdrew from only two additional percent of land 
and released 250 prisoners instead of 750.
234
 Additionally, following an attack on a car 
transporting an Israeli soldier by a group of ―angry teenagers,‖ Netanyahu called the incident a 
―lynching‖ and ―immediately cancelled all further implementation of the peace accords,‖ even 
though the soldier survived the attack.
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 Moreover, he unilaterally added three conditions to the 
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agreement: ―that the Palestinians must (1) stop asking for the release of prisoners, (2) stop 
inciting violence, and (3) stop preparation for declaring statehood on May 4
th.‖236 
Further, responding to the call: ―take over the hills of the West Bank before it is too late,‖  
by then-Netanyahu‘s Foreign Minister, Ariel Sharon; land-grabs by Israeli settlers intensified, 
adding to the fact that Israeli settlement constructions after the signing of Oslo I agreement in 
1993 increased by 40%.
237
 Sharon also announced that if the Palestinians declared a state on May 
4, 1999 Israel would annex parts of the West Bank.
238
 On the other hand, the Clinton 
administration watched with passivity, and measures such as placing economic restrictions on 
Israel to force its adherence to the Oslo Accords and the Wye River Memorandum were not 
contemplated by the Clinton administrative officials. 
Instead, on the eve of a PLO Council meeting in Gaza City to decide on what to do on 
May 4
th
, a letter from Bill Clinton prompted the Palestinian leadership to postpone their 
anticipated declaration of a Palestinian state, gave a U.S. pledge ―to support the Palestinians‘ will 
to ‗determine their future as a free people on their land;‖ and called for ―the renewal of 
negotiations for a final settlement ‗in accelerated mode,‘ the implementation of previously 
signed agreements, and the cessation of unilateral acts including a Palestinian declaration of state 
and Jewish settlement building.‖239 This letter served ―to fill the legal vacuum left at the end of 
the interim agreement on May 4,‖ which would have made the PA left with a constitutional 
vacuum as its interim five-year autonomy expired.
240
 However, while reaching such a deadline 
was only postponed, the chaos at the end of the tunnel might have been the intended policy of 
Netanyahu‘s government.  
 
The “Final Status” Negotiations and the Second Intifada 
At the same time, since the Clinton administration‘s diplomatic pressure on Benjamin 
Netanyahu yielded very few results, once Ehud Barak from the Labor Party won the Israeli 
elections of May 17, 1999 the Clinton administration ―decided that the United State would no 
longer act as [a] mediator in peace talks but as a ‗friendly observer.‘‖241 This also had a lot to do 
with domestic U.S. political considerations. According to professor of government and foreign 
affairs at the University of Virginia, William B. Quandt, from the start of the Oslo Accords the 
Clinton Administration was in a state of ―permanent campaign‖ and at this juncture, this 
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campaign was ―working on behalf of Vice President Al Gore‘s presidential run and Hillary 
Clinton‘s Senate bid in New York.‖242 Thus, if winning a second term during the 1996 elections 
gave President Clinton the flexibility to pressure Netanyahu regarding the Wye River 
Memorandum of 1998, the closing-in of the next election cycle made his administration more 
careful regarding its policies towards Israel.    
In effect, not only did Barak try to further suspend the implementation of Wye River 
Memorandum, but he also attempted to postpone carrying out a third Israeli withdrawal from the 
West Bank until after the ―final status‖ negotiations took place. However, he eventually yielded 
to the Palestinians‘ inflexibility, giving the fact that a unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state 
based on the 1967 borders would have isolated Israel, and made Israeli settlements in the West 
bank further exposed as illegal under international law.  
When the PA accused Barak of ―breaching the trust,‖ he carried out the second 
withdrawal that was called for at Wye River from an additional 5% of West Bank territory (still 
6% short of the 13 percent promised at Wye).
243
 Further, the ―safe passage‖ between Gaza Strip 
and the West Bank was opened in August, 1999 and building a seaport on Gaza beach began a 
few months thereafter. Furthermore, with Madeline Albright present as a ―witness,‖ an 
agreement was signed between Arafat and Barak for a third withdrawal from an additional 11% 
of the West Bank, the release of an additional 350 Palestinians, and the start of the ―final status‖ 
negotiations in February 2000.
244
 
At the same time, the Camp David Summit where those negotiations took place did not 
come about until July, 2000. Adding to the atmosphere of distrust between the parties prior to 
that summit, Barak strengthened the Israeli possession of more than 50% of the West Bank by 
approving the settlers‘ confiscation of yet more Palestinian land. According to the PLO Map 
Center, the rate of settlement expansion in the West Bank under Barak‘s government surpassed 
that of Netanyahu‘s.245 Moreover, Barak carried out the ―E1-Plan‖ for constructing ―inter-
connecting by-pass roads‖ between Jewish settlements in the West Bank, such as Rout 45 that 
runs in the shape of a ring around Jerusalem.
246
  
As one of Rabin‘s official spokesmen highlighted soon before the signing of Oslo II 
agreement, Israel‘s policy has always been that of ―‗enlarging and strengthening some existing 
settlements [to] make it easier to argue that they should be retained‘ as the so-called peace 
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process [took] shape.‖247 Barak‘s expansion of those settlements and his building of 
interconnecting roads between them only signaled that his government pursued the same policies 
of Rabin as well as those of Netanyahu‘s. Furthermore, just before leaving for the Camp David 
Summit,‖ reports Victor Ostrovsky, ―Barak said ‗It is my main goal in these upcoming 
negotiations to guarantee the safety of the citizens of the state of Israel, while keeping within the 
red-lines this government has marked for itself.‖ For Barak, those ―red lines‖ were: ―separation 
between the Palestinians and Israelis, refusal to return to the 1967 borders, a unified Jerusalem 
under Israeli Jurisdiction, and a refusal to accept responsibility in the matter of the [Palestinian] 
refugees.‖248  
Afif Safih, Former head of PLO delegation in Washington, reports that in contrast to the 
Israeli and American narrative of a ―generous offer‖ that Israel had allegedly presented the 
Palestinians at Camp David, Barak offered them only close to 85% of the West Bank and in an 
op-ed piece in New York Times he ―explicitly stated that Israel should keep fifteen percent of 
Judea and Samaria, plus a security zone in the Jordan Valley.‖249 Thus, giving the fact that 
signing the Camp David offer would have divided the West Bank into three separate ―cantons;‖ 
left the Palestinians with no sovereignty over East Jerusalem and no control over their borders; 
and would have not allowed for the return of Palestinian refugees to their homes nor provided for 
their compensation; the Palestinians rejected the offer. The difference between what was offered 
and what the Palestinians demanded is the same as that between an ―entity‖ and a ―state,‖ and the 
Palestinians refused to accept any offer that does not give them the viability, sovereignty, and 
independence of a state. 
A few months after the summit, the second Palestinian Intifada also broke out, in 
declaration of the Palestinian population‘s rejection of the status quo. For Afif Safieh this 
uprising was the collective result of: (1) the subjection of the Palestinians to ―fifty-three years of 
diasporisation and thirty-four years of endless occupation…the longest military occupation in 
modern history, with humiliation and harassment of an entire people on a daily basis;‖ (2) the 
failure of the peace process to deliver concrete results that would grant the Palestinians 
independence and sovereignty in a separate state; (3) the ―failed nature and the content of the 
Camp David talks‖ of July 2000, and the provocative visit of Ariel Sharon to Al Aqsa Mosque in 
Jerusalem on September 28, 2000 with 1000 armed security guards.
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In 1996, Congressman James Moran (D-VA) openly questioned U.S. aid to Israel at the 
House International Relations Committee by pointing out that the U.S. has ―substantial leverage 
with Israel.‖ Moran argued ―There is that $3 billion a year we give her. We have the 
responsibility to use the leverage to further the peace process…We are more than a disinterested, 
passive observer.‖251 However, such rare remarks in U.S. Congress were ignored. The 1996 level 
of U.S. aid to Israel amounted to ―$1,000 for every Israeli man, woman and child. Every Israeli 
family of five, therefore, receive[d] the equivalent of $5,000 U.S. dollar in aid per year – every 
year. This is more than the average amount received by U.S. citizens on welfare, who represent 
small portion of the total U.S. population, but generate a great deal of political heat,‖252 yet the 
U.S. never used such economic leverage as a tool for pressuring Israel in the Peace Process. 
From 1949–2000, total U.S. economic and military aid to Israel reached $91,816,507,200 
(not including the amounts incurred by U.S. tax payers in interest on this sum), while U.S. aid to 
all of the sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean counties combined reach 
64,127,500,000 by 1997.
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 Based on an agreement that was signed between Benjamin 
Netanyahu and Bill Clinton in 1999, U.S. aid to Israel was reduced by $120 million in economic 
aid starting in FY‘2000 and for every year thereafter for nine years until it reached zero.254 
However, starting in FY‘2000, U.S. military aid for Israel became ―slated to increase every year 
by $60 million‖ so that by 2010 U.S. annual military aid to Israel would reach a total of $2.4 
billion annually –not including any extras from Pentagon‘s budget.255 
 As Richard Curtiss argues, since the U.S. never tied the actual U.S. aid to Israel to 
Israel‘s performance on the negotiation table, ―in contrast to conditions it places on its aid to the 
Palestinians, this immense outlay by U.S. taxpayers actually hinders the peace process by 
encouraging Israeli intransigence.
256
 Such aid was never conditional since all U.S. aid is 
approved through Congress, where the Israeli lobby and its allies in the evangelical Christian 
community have the most leverage. At the same time, this still does mean that their influence on 
the executive is insignificant. 
 Based on a 1992 conversation between AIPAC‘s former president, David Steiner, and a 
potential AIPAC donor, AIPAC ―negotiated‖ with President Clinton the names of his appointees 
to the posts of Secretary of State, Foreign Policy Adviser, and National Security Adviser.
257
 
Steiner was forced to resign following this press-leak; however, just as that conversation 
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entailed, Martin Indyk who was a former AIPAC employee, ―was named National Security 
Council senior director for the Near East and South Africa and as a special assistant to the 
president.‖258 In the past, ―no one who had not been a U.S. citizen for at least 10 years could be 
named a Foreign Service officer,‖ but Indyk had been a U.S. citizen for nearly one month before 
being ―put in charge of White House Middle East policy.‖259 Further, Dennis Ross, who was 
―another former lobbyist for Israel,‖260 was appointed by the Clinton administration to the State 
Department as chief Middle East negotiator and Special Envoy to the region, which further 
explains why there has been little economic pressure on Israel during the Clinton administration.  
 
III. The Israeli Lobby and the Peace Process   
Following the election of Yitzhak Rabin as Israel‘s Prime Minister in June 1992, there 
was ―a major shakeup of both the board and staff‖ of AIPAC to accommodate the changing of 
government in Israel from the Likud to the Labor party. In particular, after Rabin ―made it clear 
he wanted AIPAC to concentrate on Congress and leave negotiating with Clinton to the Israeli 
government,‖ AIPAC‘s former president, vice president, and executive director were all forced 
to resign ―over different issues.‖261 However, Rabin remained unable ―to control many of the 
American Jewish organizations that are independent of Israeli government funding, and leaders 
of some of them had become vocal private and public critics of the peace process, and of Rabin‘s 
handling of it.‖262 Those organizations include the Zionist Organization of America, Americans 
for Safe Israel, the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress, B‘nai B‘rith, 
and ―most other components of the 50-member Conference of Presidents of Major American 
Jewish Organizations.‖263  
Jewish-American critics of Rabin‘s peace camp were particularly supported by ―fax 
attacks sent by Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu to members of the U.S. Congress;‖ however, 
countermeasures were still expressed in newspaper advertisements by i.e. 1,000 Rabbis on 
September, 1995 agreeing that ―the Peace Process must continue,‖ and calling upon members of 
Congress ―to renew the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act (MEPFA).‘‖264 MEPFA was passed 
on April 30, 1994 and it authorizes the U.S. government to provide the Palestinian Authority 
with $500 million in aid over the second half of 1990s.  This bill was introduced by AIPAC‘s 
friend in Congress, Jesse Helms, and it was supported by Rabin‘s successor, Shimon Peres, who 
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told members of Congress during his December 12, 1995 visit to the U.S. that ―aid to the 
Palestinians ‗is not only important for the peace but for the future.‘‖265 U.S. aid to the Palestinian 
Authority, and the creation of the PA itself, has relieved Israel from having to administer the 
Palestinian territories by itself.   
On the other hand, once the Likud party in Israel regained power with the election of 
Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996, AIPAC went back to supporting Israel‘s hard-line policies that call 
for making no concessions to the Palestinians. Former Foreign Service officer, Eugene Bird, 
notes that ―in contrast to the appearance of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin‖ at the AIPAC 
annual conference of 1995, ―which was followed by a floor fight over the Peace Process; 
Netanyahu swept the delegates‖ to AIPAC‘s 1997 conference ―to their feet repeatedly.‖266 At the 
same time, polls conducted by The Israeli Policy Forum indicate that by 1997 ―70 percent of 
[American] Jews express[ed] strong support for the Oslo accords,‘‖ despite the majority of 
Jewish-American organizations‘ endorsement of Netanyahu‘s attempts to undermine the Peace 
Process.
267
  
With the help of the Israeli lobby, many resolutions and congressional statements in 
reference to the Peace Process were passed/made during the 103
rd
-106
th 
sessions of Congress 
(1993-2000), some of which have had lasting impacts on U.S. handling of the Peace Process. 
During the 103
rd
 Congress (1993-1994), when AIPAC was undergoing major transformation to 
support Rabin‘s government, those resolutions included concurrent268 S.Res.43, which expressed 
―the sense of the Congress concerning the historic opportunity for peace in the Middle East;‖ 
S.CON.Res.50 and S.RES.184, which condemned the massacre in Hebron—where an American-
born settler, Baruch Goldstein, killed 29 Muslim men and boys at prayer in February 1994—and 
urged ―all parties in the Middle East Peace Process to renew energy to achieve a just peace;‖ and 
Senate Amendment 1538 that expressed ―the sense of the Congress concerning United Nations 
resolutions on Jerusalem.‖269  
In reaction to a 1994 UNSC resolution that described East Jerusalem as an ―occupied 
territory,‖ then-U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Madeline Albright, expressed in a letter to her 
colleagues the U.S. government‘s ―belie[f] that resolution language referring to [final status] 
issues should be dropped, since these issues are now under negotiation by the parties 
themselves.‖270 These issues include the status of Palestinian refugees, the settlements, and the 
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territorial sovereignty and status of Jerusalem.
271
 Ian Williams argues that in effect, what 
Albright was asking for was ―that international law and the decisions of the United Nations be 
set aside so that the Israelis, from a position of strength, can force the Palestinians into agreeing 
to give up their rights.‖272 According to Phyllis Bennis, despite the admittance of the PLO as a 
U.N. observer in early 1990s, the U.S. succeeded ―at keeping the U.N. out of the peace process 
in the region,‖273 by vetoing UNSC resolutions critical of Israeli actions in the occupied 
territories, and making the UN role limited to providing humanitarian assistance to Palestinians 
under occupation. Further, while Albright argued that issues such as Jerusalem should be left for 
the parties to negotiate, U.S. Congress was attempting to enforce new facts on the ground as it 
was urging Clinton to recognize United Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.  
In August 1994, four members of Congress, including Rep. Newt Gingrich, sent a letter 
to President Clinton calling for Jerusalem to remain the united capital of Israel, which supported 
a Senate amendment that ―prohibits any new U.S. offices or official meetings in Jerusalem to 
deal with the Palestinian Authority and calls upon the administration to protect Jerusalem ‗from 
any Palestinian claim to the city.‘‖274 Another letter that was endorsed by 200 members of U.S. 
House of Representatives urged Clinton ―to use his influence to keep Palestinian Authority‘s 
Yasser Arafat from holding any official meetings in East Jerusalem.
275
 Thus, on May 17, 1995 
the Clinton administration used the first U.S. veto in five years against a UNSC resolution, which 
―suggested that…Israeli land confiscation in Jerusalem [should] be stopped.‖276  
During the 104
th
 Congress (1995-1996), the issue of Jerusalem was ever prominent due to 
Senator Robert Dole, who introduced the bills S.770 and S.1322 (The Jerusalem Embassy Act), 
which call for moving the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem by 1999 and authorizes 
$100 million for ―preliminary‖ spending.277 However, President Clinton signed the waiver for 
implementing this act, based on ―a compelling national interest.‖278 Lucille Barnes notes that 
―during his 40 years in Congress, Senator Dole somehow has avoided thoroughly prostituting 
himself to the Israel lobby. This is partly because it is not required for re-election in his home 
state of Kansans…‖279 But, his decision to run for U.S. presidency in 1996 made him try to 
mobilize the support of a powerful constituency (both Jewish and evangelical) that could play an 
important role in a presidential election.
280
 During the 104
th
 Congress, Dole also sponsored 
S.RES.69 that condemned suicide bombings in Israel, which was reiterated by Jesse Helms‘ 
S.RES.228.
281
  
  
45 
 
In the 105
th
 session of Congress (1997-1998), S.CON.RES.21 congratulated ―the 
residents of Jerusalem and the people of Israel on the thirtieth anniversary [since 1967] of the 
reunification of that historic city.‖282 Further, 14 letters were sent to the Clinton administration, 
signed by more than 140 Senators and Representatives, urging the White House ―not to 
participate in…[a] Gaza meeting to mobilize international pressure against Israel‘s decision to 
build‖ 6,500 housing units in the settlement of Har Homa in East Jerusalem.283  Representative 
Newt Gingrich even accused Arafat of being ―in coalition with ‗the forces of terrorism‘ and [of] 
waging an ‗information warfare campaign against Israel...‘ Regarding Har Homa, he said, ‗Let 
me be clear. Har Homa is not, as the media attempt to insist, a settlement. It is a Jewish 
neighborhood in the city Israel has chosen as her capital.‘‖284  
When the Clinton administration was attempting in 1998 to announce the American 
Peacemaking Package that laid out the frameworks for the Wye River Memorandum, ―Israel 
launched a full-scale public relations and lobbying blitz in March and April…and Netanyahu 
sent his foreign advisor, Uzi Arad, to lobby key congressmen to quietly pressure Clinton not to 
go public with the plan.‖285 Furthermore, ―he sent Israeli cabinet members and American Jewish 
Leaders to tell anyone who would listen that the administration was on a collision course with 
Israel.‖286 Therefore, on April 5, 1998 Senator Joseph Lieberman sent a letter to Clinton, signed 
by 81 Senators, claiming that ―Israel had kept the promises it made at Oslo, but that the 
Palestinians had not kept their security promises and that Arafat had refused to conclude 
negotiations on the remaining interim status issues.‖287 The letter also ―urged Clinton not to go 
public with ‗a peace proposal which is known to be unacceptable to Israel,‘‖ as it required 
additional Israeli withdrawals from the West Bank.
288
  
 In May, 1998 Senators Alfonse D‘Amato, Connie Mack, and Arlen Specter further 
criticized the White House through letters and public statements, while in practical terms they 
were only trying to please their campaign contributors (See Table 1 and Table 2 in Index-Ch.2). 
Mack reportedly said, ―we should not publicly pressure an ally to violate their own Security 
assessment.‖289 Additionally, in a letter that was signed by 236 Representatives and sent to 
President Clinton on May 6, U.S. Congress ―strongly [urged] Clinton not to pressure 
Netanyahu.‖290 Then-Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich, also held a press conference where 
he stated: ―‗now it‘s become the Clinton administration and Arafat against Israel,‘ and that as 
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Israel celebrates its 50
th
 anniversary, ‗the Clinton administration says, Happy Birthday. Let us 
blackmail you on behalf of Arafat.‘‖291  
Newt Gingrich even attempted during a May, 1998 AIPAC-sponsored congressional trip 
to Israel to ―visit the proposed site of the new U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem and participate in a 
cornerstone-laying ceremony.‖292 Additionally, thirteen Republican representatives wrote a letter 
to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in October, 1998 arguing against her demanding that 
―Israel should refrain from unilateral acts, including what Palestinians perceive as the 
provocative expansion of settlements, land confiscation, home demolitions and confiscations of 
IDs.‖293 As Rep. John Fox told the Jewish Telegraph Agency, ―‗the majority‘s role [in Congress 
was] to support Netanyahu and to support the protection of Israel from the [alleged] violence and 
arrogance of Arafat.‘‖294 However, in effect they were only making the U.S. lose its credibility 
as the facilitator of the Peace Process, as well as adding to the general atmosphere of distrust that 
led to the collapse of the Camp David Summit.   
At the same time, as that Summit was being delayed during the 106
th
 session of Congress 
(1999-2000), and discussions among the leaders of the Palestinian Authority were taking place 
with regards to making a unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state, ―Israel‘s friends in 
Congress‖ passed many resolutions and bills that were designed to condemn and punish the 
Palestinians‘ as well as their supporters. S.CON.RES.5 urged the President ―to assert clearly 
United States‘ opposition to a unilateral declaration of [Palestinian] statehood.‖295 Moreover, 
S.CON.RES.36 condemned ―the Palestinian efforts to revive the original Palestine Partition 
Plan‖ and it condemned the United Nations‘ Commission on Human Rights for its April 27, 
1999 resolution, which ―endorses Palestinian self-determination.‖296 S.Res.2938 of July 26, 2000 
also ―prohibit[s] the United States assistance to the Palestinian Authority if a Palestinian state is 
declared unilaterally.‖297  
Further, S.Res.3007 that became known as the ―Unilateral Palestinian Statehood 
Disapproval Act of 2000‖ calls for voting against Palestinian membership in the United Nations 
or other international organizations, as well as cutting economic assistant to a Palestinian state 
declared through the U.N. or any affiliated agency, ―except for humanitarian assistance and 
cooperation on security and antiterrorism matters.‖298 Furthermore, S.Res.3250 or the ―Peace 
Through Negotiations Act of 2000‖ provided for downgrading the status of PLO office in the 
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U.S. and withholding financial contributions to international organizations that recognize a 
unilaterally declared Palestinian state. 
299
 As stated earlier, the path-dependence of U.S. support 
of Israel is backed by the coercive political and economic power of the U.S. While Netanyahu 
has always wanted to prevent the creation of a Palestinian state through the Peace Process, the 
Israeli lobby in the U.S. has worked tirelessly to ensure that such a state would not be declared 
unilaterally; thereby enforcing the status quo that gives the Palestinians a sub-administrative 
entity lacking the viability and the independence of a state. 
Even more, in reaction to the breakout of the second Palestinian Intifada that rejected 
those dictations, the House of Representatives passed by a roll-call vote of 365-30 a resolution  
―expressing its solidarity with Israel, condemning the Palestinian leadership for encouraging the 
violence and doing little to stop it, and urging the administration to use its veto power to prevent 
the U.N. Security Council from passing ‗unbalanced‘ resolutions concerning the violence in the 
Palestinian territories.‖300 This was in reference to UNSC Res.1322, which condemned ―acts of 
violence, especially the excessive use of force by the Israeli forces against Palestinian civilians,‖ 
as well as the ―illegal‖ settlements.‖301 96 Senators also signed a letter to President Bill Clinton 
urging that he ―‗express solidarity with Israel at this critical moment…, condemn the Palestinian 
campaign of violence…, and stand with Israel in international arenas.‘‖302 
On the other hand, no condemnation was made in U.S. Congress of Israel‘s use of U.S.-
built Israeli gunships against the Palestinian demonstrators in Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
303
 
What resonates with a sounding clarity is an analogy made by Jewish-American Peace Activist, 
Rachelle Marshall, who stated in March 2001 that ―If a similar conflict were taking place in any 
other country, U.S. support would be expected to go to the freedom forces rather than the 
oppressor.‖304 If the U.S. helped arming the Libyan rebels when Qaddafi used similar tactics to 
those of Israel‘s to put down a popular uprising; is it legitimate to expect the same from the U.S., 
or at least something similar, in relation to the Palestinians‘ demands of ending the Israeli 
occupation of their land?  
 
Pro-Israel PACs Contributions 
The majority of the sponsors and cosponsors of resolutions by U.S. Congress in relation 
to the Peace Process during the 103
rd
-106
th
 sessions of Congress, as well as the signers of letters 
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sent to the Clinton Administrations, were Congress members who received campaign 
contributions from the network of pro-Israel PACs; such as Carl Levin, Jesse Helms, Dianne 
Feinstein, Richard Lugar, Arlen Specter, Robert Torricelli, Mitch McConnell and James Inhofe 
(See Table 2 in Index-Ch.2). Sponsoring or cosponsoring a resolution that favors Israel is a 
strategy of ―position taking‖ that signals the responsiveness of those Congress members to 
―attentive publics‖ such as the pro-Israel PACs.305 This in turn translates into more campaign 
contributions, which facilitate congressmen‘s re-election. As former representative Les AuCoin 
(D-OR) said in 1989, ―Something is systemically wrong with Congress today, and it‘s money, 
the pursuit of money, the endless pursuit of money, the virtual hourly pursuit of money, either to 
finance the perpetual campaign or to maintain a certain standard of living.‖306  
Based on data compiled by this author from the Washington Report’s bi-annual 
publications on pro-Israel PACs—compiled themselves from the Federal Election Commission‘s 
(FEC) quarterly reports—the top recipients of campaign contributions from pro-Israel PACs 
serve on key committees and subcommittees in the House and Senate, such as the Foreign 
Affairs, Foreign Relations, Appropriations, Defense, and Armed Services committees. 
Considerable portions of such contributions are also ―early elections money,‖ i.e. given as early 
as 1.5 years before elections, which ―help build war chests so huge that opponents [of those 
favored] are discouraged from running at all.‖307 Additionally, as illustrated in Table 1 in Index-
Ch.2, pro-Israel PACs have generally out-spent Arab/Muslim-American PACs by margins 
greater than 100%. 
Pro-Israel PACs usually favor incumbents rather than challengers and ―in cases where the 
challenger was Jewish and the incumbent was not, but had a pro-Israel [voting] record, most pro-
Israel PACs support the incumbent.‖308 This helps the pro-Israel lobby maintain a selected group 
of supporters in Congress that promotes its policies regarding the Middle East through 
introducing, sponsoring and cosponsoring resolutions. In particular, the policy path-dependence 
that this system creates makes U.S. policy of unconditionally supporting Israel harder to change, 
especially in terms of economic aid. Those campaign contributions help politicians and members 
of Congress build their political careers, and as such, they would only be expected to show 
loyalty. As James Zogby point out, ―when money and voters and winning elections are at stake, 
principles and understanding take a back seat to politics.‖ 309 
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 At the same time, following the signing of the Oslo agreement, all of the directors of pro-
Israel PACs complained ―about a lessening of interest among American Jews in supporting 
Israel…Some…believed the century-old dispute between [the] Israelis and [the] Palestinians was 
over. Others disapproved of any Israeli government that proposed to trade land for peace. For 
both reasons, donations declined.‖310 At least eleven pro-Israel PACs closed down in 1993 and 
1994 due to low contributions.
311
 As Table-1 in Index-Ch.2 also indicates, the totals raised by 
pro-Israel PACs in all election cycles are greater than the amount they raise from individual 
donations, which leaves PACs a reasonable sum ―to use for various other expenses such as 
travel, banquets and other social events, and mailouts soliciting more money;‖312 therefore, 
another reason behind those closures was rumors about the high salaries that PACs executives 
received. In 1992, Pro-Israel PACs raised $14,015,509, but donated only $3,963,007 to that 
election cycle, and for the following election cycles an average of only $5 million was raised.  
This was the case mostly due to a sharp decline in donations for the reasons pointed out 
above; however, pro-Israel PACs also started using techniques that conceal the actual totals, 
which could be calculated from FEC records by watchdog groups. During the second half of 
1990s, pro-Israel PACs started using methods such as ―bundling‖ checks of small amounts from 
individual donors and sending them directly to congressional candidates, instead of being the 
ones who cash and donate those checks, in order to hide the actual totals of campaign 
contributions they otherwise need to report to the FEC.
313
 This is ―‗soft money,‘ whose origins 
and purposes cannot be traced…The amounts of these individual donations over $250 could be 
recorded, but the purposes of the donations could not.‖314 Matthew Dorf of the Jewish 
Telegraphic Agency reported that ―Jews gave more than $25 million‖ to fund the 1996 
congressional elections,
315
 in contrast to the $5,228,998 officially reported to the FEC (See 
Table-1 in index-Ch.2).  
―Bundling‖ is also used by candidates who do not accept PAC contributions.316 In fact, 
many of the pro-Israel candidates do not need to accept PACs contributions if they are from 
―prosperous states with large Jewish populations…, because they have enough wealthy pro-Israel 
residents to donate directly to them.‖317 Former Senators such as Robert Packwood have also 
―asked PACs for membership lists, so that they can conduct fund-raising activities with pro-
Israel individuals directly.‖318  
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Pro-Israel PACs look at potential vacancies in key congressional committees, i.e. the 
Appropriation Committee that approves the annual U.S. foreign aid bill, and they support the 
pro-Israel candidates with the highest chances of filling them. In effect, this means pro-Israel 
PACs would support evangelical and Republican candidates, like Newt Gingrich, regardless of 
their views on other issues such as imposing prayers in U.S. schools, which most Jewish-
Americans oppose. As James Zogby emphasizes, the actions of those PACs are ―not a reflection 
of Jewish attitudes, since the bulk of the PAC money is derived from a rather small group of 
individuals (less than one thousand) and are directed by an even narrower group of leaders to 
serve a single issue.‖319 Based on late 1990s polls, ―over two-thirds of American Jews 
support[ed] the Middle East peace process and, surprisingly, a large percentage of American 
Jews even support[ed] a Palestinian state,‖320 while the majority of Jewish-American leaders and 
PACs directors  supported the hard-line policies of the Likud government of Netanyahu. 
 Additionally, PACs do not take into consideration the fact that ―the overwhelming 
majority of American Jews are repulsed by the Christian fundamentalist agenda that has been 
adopted by the Republican majority in Congress‖ since the 1990s.321 A study by Beth Rosenson 
et al on Senators sponsorship/cosponsorship of legislations favoring Israel from 1993-2002 
indicates that from the 103
rd
-105
th
 sessions of Congresse, Senators identification as a Republican 
and/or evangelical produced ―higher levels of support for Israel.‖322 Republicans were ―75% 
more likely to support Israel at the highest level than Democrats,‖323 while particularly in the 
104
th
 Congress (1995-1996), when the Oslo I and Oslo II agreements were being implemented, 
―evangelical identification ha[d] its strongest impact.‖324 One of the main findings of this study 
indicates that ―conservatives appear to have replaced liberals…as the most vocal supporters of 
Israel.‖325   
 
IV. Evangelical Christians’ Reactions 
As Colin Chapman argues, ―‗It is hard to think of another situation anywhere in the world 
where politics have come to be so closely bound up with religion and where scriptures have such 
a profound effect on political action.‘‖326 After Netanyahu‘s first election in 1996, 70 American 
evangelicals and fundamentalist leaders were flown to the Holly Land for a tour and a 
conference at which they ―pledged their support for what was essentially a Likud agenda.‖327 
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Additionally, when Benjamin Netanyahu visited Washington in 1998, ―his initial meeting was 
not with President Clinton but with Jerry Falwell and more than 1,000 fundamentalist Christians. 
The crowd saluted the prime minster as ‗the Ronald Reagan of Israel,‘ and Falwell pledged to 
contact more than 200,000 evangelical pastors, asking them to ‗tell President Clinton to refrain 
from putting pressure on Israel to comply with the Oslo accords.‖328  
Evangelical Christian leaders in the U.S. do not only believe that ―the West Bank forms 
an integral part of the land given by God to the Jewish people forever,‖ but they also have acted 
on those believes by ―assisting Jews to emigrate from the former Soviet Union, 
[and]…support[ing] their resettlement within the Occupied Territories.‖329 The evangelical 
Christian organization of Bridges for Peace (BFP) asks the rhetorical question: ―‗What is so 
sacred about the June 4
th, 1967 line?‘ Nothing, they argue, since historically this was all part of 
biblical Israel and ‗squarely won in defensive battles in 1967 and 1973.‘‖330  
Stephen Sizer points out that the 1990 Jerusalem resolution came about as a result of 
efforts from the International Christian Embassy of Jerusalem (ICEJ), which made 
Representative Richard Hellman testify before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
in February, 1984 ―to urge the U.S. to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and 
recognize the city as the capital of Israel.‖331 In an effort to enforce the 1990 Jerusalem 
resolution, in 1992 the ICEJ also ―sponsored various receptions marking the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of what they referred to as the ‗Reunification of Jerusalem.‖332 Additionally, in 1997 
the ICEJ ―gave support to a full-page advert placed in the New York Times entitled ‗Christians 
Call for a United Jerusalem,‘‖ which was signed by prominent evangelical leaders such as Pat 
Robertson and Jerry Falwell.
333
  
Moreover, in 1991 the evangelical Christian president of Religious Roundtable launched 
the Christian Israel Public Affairs Committee (CIPAC), with the initial task of lobbying 
Congress on the issue of Israeli loan guarantees,
334
 as well as Jerusalem. CIPAC ―was modeled 
on the powerful American Israel Political Affairs Committee (AIPAC),‖ and one the members of 
its board of directors was former AIPAC Executive Director, Tom Dine.
 335
 In 1990s CIPAC was 
one of the main lobbying organizations that opposed the implementation of the Oslo Accords. 
Moreover, the Unity Coalition for Israel (UCFI) was founded by Esther Levens in Kensas in 
1992 and by early 2000s it comprised 200 ―different and autonomous Jewish and Christian 
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organizations, representing 40 million members who are ‗dedicated to secure Israel‘[and] their 
principle strategy is to lobby the US media and political establishment, to challenge what they 
term ‗disinformation and propaganda‘ and to express ‗the truth about Israel.‘‖336  
Further, in response to the signing of the Oslo Accords, Ted Beckett founded in 1995 the 
Christian Friends of Israeli Communities (CFOIC) with the purpose of ―forg[ing] links between 
illegal Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories and churches and individual Christians 
internationally.‖337 Under CFOIC‘s ―Adopt-a-Settlement‖ program, 39 illegal settlements in the 
West Bank ―were adopted by over fifty denominational as well as independent churches in the 
U.S., South Africa, Germany, Holland, and the Philippines.‖ 338 The settlement of Har Barch was 
adopted by The Faith Christian Center in Indiana; the settlement of Itamar was adopted by the 
Johnston Federal United Methodist Church in Ohio; the settlement of Alei Zahav was adopted by 
Clavary Chapel in Tennessee; and the settlement of Shiloh was adopted by Shiloh Christian 
Fellowship in California.
339
 CFOIC works closely with Lev Ha‘Arets, ―the tourism body for 
Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, to promote Christian tours to biblical sites now 
managed by the settlers,‖ in order to help the settlements ―in becoming self-sustaining.‖340  
At the Third International Christian Zionist Congress that was held in Jerusalem in 
February 1996, 1,500 delegates from over 40 countries declared: ―The land of Israel has been 
given to the Jewish people by God as an everlasting position by an eternal covenant. The Jewish 
people have the absolute right to possess and dwell in the land, including Judea, Samaria [the 
West Bank], Gaza, and the Golan.‖341 CFOIC warns that withdrawals from Palestinian cities, or 
implementation of the Oslo Accords, ―run counter to ‗God‘s Plan for the Jewish nation.‖342 
CFOIC‘s Adopt-a-Settlement program is thus intended ―to be a means by which financial 
assistance as well as practical support for the settlers is delivered.‖343 This includes ―medical 
equipment, computers, preschool supplies, library books…, furniture,‖ as well as specific 
programs such as ICEJ‘s ―Bulletproof Bus for Efrat‖ and BFP‘s ―Operation Ezra‖ that funds 
more than fifty projects like the settlement farm Sde Bar.
344
 
Furthermore, a serious threat to the peace and security of the region as a whole and that 
illustrates evangelical Christians‘ hastening of Armageddon, is the evangelicals‘ support of the 
Temple Mount Jewish organizations that aim at destroying Al Aqsa mosque and Dome of the 
Rock, rebuilding the Jewish temple, and reinstituting temple worship, priesthood and 
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sacrifices.
345
 Those organizations include the Temple Institute, the Jerusalem Temple 
Foundations, Gush Emunim, Ateret Cohanim, and the Temple Mount Faithful of Gershon 
Salomon. Speaking at the Christian Zionist Congress in 1998 as a guest of the ICEJ, Salomon 
asserted: ―‗The mission of the present generation is to liberate the Temple Mount and to remove 
– I repeat, to remove – the defiling abomination there…We [Jewish people] will fly our Israeli 
flag over the Temple Mount, which will be minus its Dome of the Rock and its mosques and will 
have only our Israeli flag and our Temple.‖346 In another occasion, Solomon demanded: ―The 
Messiah will not come by himself; we should bring Him by fighting.‖347 
Grace Halsell argues that ―between 1967 and 1990 there were over 100 armed assaults on 
the Haram Al-Sharif by Jewish militants, often led by rabbis.‖348 Instead of condemning such 
attacks, the Israeli government appointed in 1994 Meir Davidson, ―a senior official of Ateret 
Cohanim, as a municipal adviser on Palestinian properties,‖ in Jerusalem.349 In 1996 Ateret 
Cohanim, which is largely funded by tax-exempt donations from Jewish-Americans, opened a 
tunnel that was ―excavated in secret night-time operations,‖ and ―runs the length of the Al Aqsa 
complex.‖350 65 Palestinians and 15 Israelis were killed in the fighting that broke out following 
the tunnel‘s opening; however, ―the Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu proudly visited 
the tunnel, as have fundamentalist Christian leaders.‖351 Soon thereafter, the Pentagon under the 
Clinton administration also gave Israel $50 million ―in excess U.S. military hard ware.352  
Halsell points out that ―millions of U.S. evangelical Christians endorse and financially 
support this Jewish plan...[and they give] their gold wedding rings and gold earrings to finance 
the mosque‘s destruction.‖353 She argues that Stanley Goldfoot of the Jerusalem Temple 
Foundation raises up to $100 million a year ―through American Christian TV and radio stations 
and evangelical churches;‖ and he has also ―acknowledged‖ receiving funds from the ICEJ.354 
Other evangelical Christian organizations such as the Christian Broadcasting Network of Pat 
Robertson and Peter Wagner‘s World Prayer Center have also funded Solomon‘s Temple Mount 
Faithful.
355
 They hasten Armageddon through such actions, which could agitate the entire 
Muslim world against the state of Israel, given the fact that Al-Aqsa is the second most important 
holly place in Islam. But they are not worried, as they believe they will be ―raptured‖ and 
―wafted up to heaven to view the slaughter below.‖356 Televangelist Jerry Falwell insists: ―‗I‘m 
not worried. You know why? I ain‘t gonna be here!‘‖357 
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Sizer argues that evangelical Christians in the U.S. also promote hatred of Arabs, which 
is ―personified‖ in their attitudes toward Yasser Arafat. He points out that in the June 1997 issue 
of the ICEJ‘s Middle East Intelligence Digest there was an article entitled ―‗Evil that will not die: 
Arafat shares Hitler‘s determination to wipe out the Jews.‘‖358 Clarence Wagner of BFP argues 
that ―‗We need to encourage others to understand God‘s plans, not the man-inspired plans of the 
U.N., the U.S., the EEC, Oslo, Wye, etc…Messiah is not coming back to a Moslem city called 
Al-Quds, but to the regathered, restored Jewish city of Jerusalem.‘‖ For those evangelicals, 
―Arabs and Palestinians are Satanic enemies of the Jewish people,‖ and peace talks are ―not only 
a waste of time, they demonstrate at best a lack of faith and at worst a rebellious defiance 
towards God‘s plans.‖359 Pat Robertson even retorted that ―Rabin‘s assassination was an act of 
God, a judgment for his betrayal of his own people.‖360 
 
This chapter has followed the progress of the Middle East Peace Process from early 1990s -2000, 
while highlighting the effects of Palestinian domestic divides, as well as the Israeli vision for 
settling the conflict, on the actual path of the Peace Process. It has explained the influence of the 
Israeli lobby on the election and administration of former President Bill Clinton; and the 
reactions of the Lobby and its evangelical Christian allies to the Peace Process and its 
implementation. The following chapter investigates the effects of the 9/11 attacks on the Middle 
East peace policies of the second Bush administration (2001-2008), and how the attacks were 
used as a tool by pro-Israel U.S. interest groups to further suppress the Palestinian aspirations for 
a state of their own. 
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Chapter Three 
Advantageous Involvement 
 
The Bush administration‘s approach to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict after 9/11 was a 
means towards the end of creating regional stability for its ―agenda regarding terrorism and 
Iraq;‖ ―Bush‘s end game was not a peace settlement.‖361 At the same time, Israeli policies to 
putdown the second Palestinian Intifada became looked at by the Bush administration as part of 
the broader ―War on Terror,‖ rather than through the lens of a popular uprising, which gave 
legitimacy to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land. The attacks ―highlighted‖ the Palestinian 
use of suicide bombing as a terrorist act. ―Coupled with much publicized Palestinian rejoicing in 
the streets following 9/11, it was not difficult to associate Palestinian terror with the broader war 
against terror.‖362 This was further fueled by the Israeli seizure in January, 2002 of an Iranian 
arms ship that was allegedly on its way to the Palestinian Territories. There was no evidence that 
―directly implicated Arafat;‖ some even argued that the ship was bound to Hezbollah in 
Lebanon.
363
  However, ―the Israeli government and the lobby worked hard [and successfully] to 
make the case that Arafat had procured the weapons and explosives to abet his terrorism 
campaign against Israel.‖364  
After 9/11, the Bush administration ―came to see Israel as the ‗canary in the coal mine‘ 
for Islamic terror...,‖365 and its tilt toward Israel became clear in 2002, when Bush met several 
times with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, ―whom he called ‗a man of Peace,‘‖ and 
repeatedly refused to meet with Arafat.
366
 This is the same Israeli official who ―compared the 
Rabin government [After it signed Oslo II] with the Jewish community council in Europe, whose 
World War II collaboration with the Nazis is widely blamed in Israel for facilitating the vast 
slaughter of Jews during the European Holocaust.‖367 Additionally, ―the targeting of terror 
groups focused on Israel‖ on November 2, 2002, when the State Department added the 
Palestinian groups of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, as well as Lebanese Hezbollah, to its list of 
foreign terrorist organizations, ―signaled the ‗War on Terror‘ was wider than al-Qaeda, but also 
that the U.S. and Israel had developed a relationship of mutual interest in the region.‖368 
Anouar Boukhars and Steve Yetiv paint the picture by contrasting U.S. to European 
reactions after 9/11. They explain that ―the Europeans condemned Palestinian terrorist attacks on 
Israeli civilians, but at the same time argued that it was quite counterproductive for Israel to 
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launch major military reprisals, to re-occupy Palestinian-controlled areas, to impose wide–
ranging curfews, and to assassinate suspected terrorist masterminds.‖369 As Boukhars and Yetiv 
point out, in the eyes of the Europeans those ―tactics‖ ―only exacerbated the problem and 
provoked even more terrorism.‖370 On the other hand, greater understanding to such Israeli 
policies was given from the U.S, which ―was much more likely after 9/11 to view the Israeli 
tactics through the prism of international terrorism, than were the Europeans.‖371 When the U.S. 
blamed Arafat ―for not doing enough to stop terrorism,‖ the Europeans held the position that ―he 
could not control all terrorism.‖372  
President Bush Jr. wanted to combat terrorism, and Ariel Sharon succeeded in convincing 
the Bush administration that the Palestinians were part of the problem, rather than being part of 
the solution for it; that the Palestinians were determined to ―wipe out Israel‖ just as Bin Laden 
launched an all-out war on the U.S. and its interests in the region. However, the part that was lost 
in translation was that the Palestinian moderates‘ quest for independence and having a state of 
their own was not in any way connected to the violent ambitions of the bin Ladens. Arafat and 
the PA recognized Israel as part of the Oslo Accords and they wanted to have a state living in 
peace with Israel, but it was the Likud policies of building more and more settlements that have 
always been the main obstacle for peace. While Arafat ―publicly told Osama bin Laden to stop 
claiming he was fighting for the Palestinians,‖373 President Bush, just like Ariel Sharon, insisted 
that Arafat must go, and they pursued aggressive policies toward the Palestinian uprising. 
 
I. The Bush Administration and the Middle East Peace Process (2001-2008) 
As Kenneth W. Stein highlights, this was particularly enforced by the fact that ―on the 
field of Arab-Israeli diplomacy, the Bush administration could not have inherited a negotiat[ion] 
process more unlikely to succeed.‖374 The region erupted in violence after the failure of the 
Camp David Summit to deliver a viable and independent Palestinian state, and the failure of that 
final summit in the Oslo Accords made the Bush administration more pessimistic about 
mediating between Israel and the Palestinians.  
President Bush ―inherited‖ from the Clinton administration the George Mitchell Fact 
Finding Committee and its report, which was called for at a Sharm al-Shaykh agreement in 
October, 2000. This Mitchell Report ―investigated the underlying causes of the Intifada, 
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suggested ways to prevent violence from recurring, and offered ways to reduce tensions and 
build confidence between Palestinians and Israelis.‖375 Thus, before 9/11, Bush‘s administrative 
officials ―attempted to use [Mitchell‘s] report as a springboard for America‘s re-engaging in the 
Arab-Israeli negotiations.‖376 Building on the report‘s recommendations, then-CIA Director 
George Tenet was appointed in June, 2001 to ―broker a cease-fire‖ between the Palestinians and 
the Israelis.
377
 However, neither the findings of the Mitchell Committee, nor the George Tenet 
Plan for bringing about a cease-fire were effective; violence continued to escalate, and U.S. 
executive remained a passive observer. 
 On the other hand, after Sept. 11, 2001 the Bush administration became more engaged, 
and according to CATO Institute, it advanced two alternative approaches toward the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict. First, it attempted to counter anti-American sentiments in the Arab world, 
stabilize its presence in the Middle East, and enhance its efforts to build an alliance with Arab 
states for its ―War on Terror,‖ by supporting the Middle East Peace Process.378 In an address at 
the U.N. General Assembly on November 10, 2001 President Bush became the first U.S. 
President to ―formally declare the U.S. support for the establishment of a Palestinian state.‖379 
This was a ground-breaking initiative giving the fact that ―[a]ll previous attempts to endorse a 
Palestinian state in the formal language of a Security Council resolution had been vetoed by the 
U.S.‖380 Hence, the Bush administration directly addressed the main reason behind anti-
American sentiments in the Middle East, namely the U.S. support of Israel despite its oppression 
of the Palestinians. 
Further, the Bush administration tried to advance the Tenet Plan for reaching a seize-fire 
by appointing in November, 2001 retired Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni to the region. 
Zinni did not succeed at building bridges of trust between the two sides, but the Bush 
administration remained proactive as Secretary of State Colin Powell made multiple trips to 
Israel and the Palestinian territories, and the Bush administration joined the E.U., Russia and the 
U.N. in forming the Quartet for peace in the Middle East. The Quartet issued in 2002 the 
infamous Roadmap for Peace, with provisions for creating a Palestinian state within three years. 
Furthermore, Colin Powell announced the U.S. support of an Arab initiative calling for the 
normalization of Arab-Israeli relations conditional to Israel‘s withdrawal from all Arab land it 
has occupied since the 1967 war, and its recognition of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as 
a capital. UNSC Res.1397 that endorses this initiative was passed on March 12, 2002 with U.S. 
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support. However, Israel felt it was being singled out and it turned down the initiative; the 
populous Palestinian uprising continued; and Israel carried on its ―anti-terrorism‖ campaign with 
U.S. support.  
In March, 2002 the Israeli army launched its Operation Defense Shield, the biggest 
military ―incursion‖ into Palestinians cities after the 1967 war, as the Israeli army re-occupied 
Palestinian cities in the West Bank and Israeli tanks surrounded Arafat in his Muqata‘a  
headquarters, nearly demolishing the entire building with Arafat inside. Giving his, as well as 
Israel‘s, resentment of Arafat‘s ―inability‖ to stop terrorism—the populous Palestinian Intifada—
and in an effort to be more even-handed, President Bush drew ―on the broader principles 
enunciated in the War on Terror,‖ and decided that ―regime change of some form was necessary 
in the Palestinian Authority.‖381 Following his White House speech of June, 2002 it became clear 
that President Bush‘s proposal for Palestinian statehood ―called for new leaders, a functional 
democracy, constitution and market economy - prior to statehood,‖ which, ―as one observer 
notes, had not been accomplished by any Arab state after a half-century of independence.‖382 He 
also called Arafat ―the leader of a terrorist organization‖ and in his June, 2002 speech he asked 
Arafat ―to step down as leader of the Palestinian Authority.‖383  
In the lead up to U.S. war on Iraq, President Bush‘s call for regime-change in the Middle 
East ―seemed to be making major headway in the reshaping of the Palestinian Authority‖ as 
Arafat announced in March, 2003 the creation of a Prime Minister post and the appointment to it 
of Mahmoud Abbas.
384
 Moreover, the Palestinians ―began to speak openly of problems with 
Palestinian Authority corruption.‖385 However, a clash of power and autonomy between Arafat 
and Abbas made the latter resign, and following a suicide bombing in Israel, Sharon launched a 
second major military operation in the West Bank with U.S. support.  
 
The Peace Process on the “Policy Backburner” 
According to Cato Institute, the Bush administration then started pursuing its second 
approach toward the Conflict: putting the Peace Process on the ―policy backburner,‖ while 
applying, or attempting to apply, U.S. military power against radical players in the region such as 
Iraq and Iran, and supporting Israeli wars against the two Iranian proxies of Hezbollah and 
Hamas.
386
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With the beginning of U.S. war on Iraq, academics and analysts‘ attention became 
―focused on a White Paper written in 1996 for then-Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu‖ 
by Douglas Faith, David Wurmser and Richard Perle, called ―A Clean Break! A New Strategy 
for Securing the Realm.‖387 President Bush‘s policy towards the Middle East after the 9/11 
attacks simply reflected the provisions of this paper. ―The realm the neocons sought to secure 
was not the United States, but Israel. American policy would be so manipulated that the United 
States would use its military power to fight Israel‘s enemies—of which Iraq was the first.‖388 
Douglas Feith‘s Office of Special Plans was the primary reason behind the false information that 
was provided to the Pentagon on Iraq‘s ―weapons of mass destruction.‖ Former Foreign Service 
officer, Andrew I. Killgore argues that ―The OSP‘s real purpose was to promote an American 
war against Iraq, during which Israel would have a free hand in Palestine.‖389  
Attempting to reach a peaceful settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict formally 
became a secondary objective with the start of U.S. campaign against Iraq in 2003. In ―a 
grandiose‖ speech in February 2003, Bush linked Iraq to Palestinian ―terror‖ and argued that 
―once the patron is gone, Palestinian terror would be reduced, and willing Palestinian moderates 
could rein an independent Palestine.‖390 However, ―the road from Baghdad did lead to Jerusalem, 
but not as the Bush administration expected it would.‖391  
 After Arafat was deceased in November, 2004 and Mahmoud Abbas won the Palestinian 
presidential elections of early 2005, a peace summit between Sharon and Abbas at Sharm el-
Sheikh led to a cease fire between the two sides. Sharon claimed that he finally found a partner 
for peace. This was followed by the implementation of Sharon‘s ―unilateral‖ disengagement plan 
from the Gaza Strip in September, 2005, which was not coordinated with the PA and side 
stepped the provisions of the Roadmap for establishing a Palestinian state by the end of 2005. 
However, President Bush still supported the Israeli plan in a letter to Ariel Sharon in April, 2004 
as well as the Israeli request for a $2.2 billion in additional U.S. aid to finance the withdrawal.
392
  
In May, 2004 eighty-two ―former American diplomats wrote President George W. Bush 
to express their firm believe that his…endorsement of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon‘s 
unilateral ‗disengagement plan‘ was not in the best interests of the U.S., or Israel, or the 
Palestinians. Through his endorsement,‖ they argued, ―Bush had closed the door to negotiations 
with Palestinians and the possibility of a Palestinian state.‖393 Bush‘s letter to Ariel Sharon (See 
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index–Ch.3 for full text of the letter) endorsing the disengagement plan denied ―the right of 
refugees to return to their homeland,‖ and supported Israel‘s possession of ―five large illegal 
settlement blocs in the occupied West Bank‖ as part of any future agreement.394Additionally, 
Bush‘s endorsement of the plan, argues the former American diplomats, ―severely damaged long 
standing U.S. policy‖ that strictly called for full Israeli withdrawal back to the 1967 borders.395  
The implication of the disengagement plan became clear soon thereafter, as the Bush 
administration ―permitted, if not encouraged, Israeli wars on neighboring Hezbollah and Hamas 
forces in 2006 and 2008, partly out of concern that the post-Saddam Middle East tilted the 
balance of power toward Iran and its proxies.‖396 During the second half of 2006, more than 400 
Palestinians were killed in Gaza Strip as a result of a five-month Israeli operation to free Gilad 
Shalit, an Israeli soldier that Hamas militants kidnapped.
397
 The Gaza Strip was put under Israeli 
siege soon thereafter and the Israeli operation destroyed its main electricity power station, 
leaving its population in darkness for years to come. A UNSC resolution condemning Israel‘s 
―excessive‖ use of force during that operation, while ―calling on the Palestinians to stop their 
rocket attacks‖ was vetoed by the U.S.398 Thus, it became seen that the main effect of the 
disengagement plan was to further undermine the Palestinian demands for an independent and 
contingent Palestinian state and to make them pre-occupied with issues of autonomy. At the 
same time, the U.S. focus on ―combating terrorism‖ bushed the Peace Process further and further 
into the policy backburner.  
During the 2006 Israeli war on Gaza Strip, Arab states renewed their 2002 initiative, and 
even Hamas‘ Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Zahar ―endorsed‖ their call ―for comprehensive 
Middle East peace negotiations under U.N. sponsorship.‖399 Hamas‘ spokesman, Khaled Meshal, 
also indicated Hamas‘ ―willingness to coexist with Israel‖ as he talked about ―establishing a 
Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.‖400 Talks between Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas‘ 
Prime Minister Ismail Haniyah nearly led to an agreement in mid-November, 2006 ―on a plan 
calling for Hamas officials to be replaced by neutral administrators in a government of national 
unity with Fatah‖ and for the new government to release Shalit.401 On Nov. 27, 2006 Sharon‘s 
Labor-Party successor, Ehud Olmert, himself offered that ―Israel would free ‗numerous 
Palestinian prisoners,‘ reduce the number of checkpoints, dismantle some West Bank 
settlements, and release Palestinian tax revenues collections as soon as the Palestinians released 
Cpl. Gilad Shalit and established a government that agreed to renounce violence, recognize 
  
61 
 
Israel, and accept previous Israeli-Arab peace agreements.‖402 However, the U.S. did not back 
those peace efforts, and an Israeli attack on the town of Beit Hanoun, which ―culminated a week 
in which 62 Palestinians had been killed,‖ made the Abbas-Haniyah agreement be indefinitely 
postponed.
403
  
After supporting the municipal and parliamentary elections in the Palestinian Territories 
in late 2006-early 2007, the Bush administration was dissatisfied with Hamas‘ winning of 
majority seats (56%) in the parliamentary elections, and it immediately placed its financial 
assistance to the Palestinian Authority on-hold. Bush viewed Arafat ―as either unable or 
unwilling to stop terrorism and thus part of the problem. Yet, even after Arafat, the U.S. did not 
make a priority out of achieving a solution.‖404 Following the Palestinian elections, the Bush 
administration pursued a different agenda, as Hamas had been designated by the State 
Department as a terrorist organization. In its efforts to ―combat terrorism,‖ the Bush 
administration launched an ―Iran-contra‖ styled operation in Gaza Strip to oust Hamas from the 
power positions it held as a result of the elections.
405
  
Tying Israel‘s occupation of Palestinian land to U.S. foreign policy proved to be an 
effective Israeli strategy, as Hamas‘ entry into the political process became the major focus of 
U.S. ―War on Terror,‖ and U.S. support of Palestinian democracy retracted. In late 2006, the 
Bush administration requested an emergency $86 million from Congress to support Mahmoud 
Abbas‘ PA forces with weapons and training.406 As the funds were pending approval from 
Congress, the State Department reached out to other countries in the region such as Egypt, 
Jordan and the United Arab Emirates; and their contributions led to the shipment of the first load 
of arms for Fatah and PA forces in Gaza Strip.
407
 Consequently, heavy fighting between the 
Palestinian rival groups of Fatah and Hamas was sparked, but with the mediation of Saudi 
Arabia, they signed in February, 2007 an agreement to establish a unitary-government in Gaza 
Strip and the West Bank.  
Following the signing of this agreement, the U.S. and the E.U. officially withdrew their 
financial aid to the PA and the Bush administration launched its Action Plan for Palestinian 
Presidency. U.S. General Keith Dayton worked closely with Muhammed Dahalan, one of the 
leaders of PA forces in Gaza Strip and the West Bank, to arrange for ―specialized training 
abroad‖ for a selected group of Fatah fighters, while Abbas was to replace the unitary- 
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government by an emergency government at the end of 2007.
408
 Thereafter, this new group of 
―authority‖ was to increase its ―level and capacity‖ to 15,000 men over a period of five years, 
with their needed training, salaries, arms, and equipments provided for by the U.S.
409
 This 
Action Plan for the Palestinian Presidency was described by Dahalan‘s aid, Bassil Jaber, as a 
plan ―to create a security establishment that could protect and strengthen a peaceful Palestinian 
state living side by side with Israel.‘‖410 However, giving the low popularity of Mohammed 
Dahalan among Hamas forces; leaks about this Action Plan in the Jordanian newspaper, Al Majd, 
led to the renewal of armed-clashes between Fatah and Hamas, and the arrival of 500 heavy-
armed Fatah National Security Forces, fresh from training camps in Egypt, further intensified the 
situation.
411
     
On June 7, 2007 ―there was another damaging leak, when the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz 
reported that Abbas and Dayton had asked Israel to authorize the biggest Egyptian arms 
shipment yet—to include dozens of armored cars, hundreds of armor-piercing rockets, thousands 
of hand grenades, and millions of rounds of ammunition.‖412 Just before the second group of 
Fatah National Security Forces was scheduled to leave for training in Egypt, ―the coup began in 
earnest,‖ and within a few days Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip, Abbas dissolved the 
unitary government agreement and established an emergency government in the West Bank, and 
Gaza Strip became put under tighter Israeli siege.
413
 The goal of the Bush administration was to 
eventually cleanse the Gaza Strip of Hamas forces, but Hamas struck first and its coup forced the 
PA forces out of Gaza Strip. 
As Robert Novak notes, Colin Powel‘s departure from the Secretary of State during 
President Bush‘s second term (2005-2008), ―‗eliminated the administration‘s last major figure 
who was at all serious about the Peace Process.‘‖414 After sparking that Palestinian civil war, 
which resulted in nearly 700 deaths among the Palestinians,
415
 the Bush administration resumed 
its ―peace efforts‖ and a Peace Conference was held in Annapolis in November, 2007. The 
conference promised the establishment of a Palestinian state within a year, but ―Bush had little 
leverage or no credibility to bring states to the table, and little came from the final year of talking 
despite numerous shuttling visits by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.‖416  
 The ―peace efforts‖ of President Bush‘s final year in office were taking place while the 
population of Gaza Strip was being put under heavy siege that starved the population and cut off 
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their basic food, medicine, electricity and other humanitarian needs as a way of isolating Hamas. 
Talks about peace were being carried out as the situation between southern Israel and Gaza Strip 
witnessed increased intensity and exchanges of assaults that eventually led to an all-out Israeli 
war. At the same time, ―the American government and Mainstream Media…voiced not one word 
of protest. The U.S. only [gave] Israel more and more weapons to continue the attempted 
starvation‖417 of the Gaza population and Hamas‘ moderate remarks in late 2006 about 
coexisting with Israel were simply ignored rather than worked with. The defining course of 
action was the Israeli-U.S. alliance in their War on Terror. 
 
II. U.S. Public Opinion and the Media 
U.S. public opinion and the general perceptions of U.S. citizens after the 9/11 attacks also 
linked Israeli policies to putdown the Palestinian Intifada to the U.S. War on Terror. Even after 
the high death toll in Palestinian lives (more than 1400 people) due to Israel‘s war on Gaza strip 
from December, 2008 – January, 2009 Gallup polls indicated that 59% of Americans 
sympathized with Israel, while only 18% sympathized with the Palestinians.
418
 The 9/11 attacks 
and U.S. War on Terror made the humanity of the Israelis emphasized, while the Palestinians 
became de-humanized. 
Due to the fact that U.S. media ―highlighted‖ some Palestinians‘ rejoicing of the attacks 
in Gaza streets, a Zogby International poll from October, 2001 indicated that ―the PA was seen 
favorably by only 10% of U.S. public and negatively by 72%.‖419 Such findings were exploited 
by the public-relations campaign of pro-Israel groups in the U.S. Earlier in 1997, when U.S. 
media were reporting on the Clinton administration‘s efforts to stop Netanyahu‘s Har Homa 
settlement project, the media watchdog group of CAMERA solicited $160,000 in public funding 
―to conduct ‗a multi-faceted campaign to expose the ‗bias‘ and promote more complete and 
accurate reporting‘ in the New York Times.‖420 While this was motivated by the perceived need 
of providing a cover-up for such Israeli policies, it soon became evident that CAMERA 
succeeded in having this cover up ingrained within the institutional and publishing character of 
New York Times during the Palestinian Intifada. 
For instance, a study by Susan Ross on the way New York Times editorials framed the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict from March, 2001-March, 2002 found that after 9/11, ―the losses and 
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suffering of the Palestinians…[were] made acceptable... Their human costs often [were] ignored 
or minimized.‖421 Ross reports that the editorials portrayed the Palestinians ―as a configuration of 
hate, a plague of death, a suicide cult, and a puppet spouting anti-American and anti-Israeli 
vitriol.‖422 Her study indicates that after 9/11 NYT editorials depicted ―the Palestinians as 
terrorist suicide bombers led by a bitter hypocrite [Arafat] who taunts Israel to hide his own 
ineptitude.‖423 They showed that ―the needs for Palestinian sovereignty and security is routinely 
presented as less substantial or legitimate than the same interests of the Israelis. What Israelis 
deserve; Palestinians are begrudgingly or conditionally granted.‖424 Ross highlights that ―the 
relative preponderance of editorials…immediately after Sep. 11 indicates that New York Times 
editorials did tie the conflict to the global anti-terrorism initiative of the United States,‖425 to 
rally public opinion support of Israel‘s crackdown on the Palestinian Intifada.  
Another two-year study by If Americans Knew found that during the first year of the 
Intifada The New York Times reported on 42% of Palestinian deaths and on 119% of Israeli 
deaths, while in reality ―over three times more Palestinians were being killed than Israelis.‖426 
IFK‘s study notes that when in 2004 eight Israeli and 176 Palestinian children were killed, the 
New York Times ―headlines and lead paragraphs reported on Israeli children‘s deaths at a rate 
almost seven times greater than Palestinian deaths.‖427 When IFK presented such finding to The 
New York Times, they were simply ignored, or purposefully not acknowledged.
428
 Richard H. 
Curtiss points out that Abe Rosenthal, then-chief editor of The New York Times, had a 
―passionate Attachment to Israel.‖429 Alfred M. Lilienthal recalled that, for instance, when 
Thomas Friedman described the Israeli 1982 bombardment of Beirut as ―indiscriminate‖ for a 
New York Times article, Rosenthal gave Friedman a $5000 raise but warned him: ―if you pull a 
stunt like that again, you are fired.‖430 The New York Times, which is considered ―‗the newspaper 
of record,‘ with hundreds of newspapers‖ subscribed to its News Service, also referred to 
settlements such as Gilo and Har Homa as ―neighborhoods in Jerusalem.‖431  
Robert Murdoch, the owner of more than 120 news corporations in the U.S. himself has 
―strong personal and business attachments to Israel,‖ which made him ―become a strong political 
backer and close friend of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.‖432 Murdoch‘s PAC of ―News America 
Holding‖ even makes campaign contributions to Israel‘s supporters in Congress, such as Rep. 
Howard Berman, Eric Cantor, Steny Hoyer and Harry Reid, among others.
433
 A study by 
Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) found that ―only four of 99 network reports on the 
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Middle East from Sept. 28 to Nov. 2 2001 mentioned occupation,‖ leaving the public unaware 
that the Israeli army during that period was ―in Palestinian cities in violation of international 
law.‖ 434  
A second study by If Americans New found that from Sep. 29, 2000 to March 31, 2001 
the San Francisco Chronicle ―gave readers a false sense of parity between Israelis and 
Palestinians by reporting nearly equal number of deaths on both sides, despite the fact that 
Palestinians [were] being killed at a rate three to four times greater than Israelis,‖ while the San 
Jose Mercury News even ―inverted the death rates in its front-page headlines.‖435 Alex Ionides 
points out that coverage by American mainstream media of the frequent Israeli ―incursions‖ into 
the Palestinian Territories during the first five years of the Intifada generally labeled them as 
―operations to filter out ‗militants‘ or ‗terrorists.‘‖436 In effect, they ―essentially ignore the 
injustices perpetrated on the Palestinians by the Israeli military, and rarely question[ed] the facts 
on the ground.‖437  
Robert Fisk notes that journalists became required to say ―Israel is under siege by 
Palestinians (rather than occupying Palestinian land), that Palestinians are responsible for the 
violence (even though Palestinians are the principle victims), that Arafat turned down a good 
deal at Camp David (though he was offered just over 60 percent of his land, not 94 percent), and 
that Palestinians indulge in child sacrifice,‖ rather than Palestinian children being shot to death 
by the Israeli Army.
 438
 According to Fisk, this made it easier to learn about ―the brutality of 
Israeli soldiers‖ through Israeli newspapers such as Ha’aretz than the American media.439  
The Israeli lobby manipulated the media and public debates in the U.S. regarding the 
Israeli treatment of the Palestinians during the second Intifada to the extent that Fisk compared 
its targeting of academics, analysts and reporters ―who dare to criticize Israel (or tell the truth 
about the Palestinian uprising)‖ to the ―MaCarthyite‖ era. 440 The Zionist Organization of 
America demanded for instance the dismissal of Edward Said‘s professorship from Colombia 
University ―solely because he points out, with clinical ferocity and painful accuracy,‖ argues 
Fisk, ―the historical tragedy of Palestinian dispossession, the brutality of Israel‘s continued 
occupation and the bankruptcy of the Oslo ‗peace‘ agreement.‖441  
In 2004, in anticipation of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling on Israel‘s 
separation Wall in the West Bank, which considered it illegal under International law, ―hundreds 
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of American Jewish Activists launched a concentrated pre-emptive media campaign…to 
minimize negative publicity for Israel.‖442 They contacted local news organizations across 
America ―to argue—in advance of…ICJ‘s decision—that Israel has the right to fend off 
terrorists,‖ and their messages ―were carefully crafted and orchestrated‖ by The Israel Project, a 
Washington-based pro-Israel advocacy group.
443
 This event was cosponsored by the Jewish 
Council for Public Affairs, the United Jewish Communities and the Conference of Presidents of 
Major Jewish Organizations, and as a result of it a Community Relations Council network was 
established to coordinate media strategies in local communities.
444
  
In retrospect Israel‘s siege on Gaza Strip was rarely criticized, and U.S. public opinion‘s 
support for Israeli/U.S. policy toward the Palestinians was further strengthened. Moreover, the 
Palestinian Intifada‘s demands for an independent Palestinian state were not addressed, and 
Israeli occupation of the West Bank was given legitimacy.   
 
III. U.S. Congress and the Middle East Peace Process 
This right-or-wrong support for Israel did not only manipulate U.S. public opinion 
through censoring the media and labeling critics as anti-Semitic (i.e. Jimmy Carter) or as ―self-
hating Jews‖ (i.e. Norman Finkelstein and Norman Chomsky), but it was also carried out in U.S. 
Congress, were legislators were competing to please their campaign contributors.  As explained 
in Ch.1, the executive and the legislative foreign policy roles are particularly complementary to 
one-another in times of war. Additionally, Congress reflects the opinion of the general public, 
since congressmen are closer to the electorate and they try to represent them during the public 
policy debates on the Hill; but Congressmen could also be manipulated by other factors, just as 
public opinion is heavily influenced by media watchdog groups. All such mechanisms worked in 
sync with one another in regards to U.S. policy towards the Palestinians after 9/11.  
 AIPAC and its ―dollar-dispending minions‖ keep record of congressional votes on Israel 
and they financially subsidize the winning, or losing, of their ―friends and foes.‖445 For instance, 
they donated $300,000 to the single election of Artur Davis During the 2002 congressional 
election cycle.
446
 Pro-Israel PACs in this case supported the challenger of five-term incumbent 
Representative Earl Hillard of Alabama‘s 7th congressional district, because Hillard had other 
interest to represent, namely those of the African-American community, and ―refused to play 
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Steppin‘ Fetchit for Israel.‖447 Hillard was once quoted as saying ―‗we never pass anything 
bashing the Israelis when they do something wrong,‘ and comparing the Palestinians to 
American civil rights activists in the late 1960s;‖448 thus, he was targeted for defeat by AIPAC. 
While pro-Israel PACs contribute to the elections of hundreds of congressmen at a much 
higher rate than Arab/Muslim-American PACs (See Table 3 and Table 4 in Index-Ch.3), their 
campaign contributions are usually made to a selected group of candidates. For the 2005-2006 
election cycle, Pro-Israel PACs contributed to the campaigns of 271 candidates.
449
 However, 
during that election cycle they targeted a group of 21 candidates for an average contributions of 
$68,000 each, while the remaining 251 candidates they favored received an average of only 
$6,000 each.
450
 ―In other words, by giving modest ‗retainers‘ to the vast majority to whom they 
contributed, the pro-Israel PACs could give substantial amounts—enough, perhaps, to make a 
difference in close elections—to a handful of candidate.‖451 This also leaves room for 
competition among congressmen to be part of the targeted group for high levels of contributions, 
by voting for, sponsoring and co-sponsoring resolutions that favor Israel. 
 
107
th
 Congress (2001-2002) 
 During the 107
th
 Congress, both of Israel‘s staunchest supporters and top recipients of 
campaign contributions from pro-Israel PACs, Jesse Helms and Sam Brownback, remained in 
the Senate positions of Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Near East 
Subcommittee, respectively. Further, Ben Gilman, who was another asset for AIPAC in 
Congress, became the Chairman of the Europe, Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee. 
Other members of those committees and subcommittees such as Shelley Berkley started this 
session of Congress by saying ―it was time to regard Arafat and the Palestinians as 
‗terrorists.‘‖452 
 During the 107
th
 Congress, the campaign promise of George W. Bush to start the move 
of U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem was enforced by the passage of series of 
resolutions, including H.CON.RES.30, H.R.598, and H.R1643.
453
 Co-sponsors of all those 
resolutions, such as Jewish-American Eric Cantor, were among the top-recipients of campaign 
contributions from pro-Israel PACs (See Table 4 in Index-Ch.3). Additionally, H.R.2500 and 
S.1215 called upon the State Department to re-enforce the Jerusalem Act of 1995 by 1) placing 
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the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem ―under the supervision of the U.S. ambassador to Israel;‖ 2) 
making ―any official U.S. government documents that list countries and their capital cities 
identify Jerusalem as the capital of Israel;‖ and 3) recording the place of birth as Israel in all 
passports, registration of birth certificates, or certificates of nationality of U.S. citizens born in 
Jerusalem.
454
 Those provisions became inserted in all subsequent appropriation bills for the State 
Department and their effects on the Peace Process were simply ignored, since the campaign 
contributors of the sponsors of such resolutions aimed at both: keeping the status quo as it was 
unfolding, and strengthening the Israeli possession of Palestinian land. 
At the same time, rather than acknowledging the demands of the Palestinian uprising and 
attempting to enforce the call for a two-state resolution, H.Res.2566 demanded a removal of all 
direct and indirect aid to the PA ―unless the president certifie[d] ‗that no excavation of the 
Temple Mount in Israel is being conducted, other than that authorized by the Israeli Antiquities 
Authority.‘‖455 Eric Cantor, who introduced this resolution, declared that his goal is ―to fight ‗all 
efforts to create a Palestinian State‘ and ‗strong-arm Israel into sacrificing its land.‘‖456 Cantor 
also introduced H.R.3624 to prohibit any U.S. funds from being used ‗for any form of assistance 
directly or indirectly to the Palestinian Authority or any instrumentality of the Palestinian 
authority.‘‖457  
 As Shirl McArthur indicates, Pro-Israel groups‘ success in influencing U.S. Media 
coverage after 9/11 was met with ―overwhelming success in the U.S. Congress…This [was] 
evident by the steady stream of bills and resolutions in both houses of Congress designed to 
condemn or punish the Palestinians.‖458 H.R.2098 and S.1377 called for establishing in the 
Department of Justice an office ―to, among other things, monitor acts of ‗international terrorism‘ 
allegedly committed by Palestinians.‖459 H.R.1087 prohibited ―all direct or indirect aid to the PA 
‗or for programs, projects, and activities to the West Bank or Gaza,‘ unless the president 
certifie[d] to Congress that the PA leadership…has ‗taken all actions within its capacity to bring 
an end to the violence‘‖ of the second Palestinian uprising.460  
H.Res.1795, The Ackerman bill, called for denying visas to PLO and PA officials, cutting 
off aid, except humanitarian assistance, to the West Bank and Gaza, downgrading the PLO office 
in Washington, and designating the PLO ‗or one or more of its constituent groups‘ as a ‗foreign 
terrorist organization.‘‖461 Additionally, in an effort that was echoed by manipulated media 
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outlets, Elliot Engel introduced H.CON.RES.202 to condemn ―‗the Palestinian Authority and 
various Palestinian organizations for [allegedly] using children as soldiers and inciting children 
to acts of violence and war,‘‖ rather than condemning the Israeli army for killing innocent 
children, and it urged the president ―to withhold any future assistance to the PA until it stop[ed] 
the use of children in armed conflict.‖462 Further, Senator Bob Smith introduced S.Res.157, 
which urged the State Department to ―redesignate‖ the PLO as a terrorist organization.463  
Balanced and coherent statements were predictably ignored or sidestepped in U.S. 
Congress, which included those of Rep. James Traficant who stated that ―‗Bombs alone will not 
stop terrorists. America must pursue a comprehensive strategy, and part of that strategy should 
support statehood for Palestine…Until the issue of a Palestinian homeland is resolved, there will 
always be terrorists.‘‖464 The Jewish-American magazine, Forward, reported that during the 
second session of a three-part hearing chaired by Benjamin Gilman on U.S. Policy Towards the 
Palestinians after 9/11, ―‗every Jewish lawmaker present [i.e. Tom Lantos, Gary Ackerman, 
Shelley Berkley and Eliot Engel] was outspoken in rejecting efforts…to draw distinctions 
between Palestinian terrorism and the kind identified with bin Laden.‘‖465  
Such pro-Israel voices in Congress worked hard, tirelessly, and successfully, to make the 
case that the Israeli crackdown on the Palestinian Intifada should be looked at as part of the 
broader U.S. war on terror, rather than through the lens of a popular uprising. As a result, 
H.CON.RES.222 declared Congress‘ support of Israel ―in its legitimate exercise of 
internationally recognized rights of self-defense;‖ and H.CON.RES.278 ―recount[ed] that the 
U.S. is engaged in a war against terrorism and claim[ed] that ‗Israel has fallen victim to 
numerous similar unspeakable acts of violence committed by terrorists against the people of 
Israel.‘‖466 H.CON.RES.280, which was introduced by Tom Lantos and Henry Hyde, also 
expressed ―‗solidarity with Israel in the fight against terrorism.‘‖467  
At the same time, Senators Nita Lowey, Mitch McConnell, and Dianne Feinstein, among 
others, reinforced the restrictions of the Ackerman Bill on the PA and Arafat by introducing an 
identical bill, S.1409, and S.2194 (The Arafat Accountability Bill). Eighty-nine Senators also 
signed an AIPAC drafted letter calling on George W. Bush ―‗to remain steadfast‘‖ in standing 
with Israel, to ―‗express that solidarity with Israel publicly,‘‖ and to continue his policy of not 
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meeting with Arafat ―‗until he has taken the necessary steps to end the violence and terrorism 
against Israel.‘‖468  
Additionally, in October, 2001 outspoken evangelical Christian Tom Delay joined 
Jewish-American Tom Lantos in writing to Secretary of State Colin Powell to urge that the U.S. 
includes Hamas, Hezbullah and Islamic Jihad ―as part of its war on terrorism;‖ thereby defining 
official U.S. policy towards the Palestinians for years to come.
469
 Tom Delay then introduced the 
Solidarity with Israel Bill, H.RES.392, which supported ―‗additional United States assistance to 
help Israel defend itself.‖470 Soon after the 9/11 attacks, Lantos even asked all members present 
at a hearing of the House Middle East Subcommittee ―to stand for a moment of silence—not in 
honor of the thousands of victims of the attacks, but in honor of one Israeli colonist [settler] who 
had been killed in occupied Palestine.‖471 On at least two occasions during the first session of 
107
th
 Congress, Lantos also ―demanded a roll call vote [on resolutions], presumably so that 
AIPAC could take names,‖472 of who doesn‘t express unconditional support of Israel. 
 Moreover, in March, 2002 a letter signed by 235 Representatives, and initiated by one of 
the top recipients of campaign contributions from pro-Israel PACs, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, 
―commend[ed] Bush for his strong criticism of PA Chairman Yasser Arafat and urge[ed] that he 
‗take even stronger action‖ by adding three Fatah and PA groups to the list of foreign terrorist 
organizations: Al-Aqsa Maryrs‘, the Tanzim, and Force 17.473 Further, a Senate letter that was 
signed by 52 Senators, and was initiated by Dianne Feinstein and Mitch McConnell, expressed 
―‗profound concern and dismay‘ at Arafat‘s failure ‗to do what is necessary to help bring peace 
to Israel and his people,‘‖ and urged Vice President Richard Cheney ―to reconsider his offer to 
meet with Arafat ‗until Mr. Arafat and the Palestinian Authority demonstrate their commitment 
to end the violence.‘‖474 In other words, Congress was looking at the Palestinian uprising through 
a completely different reality; one that failed to grasp the uprising was a spontaneous popular 
revolt against the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land; one that refused to acknowledge the 
rights of the Palestinians to independence and dignity.  
 At the same time, some balance was shown by Representative John Dingell in 
H.CON.RES.253, which referred to UNSC resolutions 242, 338, and 1397 in its support of a 
two-state resolution.
475
 John Dingell was quoted by The Washington Post as saying, ―‗How do 
you become an honest broker when you give one side the feeling you‘re against them?‘‖476 
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However, Dingell‘s remarks were ignored, for being an honest broker was never part of 
congressional considerations on issues related to Israel. Giving Israel unconditional support has 
always been the defining course of congressional action. Dingell‘s H.CON.RES.253 was 
countered by H.CON.RES.369 of Representative Jim Saxton, which expressed that ―‗the 
relinquishing of…territories by Israel could give rise to new and potentially mortal threats to the 
Jewish state.‘‖477  
 AIPAC‘s April 20-22, 2002 meeting was attended by half the members of the Senate and 
100 Representatives, as well as several senior administration officials.
478
 At the meeting, 
Senators Dianne Feinstein, Barbara Boxer, and Mitch McConnell, called Arafat ―unreliable, a 
liar, and worse,‖479 all in support of Israel‘s Operation Defense Shield that practically put Arafat 
under house-arrest. Further, Charles Schumer ―criticized the president for ‗telling Israel, which is 
simply trying to defend itself, to pull back‘‖ from West Bank cities it was reoccupying as part of 
its Operation Defense Shield.
480
  
 To enforce President Bush‘s June, 2002 call for reform in the PA, the House 
appropriation Bill for FY‘03 expressed that ―no funds may be provided to support a Palestinian 
state unless the Secretary of State certifies to Congress that several reform measures, including 
democratic elections, have been undertaken by the Palestinians.‖481 On the other hand, while 
U.S. aid to the Palestinians was being restricted, The Washington Post reported on Nov. 26, 2002 
that Ariel Sharon‘s chief of staff met with then-National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, 
―to request an extensive new economic aid package for Israel: $10 billion in loan guarantees and 
$4 billion in military aid.‖482  
 On Dec.5
th
, Ariel Sharon told Israeli reporters such loan guarantees and extra aid would 
arrive ―‗in the very near future,‘‖ while assuring them that ―This aid is unconditional…and not 
linked to Israel‘s agreement to a peace plan based on the ‗Bush framework,‘‖ of the Roadmap.483 
When AIPAC pressured and lobbied legislators to support this additional aid, its argument was 
that ―‗Israel has never defaulted on a loan,‘‖ while in reality the U.S. ―automatically ‗forgives‘ 
loans to Israel, so that it never has to repay the money.‖484 From 1974-2002, the U.S. gave Israel 
$42 billion in ―waved loans,‖485 and adding to this, on March 25, 2003 president Bush ―presented 
his $74.7 billion ‗war budget‘ to Congress,‖ which included $1 billion in additional military 
grants and $9 billion in loan guarantees for Israel.
486
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108
th
 Congress (2003-2004) 
 As the Republicans won majority seats in Congress during the 2002 elections, the 
congressional tilt toward Israel became more persistent. Rep. Tom Delay became the House 
Republican Majority Leader and the other evangelical Christian, Rep. Roy Blunt, became the 
House Majority Whip.
487
 Subsequently, Blunt named Eric–my goal is to fight all efforts to create 
a Palestinian state–Cantor as his Chief Deputy Whip. Cantor is ―the House‘s only Jewish 
Republican member, whom one House staff member once referred to as ‗AIPAC‘s errand 
boy.‘‖488 Another AIPAC asset, Rep. Ileana Rose-Lehtinen, became the Chairwoman of the 
Middle East subcommittee (See Table 4 in Index-Ch.3 for a list of top recipients of campaign 
contributions from AIPAC‘s PACs during that election cycle). 
 On April 30, 2003, the day when President Bush released the Road Map for peace, a 
letter signed by 88 Senators and 322 Representatives, circulated by Senators Barbara Boxer, 
Richard Durbin, John Ensign, Mitch McConnell, and Representatives Roy Blunt, Steny Hoyer, 
Henry Hyde, and Tom Lantos; called upon Bush to demand a ―new Palestinian leadership, the 
creation of a new Palestinian security apparatus, and a cessation of terrorism before pressing 
Israel to take any positive actions.‖489 Additionally, on May 7 Rep. Tom Lantos, Henry Hyde 
and Gary Ackerman ―introduced and passed as an amendment to the State Department 
Authorization bill, the ‗Israel-Palestinian Peace Enhancement Act,‘‖ which included provisions 
such as ―support[ing] the establishment of a Palestinian state, authorize[ing] a large U.S. aid 
program for the new state, and call[ing] for the president to encourage a multilateral aid 
effort.‖490 S.1029/S.1944 bill by Senator John Ensign was also entitled the ―Israel-Palestinian 
Peace Enhancement Act‖ and it was passed on May 9. 
 While the Israel-Palestine Peace Enhancement Act seemed balanced at first sight, it 
crafted ―an eight-item list of requirements‖ from the PA, which included ―holding democratic 
elections, renouncing terrorism and the incitement to ‗acts against the state of Israel and its 
citizens;‘ and…‗engaging in ongoing and extensive security cooperation with Israel.‘‖491 Former 
Foreign Service officer Shirl McArthur highlights that ― with the exception of one ‗finding‘ that 
appears in the House version but not in the Senate bill, all of the actions called for in the act are 
to come from the Palestinian side, with no mention of either parallel or reciprocal actions by 
Israel.‖492 The ―finding‖ stated that ―‗Israel should take concrete steps to support the emergence 
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of a viable, credible Palestinian state;‘‖493 however, it did not require Israel to evacuate the 
settlements, nor did it tie U.S. aid to Israel to a settlement-evacuation. In other words, it was an 
enhancement of Israel‘s policy of postponing the inevitable, especially given the 3-year 
framework of the Roadmap. This ―finding‖ was amended in S.1944 by the statement: ―‗Israel has 
committed itself to concrete steps to achieve that end.‘‖494 
 Speaking at the Israeli Knesset during an AIPAC sponsored trip to Israel in late July, 
2003, House Majority Leader Tom Delay declared that ―the Palestinian people‘s ‗plight is real; 
they have been oppressed and abused by a pernicious enemy. But their enemy is not Israel, nor 
its people, nor its democratic government. Their enemy is Yasser Arafat…Israel is not the 
problem; Israel is the solution.‘‖495 However, confining people into air-opened prisons enclosed 
by concrete Israeli walls is the real oppression the Palestinians face; and that‘s just one example 
of Israel‘s occupation policies that find unconditional support in U.S. Congress.   
 During their AIPAC-sponsored trips to Israel, ―many members of Congress‖ such as 
Shelley Berkley, were outspoken ―in supporting the West Bank wall and criticizing [a] reported 
State Department plan to penalize Israel for building the wall by deducting an equal amount [of 
its cost] from the $9 billion in U.S. loan guarantees.‖496 Additionally, a House letter circulated by 
Nita Lowey and Henry Waxman was sent to President Bush on August 5
th
, 2003 in objection to 
the State Department‘s plan, and stating that ―‗the U.S. must never pressure Israel to take a 
position or action which would jeopardize the security of its citizens.‘‖497 A similar letter in the 
senate was circulated by Charles Schumer and argued that ―‗By building a security fence in the 
West Bank, the Israeli government is pursuing a reasonable policy that respects the terms of the 
cease-fire currently in force and does no violence to the Palestinian people.‘‖498  
 When the 2004 presidential candidate, Howard Dean, stated in a Sep. 2003 New Mexico 
speech that ―the U.S. should not ‗take sides‘ in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and that ‗we all 
know…enormous numbers of the settlements…are going to have to come out;‘‖ Sen. Joseph 
Lieberman replied that Howard Dean proposed ―a ‗major break‘ from half-century of U.S. policy 
of explicitly siding with Israel.‖499 The Bush administration did not reduce the loan guarantees to 
pressure Israel with regards to the West Bank wall, and the congressional ―knee-jerk‖ support of 
Israel intensified.  
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 In reaction to the International Court of Justice‘s hearing on the legality of the Wall, 
several letters were sent by congressmen to President George W. Bush, Secretary of State Colin 
Powell, and even U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan in support of Israel. On January 22, 2004 
Rep. Gary Ackerman sent a letter to Colin Powell urging that ―the Secretary of State…take an 
active role in challenging the use of the ICJ ‗to put Israel on trial.‘‖500 Then, on January 29th co-
Chairmen of the Democratic Israel Workshop Group, Henry Waxman and Robert Matsui, sent a 
letter to President Bush requesting ―‗a U.S. brief before the ICJ in support of Israel‘s right to 
implement defensive security measures.‘‖501 It also accused Bush of sending Israel ―‗mixed 
signals‘ by ‗claiming that the security fence being built is an obstacle to the peace process, and 
urged Bush ‗to be clear that Israel has the absolute right to defend itself from terrorism.‘‖502  
 Further, on February 19, J.D. Hayworth sent a letter to President Bush ―supporting ‗the 
right of Israel to protect its people by building a security fence,‘ and echoing Israel‘s claim that 
‗this is a political matter that is outside the jurisdiction of the ICJ.‘‖503 Furthermore, Senators 
Hillary Clinton, Charles Schumer, Orrin Hatch, and Gordon Smith ―circulated for signatures a 
letter to Annan urging him to ‗reverse‘ his support for the ICJ hearing.‖504 The letter was signed 
by 79 (out of 100) Senators. Then, Rep. Mike Pence introduced H.CON.RES.273, which 
―‗support[ed] the construction by Israel of a security fence to prevent Palestinian terrorist attacks 
and condemn[ed] the decision by the [UNGA] to request the [ICJ] to render an opinion on the 
legality of the security fence.‘‖505 H.CON.RES.390, H.CON.RES.371, H.RES.713, as well as 
S.Res.408 expressed similar provisions; and H.RES.713 referred to the Occupied Territories as 
―disputed‖ territories.506 
 M.J. Rosenberg observes that it hasn‘t mattered whether such measures ―‗are likely to 
actually become law, whether they advance U.S. policy goals or whether, if implemented they 
would benefit Israel. The point is to go on record as blasting Palestinians in the hope that pro-
Israel donors and voters believe that anything that hurts Palestinians helps Israel and that they 
will reward them accordingly.‘‖507 
 After President Bush endorsed the ―unilateral‖ disengagement plan in his April 14, 2004 
letter to Ariel Sharon, H.CON.RES.460 expressed the House‘s support and stated that the goal is 
to ―‗build the capacity and will of Palestinian institutions to fight terrorism, dismantle terrorist 
organizations, and prevent the areas from which Israel has withdrawn from posing a threat to the 
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security of Israel,‘‖508 rather than building a coherent Palestinian state. H.CON.RES.460 was 
introduced by Tom Delay and Steny Hoyer, co-sponsored by Tom Lantos and Henry Hyde, 
among others, and it was passed on June 23 by a roll-call vote of 407-9. Dov Weisglass, senior 
Sharon aide, called the House vote ―a watershed, ‗one of the most important in U.S.-Israel 
relations.‘‖509 The Israeli government and its U.S. lobby work in a complementary manner. In its 
essence, H.CON.RES.460 supported the Israeli vision of giving the Palestinians an entity, rather 
than a state; an entity that would govern the Palestinian civil affairs, while acting as a policing 
force for Israel and being military controlled by the Israeli army.  
 
109
th
 Congress (2005-2006) 
  Congress‘ unconditional support of Israel continued during its 109th session, and it was 
given a boost by the outcomes of the 2004 congressional elections. Following those elections 
Senators Lincoln Chafee and Barbara Boxer remained the Chairman and the Ranking Member, 
respectively, of the Near Eastern Subcommittee.
510
 Additionally, Henry Hyde and Tom Lantos 
returned as Chairman and Ranking Member of the House International Relations Committee; 
while Ileana Lehtinen and Gary Ackerman remained the Chairwoman and the Ranking Member 
of the Middle East Subcommittee. Ackerman, Boxer, Shelly Berkley, Ros-Lehtienen, Lantos, as 
well as other members of those committees and subcommittees were among the top recipients of 
campaign contributions from pro-Israel PACs during that election cycle (See Table 4 in Index-
Ch.3). During its 109
th
 session, Congress was pre-occupied with other issues on the international 
arena such as Iraq and Iran, but this did not prevent it from addressing the outcomes of the 
Palestinian elections and U.S. aid to the PA. 
The rise of Mahmoud Abbas to Palestinian presidency brought a lot of optimism. 
Majority Leader Bill Frist and Minority Leader Harry Reid introduced S.Res.27, which was 
unanimously passed on Feb.1 and it commended the Palestinian presidential elections of Jan 9, 
2005, and ―support[ed] the ‗vision of two democratic states, Israel and Palestine, living side by 
side in peace and security.‘‖511 Majority Whip Roy Blunt and Minority Whip Steny Hoyer also 
introduced H.Res.56, the House version of that resolution, which was passed on Feb. 2
nd
.
512
 On 
the other hand, Evangelical Christian Tom DeLay became one of the staunchest challengers to 
supporting the new Palestinian president with $200 million in additional economic aid and 
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Ackerman, who‘s Jewish, described him as being ―‗more Jewish than the chief rabbi,‘‖ by 
adding many restrictions on the aid package and removing a provision for a presidential waiver 
of such restrictions.
513
 In a statement that highlighted his changing attitudes, Ackerman criticized 
DeLay by saying, ―‗if you want to ensure that there will not be a peace process, then you attach 
enough strings that you strangle the process.‘‖514 
H.R.1143 by Anthony Weiner prohibited aid to the PA ―for programs in the West Bank 
and Gaza unless a series of stringent conditions were met.‖515 On April 28, Weiner also 
introduced H.R.2036 ―to make it illegal for the PLO to maintain an office in the U.S.‖516 Further, 
the Appropriation Bill for FY‘06 included many restrictions on aid to the PA such as an 
amendment by Shelley Berkley ―saying that of the total amount of aid available to the PA, no 
more than 25 percent may be obligated and spent during any calendar year.‖517 Highlighting the 
nature of another obstruction, Thomas Reynolds sponsored H.R.588, which reaffirmed Congress‘ 
call for recognizing Jerusalem as the united Capital of Israel.
518
 Furthermore, Senators Sam 
Brownback, Mike Crapo, and Gordon Smith introduced S.J.Res.14, ―‗providing for the 
recognition of Jerusalem as the undivided capital of Israel before the U.S. recognizes a 
Palestinian state.‘‖519  
Shirl McArthur notes that in 2005 a group of top recipients of campaign contributions 
from pro-Israel PACs such as Shelley Berkley, Tom Lantos, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, and Anthony 
Weiner seemed ―oblivious or indifferent to the changes taking place in the Israel-Palestine 
arena.
520
 As M.J. Rosenberg described it in The Israeli Policy Forum, they seemed to believe 
―‗that humiliating Abbas and the Palestinians helps Israel. For them Israel and Palestine is a 
zero-sum game: help one, hurt the other, [but] they could not be more wrong.‘‖521 This was 
particularly emphasized by the actions of Republican congressmen such Tom Delay, which 
reflected their evangelical Christian believes in an apocalyptic eschatological scheme that simply 
advocates for the battle royal and considers the peace process irrelevant.  
Such indifference was carried out parallel to congressional attempts to signal the United 
Nations out of the equation for a peaceful settlement to the Conflict. In reaction to a U.N. 
resolution that condemned Israel‘s 2006 War on Gaza Strip and Lebanon, H.Res.282 
―specifically equate[d] anti-Israel actions‖ at the U.N. with anti-Semitism.522 It‘s identical Senate 
version that was introduced by Rick Santorum, S.Res.240, expressed ―‗the sense of the Senate 
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regarding manifestation of anti-Semitism by U.N. member states and urg[ed] action against anti-
Semitism by U.N. officials, U.N. member states, and the Government of the U.S.‘‖523 Between 
1989-2004, the U.S. vetoed twelve UNSC resolutions condemning Israeli actions against the 
Palestinian demonstrators of the first and the second Intifada and/or condemning Israeli 
confiscation of Palestinian land and the building of settlements.
524
 Among their provisions, 
H.Res.242 and S.Res.240 say that ―‗the President should direct the U.S. Permanent 
Representative to the U.N. to continue working toward further reduction of anti-Semitic 
language and anti-Israel resolutions.‘‖525  
 At the same time, in the lead up to the Palestinian municipal and parliamentary elections 
of late 2006, Eric Cantor introduced H.Res.575, which advised that ―‗Hamas and other terrorist 
organizations should not participate in elections held by the Palestinian Authority.‘‖526 After 
Hamas became a U.S. designated terrorist organization, while its activities never focused on the 
U.S., efforts were now being carried out to prevent it from participating in a call for democratic 
changes in the region, made by the U.S. Seventy Senators sent a letter to George W. Bush stating 
that ―‗if terrorist groups such as Hamas were brought into the PA, ‗the U.S.—and no doubt other 
countries as well—would have little choice but to re-evaluate all aspects of [their] relations with 
the Palestinian Authority.‘‖527 H.R.4668 by Rep. Vito Fossella, and S. 2237 by Senator Rick 
Santorum also called for ―limiting aid to the PA.‖528  
At the highlight of the 108
th
 Congress was the passage of H.R.4681 (The Palestinian 
Anti-Terrorism Act) after Hamas‘ winning of the Palestinian Parliamentary elections. H.R.4681 
was introduced by Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Tom Lantos, and, among other provisions, it 
―prohibit direct assistance to the PA unless the president issues a ‗certification‘ that the PA has 
met a long, unrealistic list of requirements, including several unrelated to Hamas and the election 
results.‖529 While the Bush administration worked at ousting Hamas from its democratically held 
power positions, U.S. Congress ensured with its restrictions on aid to the Palestinians that the 
moderates in the PA would be equally suppressed.  
David Rose‘s 2008 article ―The Gaza Bombshell‖ in Vanity Affairs highlights that those 
specific restrictions on U.S. aid to the PA significantly contributed to the weakening of Fatah 
forces and the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip. As a result of it, Fatah officials lost their 
salaries, while Iran emboldened Hamas forces by providing them with their needed financial 
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capacities.
530
 The Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act also ―restrict[ed] the travel of PA 
representatives to the U.N., prohibit[ed] a PA or PLO office in the U.S., and tr[ied] to prevent 
international financial institutions from helping the PA.‖531 At its March 5-7, 2006 annual 
conference, AIPAC specifically promoted this resolution and soon thereafter it became co-
sponsored by a total of 296 Representatives.
532
 
Mitch McConnell introduced the Senate version of this Act, S.2370, which gave the 
president ―slightly more flexibility,‖ and made the provisions of the House bill regarding 
restrictions on PA officials ―discretionary rather than mandatory.‖533 Allan C. Brownfeld argues 
that this Act was ―watered down‖ due to the efforts of liberal Jewish-American groups including 
the Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism, Americans for Peace Now and the Israel Policy 
Forum.
534
 On the other hand, when Rep. Betty McCollum voted against this Act, she ―received a 
phone call from an AIPAC representative in Minnesota saying that her ‗support for terrorists 
would not be tolerated.‘‖535 When passed, H.Res.4681 also contained a presidential waiver for its 
restrictions on visas for PA representatives and the maintenance of a PLO office in Washington, 
D.C; and S.2370 contained many provisions aimed at Hamas, requiring it to undertake reform.
536
 
At the end; however, both versions of that Act made U.S. aid to the PA and U.S. contact with the 
new government pursued through microscopic lenses scrutinizing every aspect, including aid to 
international organizations operating in the Palestinian Territories such as UNRWA.  
Consequently, Chairman of the House Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee, 
Rep. Jim Kolbe, inserted a provision in the appropriation bill for FY‘06 stating that ―no direct aid 
can be given unless the Secretary of State certifies that the PA has ‗demonstrated its commitment 
to the principles of nonviolence, the recognition of Israel, and the acceptance of previous 
agreements and obligations, including the ‗Roadmap.‘‖537  Meanwhile, as U.S. aid to the PA was 
being restricted, Rep. Ileana Rose-Lehtinen introduced H.CON.RES.412, which urged the 
President and Secretary of State ―‗to affirm as a matter of U.S. policy that Jerusalem must remain 
the undivided capital of Israel‘‖ and that the president should begin ―‗the process of relocating 
the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem.‘‖538 S.CON.RES.98 called for similar provisions; 
however, in Dec., 2006 President Bush ―exercised his waiver authority,‖ thereby preventing this 
relocation of U.S. Embassy in Israel based on national security approximations.
539
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110
th
 Congress (2007-2008) 
 According to the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, the 2006 congressional election cycle 
increased the number of Jewish-American Senators from 11 to 13, and Representatives from 24 
to 29.
540
 Shirl McArthur reports that as a result of the 2006 elections, Israel‘s ―knee-jerk‖ 
supporter, Rep. Tom Lantos, became the Chairman of the House International Relations 
Committee, while the main sponsor of The Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act, Rep. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen, was replaced by the relatively moderate Rep. Gary Ackerman as Chairman of the 
Middle East Subcommittee.
541
 Iran was at the center of congressional debates during the 110
th
 
Congress; however, some congressional action still took aim at the Palestinians. 
 Building on the Palestine Anti-Terrorism Act, U.S. aid to the PA was suspended after the 
signing of the Hamas-PLO unitary government agreement in February, 2007. At the same time, 
the Bush administration requested an additional $86 million ―to strengthen…Abbas‘ security 
forces,‖542 or to advance its Action Plan for Palestinian Presidency. This request was placed ―on 
hold‖ by Nita Lowey, while Tom Lantos, Gary Ackerman, Ros-Lehtinen and Mike Pence wrote 
to Condoleezza Rice ―urging her to reconsider the decision.‖543 State Department spokesman 
Sean McCormack then said that ―in the light of the national unity agreement between Fatah and 
Hamas, the administration was seeking assurance from Abbas that none of the funds would 
benefit Hamas.‖544  
Additionally, in March, 2007 seventy-nine Senators signed an AIPAC drafted letter to 
Rice, stating that ―‗no aid or no direct contact‘‖ shall be made ―‗with any member of a 
Palestinian Government that does not explicitly and unequivocally recognize Israel‘s right to 
exist, renounce terror, and accept previous agreements.‘‖545 The liberal Jewish-American 
organization Brit Tzedek v‘Shalom opposed this letter and ―urged its supporters to call their 
senators and tell them not to sign‖ this letter. Brit Tzedek v‘Shalom argued that ―At a time when 
the U.S. should be supporting forces of moderation among the Palestinians, this letter weakens 
those forces and demonstrates to the Palestinian people that moderation brings them nothing.‖546 
At the same time, on April 25, Sam Brownback and Susan Collins introduced yet another 
resolution regarding Jerusalem, as S.J.Res.12 ―‗provid[ed] for the recognition of Jerusalem as the 
undivided capital of Israel before the U.S. recognizes a Palestinian state,‘‖547 just as Israeli Prime 
Minister Ehud Olmert expressed willingness during his negotiations with Abbas to divide 
  
80 
 
Jerusalem into two capitals. H.RES.895 called for similar provisions and was introduced by Tom 
Reynolds. Additionally, Tom Lantos‘ H.CON.RES12 ―‗congratulat[ed] Israel on the 40th 
anniversary of its victory in the Six-Day War and the reunification of Jerusalem,‖548 thereby 
approving Israel‘s occupation of Arab land as a result of that war. M.J. Rosenberg notes that this 
resolution, H.CON.RES.12, ―‗presents more evidence that the U.S. [was] abandoning the role of 
honest broker.‘‖549  
 However, despite the fact that H.CON.RES12 highlighted the views of a great majority 
in Congress, it was countered by a more balanced and reasonable resolution, S.Res.224/ 
S.Res.321 of Dianne Feinstein, which reaffirmed, among other provisions, ―the Senate‘s 
‗commitment to a true and lasting solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict, based on the 
establishment of two states, the state of Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and 
security, and with recognized borders.‘‖550 S.Res.224/S.Res.321 had only 38 cosponsors out of 
100 Senators.
551
  
Meanwhile, after armed-clashes between Hamas and Fatah resulted in Hamas‘ takeover 
of the Gaza Strip on June 11, 2007 the unitary government was dissolved, and the U.S. and other 
members of the Quartet lifted their ―embargo on direct aid to the Palestinian Authority under 
President Mahmoud Abbas [in the West Bank].‖552 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
announced on June 18 ―an aid package that would redirect all of the previously allocated $86 
million to help Abbas‘ government provide essential services.‖553 Additionally, following the 
Annapolis Conference of Nov., 2007 President Bush‘s emergency supplemental appropriation 
request for 2008 included $410 million in aid for the Palestinians.
554
 On the other hand, a 
―Memorandum of Understanding‖ between the U.S. and Israel in 2007 expressed that the U.S. 
would ―provide Israel with $30 billion in military aid over the next 10 years.‖555  
 
IV. Evangelical Christian Activism 
The language of resolutions passed in U.S. Congress during the Bush administration did 
not only reflect the views of AIPAC, but it also reflected the premillennialist personal believes of 
many congressmen. In reaction to the 9/11 attacks, evangelical leaders such as Pat Robertson 
called for ―strong, decisive, hard-line military action against the Palestinians.‖556 In an interview 
on Robertson‘s 700 Club TV Show, Jerry Falwell compared the Palestinians to Hitler ―in 
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wanting to eradicate the Jews and gain world domination.‖557 In reference to the Camp David 
summit in another occasion, Pat Robertson said that the summit was ―‗weakness in Israel under 
the Barack administration that let Hezbollah come screaming through the borders, emboldened 
the Palestinians.‘‖ To this, his 700 Club Show guest, Steve Emerson, replied: ―‗we‘ve seen 
weakness since Oslo was signed - we lost the deterrence.‘‖558  
At a Washington rally in April 15, 2002 the evangelical radio talk-show host, Janet 
Parshall, ―ridiculed calls for Israel to give up occupied territory in exchange for peace. ‗It means 
giving away Israel one piece at a time,‘ she said. ‗We will never divide Jerusalem…We will 
never vacillate in our support for Israel.‖559 At a New York rally for the same occasion, 
Jerusalem Day, Israel‘s Consul General Alon Pinkas, described Israel‘s relationship with 
evangelical Christians as one ―‗that has not been twisted or dictated by politics or interests,‘‖ and 
he expressed Israel‘s gratitude for their support of Israel ―‗especially in these times of crisis.‘‖560 
As Sharon‘s government was using excessive force to putdown the Palestinian uprising, ―the 
godfather of the Christian right,‖ Ed McAteer, expressed on a CBS TV Show ―we are seeing 
prophecy unfold so rapidly and dramatically and wonderfully and, without exaggerating, [it] 
makes me breathless.‖561 
Such views make the dreamers of Greater Israel build as many settlements as they want, 
confiscate as much Palestinian territory as they pleased, and suppress the Palestinians as they 
wished, while still counting on U.S. support. For evangelical Christians, ―the only Israelis who 
are really listening to God are the hard-line Jewish settlers who live on the West Bank and Gaza 
and refuse to move.‖562 Malcolm Hedding of the ICEJ, which by 2004 had branches in more than 
55 countries, declared that evangelical Christians ―‗stand for the right that all the land…God 
gave under the Abrahamic covenant 4,000 years ago is Israel‘s…and He will regulate the affairs 
of how Israel comes into the allotment which is hers forever…There is no such thing as a 
Palestinian.‘‖563 
The decade after the 9/11 attacks witnessed the establishment of a growing number of 
evangelical Christian organizations, dedicated to give Israel unconditional support. In 2002, the 
president of the International Fellowship of Christians and Jews, Orthodox Rabbi Yechiel Z. 
Eckstein, joined former executive director of the Christian Coalition and then-chairman of the 
Georgia Republican Party, Ralph Reed, in launching the organization Stand for Israel. Eckstein, 
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who raised over $60 million for Israeli settlements by 2002, announced that Stand for Israel 
would ―‗press the button and mobilize the troops,‘‖ in a situation ―‗for example, where someone 
in Washington is pressuring the Prime Minister of Israel to hold back in the fight against 
terrorism…‖564  
Stand for Israel became yet another lobbying organization working on behalf of Israeli 
hard-liners on Capitol Hill. CIPAC, the other evangelical Christian organization that was 
launched in response to the Oslo Accords, also lobbied Congress against placing limits on Israeli 
actions in the Occupied Territories during the Intifada. CIPAC‘s president, Richard Hellman  
―called on U.S. leaders ‗to desist from proposing any more plans to settle the Israel-Arab 
dispute.‘‖565 As Ralph Reed notes, evangelical Christians were ―‗shifting the center of gravity in 
the pro-Israel community to become a more conservative and Republican phenomena.‘‖566 
According to Morten Klein, an AIPAC staff member, ―‗in many districts where there are very 
few Jews, the members of the House and Senate are Israel‘s supporters in part because of the 
strong Christian lobby on Capitol Hill.‘‖567      
On March 4, 2002 Senator James M. Inofe said on the Senate floor: ―‗I believe very 
strongly that we ought to support Israel…because God said so…Look it up in the Book of 
Genesis…This is not a political battle at all. It is a contest over whether or not the word of God is 
true.‘‖568 The Wall Street Journal highlighted in its May 23, 2002 issue that then-House 
Republican leader, Dick Armey went ―‗so far as to suggest that Palestinians, not Israelis, ought 
to be the ones to surrender land in the quest for peace.‘‖569 In an interview with Chris Matthews 
on CNBC, Armey stated: ―‗I‘m content to have Israel grab the entire West Bank…There are 
many Arab nations that have many hundreds of thousands of acres of land, soil, and property and 
opportunity to create a Palestinian State.‘‖570 In 2002 Dick Armey also asserted: ―‗Let me be 
clear, Israel is fighting the same war on terrorism that we are fighting.‘‖571  
Evangelical Christians were the main factor behind George W. Bush‘s winning of the 
2004 close presidential elections; Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell ―claim the support of 100 
million Americans with whom they communicate weekly.‖572 The Wall Street Journal 
highlighted in 2002 that the evangelical Christians‘ support of Israel explains ―‗More than any 
other single factor…why there has been so little pressure from a Republican White House on 
Israel to curb its crackdown on Palestinians.‘‖573 President Bush‘s support of Israel was 
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strengthened by the fact that it was a successful campaign strategy. In particular, during his first 
term as U.S. president, Bush couldn‘t risk losing evangelical Christians‘ support for pressuring 
Israel to be more humane in its treatment of the Palestinians. 
When Israel launched its first major military operation in the West Bank and started to re-
occupy Palestinian cities in March and April, 2002, Bush called for an immediate withdrawal; 
however, he soon changed his stance by one that expressed support of Israel‘s ―right to defend 
itself.‖ At a CBS 60 Minutes show, Jerry Falwell claimed what happened was that he sent a letter 
―of protest to the White House, which was followed by 100,000 e-mails from Christian 
conservatives. [Therefore] Israel did not move its tanks. [And] Bush did not ask again.‖574  
In a second occasion in 2003, President Bush ―publicly berated‖ Israel for attempting to 
assassinate Hamas‘s founder, Ahmed Yassin, as provocative of more violence. However, his 
public statements on this issue changed very quickly as he again expressed solidarity with 
Israel‘s ―right to defend itself.‖ According to Gary Bauer, president of American Values, 
―‗[s]everal evangelical leaders took issue with the president…I got thousands of e-mails the next 
day,‘‖ reports Bauer, ―‗that were copies of e-mails sent to the president,‘‖ thereby bringing about 
Bush‘s changing course of action.575 Further, in April, 2004 the White House became ―publicly 
supportive‖ when Israel assassinated Dr. Rantisi, who was another political leader of Hamas.576 
In retrospect, in January, 2004 the Israeli Knesset formed the Christian Allies Caucus ―to 
coordinate activities with Christian Zionist supporters.‖577 Former Israeli Tourism Minister 
Benny Elon, reported that 400,000 evangelical Christians traveled to Israel in 2003, 
―contributing millions of dollars to the Israeli economy.‖578 Christian Friends of Israeli 
Communities‘ ―Adopt-A-Settlement‖ program brought ten tour groups a month to nearly 60 
settlements.
579
 Likud leaders such as Yitzhak Shamir, Benjamin Netanyahu and Ariel Sharon 
addressed gatherings of those supporters in Jerusalem and met with their leaders during their 
visits to the U.S; the leaders of the more than 200 pro-Israel organizations.
580
  
 The newest of such is John Hagee‘s lobbying organization of Christians United For Israel 
(CUFI), which was launched on February 2006. The number of its members grew from 4,000 
people during its first months of operation to 428,000 by 2010.
581
 At CUFI‘s founding 
conference, Hagee ―coined the term ‗Islamofacist,‘ ‗and within a week [President] Bush was 
using it.‘‖582 In his book The Jerusalem Countdown, Hagee envisions an apocalyptic scenario 
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where Iran would launch a nuclear attack on Israel, thereby ushering in the battle of 
Armageddon.
583
 Jewish-Americans who welcome the support of such evangelical leaders simply 
―dismiss the evangelical theology,‖ argues Allan C. Brownfeld; ―‗since they don‘t believe in the 
apocalypse of Second Coming, they regard such predictions as irrelevant. What matters [to them] 
is here-and-now support.‘‖584 Speakers to the second annual conference of CUFI included Sen. 
Joseph Lieberman, who ―compared the Christian Zionists to Moses,‖ former Speaker of the 
House Newt Gingrich, former Israeli Ambassador Dore Gold, and then-Israeli Ambassador 
Sallai Meridor.
585
 In his introduction of Sallai Meridor at that conference, Gary Bauer demanded 
that Israel never gives up ―one centimeter‖ of Palestinian land, ―even under American 
pressure.‖586  
With its organized offices in every state of the Union, CUFI holds the point of view that 
the U.S. should never ―tell Jerusalem how to conduct its foreign or domestic affairs.‖587 Its 
Charter states that ―God gave the land of Israel to the Jewish people in perpetuity. Therefore, any 
talk about the ‗legality of the settlements is meaningless, since all the land West of the 
Jordan…belongs to the Jewish people forever. No U.N. resolution,‖ CUFI asserts, ―can compete 
with the power of God.‖588 In effect, CUFI has recently given $6 million in aid to the settlement 
of Ariel in the West Bank, it holds more than 40 events per month nationwide, it sponsors 
outreach programs to Hispanic and African Americans, and ―it boasts a growing network on 
college campuses‖ through its national initiative CUFI on Campus.589 On the last day of its 2010 
annual conference, its members and conference participants called and visited their congressmen 
to remind them that ―their reelection might depend on how they vote…on Israel,‖ and that they 
speak ―not just for CUFI but for the 50-70 million U.S. evangelicals whose support of Israel [is] 
unwavering.‖590  
 
This Chapter has explained the Bush administration‘s approach to the Peace Process. It has 
highlighted how Israel and its allied groups in the U.S. linked U.S. ―War on Terror‖ to the Israeli 
policies towards the Palestinian Intifada, in order to strengthen the Israeli vision of giving the 
Palestinians only a sub-administrative entity. By censoring the Media and U.S. public opinion; 
issuing series of resolutions that expressed congressional support of Israel and ―condemned or 
punished the Palestinians;‖ and heavily lobbying Congress to advance particular apocalyptic 
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sceneries; pro-Israel special interest groups in the U.S. were successful at diverging the focus of 
U.S. Middle East policy from the Peace Process to an Israeli campaign of ―combating Palestinian 
terrorism.‖ As a result, radical groups in the Palestinian territories were isolated by the U.S., 
Israel as well as the PA, which made them become more extreme, increased Palestinians‘ 
suffering, and pushed the Palestinians further into the corner of autonomy-related debates and 
away from independence. The ―War on Terror‖ gave legitimacy to Israeli occupation of 
Palestinian land and it has heavily undermined the future of the two-state resolution. The 
following chapter discusses the Obama administration‘s approach to the issue of Palestinian 
statehood, as well as the Israeli lobby‘s influence over the official U.S. course of action in 
regards to the Peace Process.  
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Chapter Four 
Hesitant Involvement 
  
I. The Obama Administration and the Peace Process (2009-2011) 
Neal Allen highlights that the Bush administration‘s ―War on Terror,‖ was a 
―presidentially-created foreign policy regime‖ that resulted in a punctuated equilibrium. Such 
equilibrium has made the current Obama administration struggle to smoothly breakaway from 
certain policies of its predecessor, such as the war on Iraq and Afghanistan, and the closing down 
of Guantanamo prison.
591
  Therefore, as Stanley Renshon notes, President Obama became one of 
―vast domestic ambitions,‖ but it remains unclear ―whether he has such large ambitions 
internationally,‖ or how consistent those ambitions are.592 For instance, in his 2009 Cairo speech, 
President Obama called for the establishment of a Palestinian state and his administration 
attempted to broker a two-state resolution based on the 1967 borders of Gaza Strip and the West 
Bank; however, such efforts remained passive and George Mitchell, Obama‘s Special Envoy to 
the Middle East, has resigned in May 2011. Additional inherited policies from the Bush 
administration such as adding Hamas to the State Department‘s list of foreign terrorist 
organizations has constrained the Obama administration‘s diplomatic maneuver, as a mediator 
between Israel and Palestine. 
At the same time, in its peace efforts, the Obama administration was further inhibited by 
the influence of U.S. domestic forces that contributed significantly to Obama‘s winning of 2008 
presidential elections. Exit polls show that 78% of Jewish-Americans voted for President Obama 
and giving the fact that they usually contribute 60% of the funds collected by the Democratic 
Party in a presidential election; Jewish-Americans gave out $457.9 million to the campaign of 
Barak Obama in 2008.
593
 President Obama was silent about Israel‘s 2008-2009 war on Gaza 
Strip, which was purposefully waged soon after his election and before the ascendance of his 
administration to the White House, and in fear of becoming a one-term president, Obama has 
been ―compelled to devote all his time and energy to get reelected. In such a situation,‖ argues 
former Knesset member Uri Avnery, ―he cannot afford to provoke AIPAC and run the risk of 
losing the votes—and the money of [Jewish-Americans].‖594  
Arnaud de Borchgrave has described presidential candidates‘ kowtowing at AIPAC‘s 
2008 annual conferences, as becoming ―‗a political rite of passage, like a medieval contract for 
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exchanging goods and services…Anyone who doesn‘t pass the litmus test‖ argues de 
Borchgrave, ―can forget about becoming president of the United States.‘‖595 Philip Weis asserts 
―‗it would be hard to imagine a more naked exhibition of political power;‘‖ AIPAC‘s 2008 
conference was ―‗a convention of 7,000 mostly rich people, with more than half the Congress in 
attendance, as well as all the major presidential candidates, the Prime Minister of Israel, the 
Minority Leader, the Majority Leader [in Congress] and the Speaker of the House.‘‖596 
The Obama administration has made many gestures toward the Palestinians, but as 
Avnery notes, ―in any real test with Netanyahu and AIPAC,‖ President Obama has been ―the 
first to blink.‖597  For example, in the midst of U.S. pressure on Israel with regards to the 
settlements, Netanyahu‘s government ―publicly humiliated‖ Vice President Joseph Biden when it 
announced, during a March, 2010 visit of the Vice President to Israel, the construction of 1,600 
new housing units in the Israeli settlements of East Jerusalem.
598
 However, in recognition of 
AIPAC‘s clout, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, 
as well as ―more than half the members of Congress‖ were later present at the March, 2010 
annual conference of AIPAC.
599
 At that conference, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton ―firmly 
repeated the administration‘s position that continued Israeli construction in the occupied 
territories, including East Jerusalem, damages prospects for peace. However, Netanyahu 
defiantly declared that he had no intention of halting construction in East Jerusalem.‖600 
At the same time, following intense diplomatic pressure from the Obama administration 
and other members of the Quartet, Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to freeze the building of 
settlements for two months, thereby giving way for a peace proposal by the Quartet that called 
for the establishment of a Palestinian state by the end of 2011. However, after the expiration of 
the two months, Netanyahu resumed building settlements, and he has rejected multiple requests 
from President Obama for renewing the settlement freeze. The Obama administration even 
offered Netanyahu ―$3 billion worth of F-25 attack jets,‖ and said it would ―make no further 
demands for a settlement freeze, and veto all U.N. resolutions critical of Israel as well as any 
attempt by the Palestinians to gain U.N. support for a declaration of statehood,‖ all in exchange 
of three-additional months of a settlement freeze.
601
 Netanyahu‘s Cabinet still rejected the offer. 
Obama never asked again. The U.S. still vetoed a UNSC resolution in February, 2011 
condemning the settlements, even though that resolution ran parallel to official U.S. policy since 
1967. 
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 Threatening that the U.S. would cut its annual aid to Israel if the latter does not stop 
building settlements was out of the question, despite the fact that many members in Netanyahu‘s 
Cabinet even advocate for an Israeli annexation of the West Bank.
602
 In such a situation where 
the U.S. was losing its credibility as an honest broker, President of the Palestinian Authority, 
Mahmoud Abbas, started placing his own conditions on negotiating with Israel, asserting that the 
PA would not talk to Netanyahu‘s government until it stopped all settlement-related activities. 
Additionally, on May 4, 2011 the Palestinian rival groups of Fatah and Hamas signed an 
agreement to form ―an interim government composed of neutral technocratic experts,‖ with 
parliamentary and presidential elections to be held the following year.
603
 In reaction to the 
signing of that agreement, the Obama administration threatened to cut U.S. economic aid to the 
PA, on the grounds that ―‗Hamas is a terrorist organization that targets civilians,‘‖ and should, 
therefore, be excluded from any future Palestinian government until it renounced violence and 
accepted Israel‘s right to exist.604 Needless to say, the Peace Talks reached a dead-end. 
As the Norwegian diplomat Jonas Gahr notes, ―Hamas is a social, political, religious and 
military reality that governs 1.5 million Palestinians…‗It will not simply go away as a result of 
Western isolation,‘‖ nor will it change its covenant without a mutual Israeli recognition of 
Palestine‘s right to exist.605 Further, studies by the IMF, the U.N., and the World Bank ―have 
found the Palestinian Authority to be fully capable of running an independent state,‖ but 
highlighted that this ―could not be sustained unless Israel eased its political, physical, and 
economic restrictions in the West Bank and Gaza.‖606 It has become evident that Israel‘s control 
of more than 60% of the West Bank through its settlements, as well as its economic and political 
suppression of the Palestinians, are the main obstacles to establishing a Palestinian state. 
Hamas‘s leaders, for instance, ―repeatedly have expressed a willingness to endorse a peace 
agreement with Israel that is approved by a majority of Palestinians.‖607 
On the other hand, Moshe Ya‘alon, Netanyahu‘s Deputy Prime Minister, told the 
magazine Besheva in an interview that Israel‘s ―‗intention is to leave the situation as it is: 
autonomous management of civil affairs. If they [Palestinians] want to call it a state let them call 
it that. If they want to call it an empire, by all means; we intend to keep what exists now.‘‖608 In 
other words, Israel‘s continuation of confiscating Palestinian land is endangering the two-state 
resolution by enforcing new facts on the ground (the settlements), which hinder the coherence 
and viability of a future Palestinian state, while finding unwavering support among the Israeli 
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allied U.S. special interest groups. Thus, the PA has refused to settle for having a non-
functioning as well as dependent ―entity,‖ and it has decided to enforce UNSC R.242 and the 
U.N. Partition Plan through other channels than the Peace Process. Soon after the signing of the 
Palestinian unitary-government agreement, the PA has announced its plans of seeking full U.N. 
membership of Palestine within the 1967 borders of Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, and West Bank.  
In his May 24, 2011 speech to Congress, Netanyahu himself declared ―to a chorus of 
nonstop cheering by Democratic and Republican legislators,‖ that there would be ―no return of 
Palestinian refugees, no negotiations with a Palestinian Authority that included Hamas, no return 
to Israel‘s 1967 borders and no withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Jordan Valley [West Bank 
border area with Jordan].‖609 He also insisted that Jerusalem would remain undivided, while 
receiving unwavering support from U.S. Congress. As Rachelle Marshall puts it, ―The 
Palestinians‘ decision to go to the U.N. has…exposed the hoax that Israel is willing to accept a 
two-state solution.‖610 Uri Avenry, a former Israeli Knesset member, argues that just like his 
predecessor Yitzhak Shamir, Netanyahu‘s strategy has been since the 1990s ―To prevent any 
advance toward peace, since peace means the evacuation of settlements and the setting up of a 
Palestinian state,‖ which runs counter to his vision of Greater Israel.611 
At the same time, as part of his 2012 presidential election campaign, President Obama 
has promised that the U.S. ―would oppose ‗symbolic actions to isolate Israel at the U.N.‘‖612 
Additionally, after declaring in May, 2011 that the 1967 borders should be the main framework 
for creating a Palestinian state, with mutually agreed land swaps between Israel and the 
Palestinians, President Obama backtracked his remarks to accommodate for Netanyahu‘s 
policies. He said that ―‗The parties themselves will negotiate a border that is different than the 
one that existed on June 4, 1967 to account for the changes that have taken place over the last 44 
years.‘‖613 This is in essence what George W. Bush said in his letter to then-Israeli Prime 
Minister Ariel Sharon in 2004, which signaled to the Palestinian leadership that it should no 
longer rely on the U.S. as the broker of a two-state resolution. 
The support of the Israeli lobby in the U.S. to the Israeli policy of giving the Palestinians 
a sub-administrative entity is deceptively changing the long-held U.S. position of endorsing 
UNSC Res.242 as the framework for any future settlement. It is also violating the fourth Geneva 
Convention, to which both of Israel and the U.S. are signatories, and which prohibits an 
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occupation force from transferring its population into any land it has acquired as a result of 
military force. Thus, what benefit is there for the Palestinians out of counting on the U.S. as an 
honest broker, if the Israeli lobby is already starting to change the basis of any future 
negotiations? ―We go to the United Nations now,‖ wrote Abbas in a May 17 op-ed for The New 
York Times, ―to secure the right to live free in the remaining 22% of our historic homeland.‖614  
And this is not a unilateral move, as declared Maen Areikat, chief PLO representative in 
Washington, DC; ―By seeking U.N. membership…the Palestinian Authority is trying to show the 
international community that it is trying to preserve a two-state solution—because the only other 
alternative is a continuation of the status quo.‖615 Areikat asserted prior to the Palestinians‘ 
application at the U.N. that the PA is ―not in the business of delegitimizing Israel. We are in the 
business of legitimizing Palestine.‘‖616 On the other hand, once Mahmoud Abbas officially 
submitted the UN membership application, Abbas was ―punished by $200 million cut in aid from 
the U.S.‖617 Additionally, building on U.S laws from early 1990s (See Ch.2), the U.S. has 
withdrawn its financial contributions to UNESCO as soon as it admitted Palestine as a full-
member state in late 2011.  
Meanwhile, the Quartet announced, on the same day as when the PA officially submitted 
its petition to the international community, an additional proposal for resuming Israeli-
Palestinian negotiations. For the remainder of 2011, the PA has placed its U.N. plans on-hold, 
Israel has accelerated its settlement activities in East Jerusalem, the members of the Quartet have 
continued to be passive observers, and ―peace talks‖ continued to stagnate. However, the 
attitudes of U.S. executive and legislature toward the Palestinians‘ quest for statehood has made 
the U.S. lose credibility in being the future facilitator of the two-state resolution, and has given 
way for other members of the Quartet, such as the E.U. and the U.N., to play a more influential 
role in bringing about a peaceful settlement to the conflict.  
 
II. The Israel Lobby and U.S. Congress 
111
th
 Congress (2008-2010) 
  Obama‘s hesitancy to confront AIPAC and Netanyahu‘s government was further 
enforced by the un-conditional support that Israel enjoys in U.S. Congress. As a result of the 
2008 congressional election cycle, Jewish-American Senators remained 13 (13%), and Jewish-
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American Representatives in the House reached 32 members (7%), compared to the 2% of 
Americans who are Jewish.
618
 Top recipients of campaign contributions from pro-Israel PACs 
(See Table 5 in Index-Ch.4) such as Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, Senate Minority Leader 
Mitch McConnell, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, and House Minority Leader John Boehner have 
all retained their positions.
619
 Additionally, Jewish-American Representative Eric Cantor became 
the House Minority Whip.
 620
   
Despite being faced with domestic economic crisis, the 111
th
 session of Congress showed 
that ―congressional blind support for Israeli actions, regardless of how egregious, has not 
wavered. Within a week of convening, and in the middle of Israel‘s onslaught against 
Palestinians in Gaza,‖ reports Shirl McArthur, ―both the Senate and the House managed to find 
time to pass similar resolutions expressing ‗their vigorous support and unwavering 
commitment‘‖ to Israel‘s security, and ―‗right to act in self-defense to protect its citizens.‘‖621 
S.Res.10 and H.Res.34 were passed on Jan.9 and they concluded by the sentence ―‗against 
Hamas‘ unceasing aggression.‘‖622 Needless to say, the 2008 Israeli war left the Gaza Strip 
devastated and resulted in Israel‘s killing of more than 1400 Palestinians and the injuring of 
more than 3500 others, while only 13 Israelis were killed. S.Res.6 expressed ―‗solidarity with 
Israel in Israel‘s defense against terrorism in the Gaza Strip,‘‖ and H.Res.37 condemned 
―‗Hamas for the recent attacks against Israel.‘‖623 
 At the same time, some reasonableness was still shown by the statements and actions of a 
small minority of Congress members. A letter drafted by Representatives Lois Capps and John 
Olver was sent on Jan. 28 to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, with 64 signatures, expressing 
―the signers‘ deep concern for the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip‘ and request[ing] 
‗immediate action by the U.S. to address this crisis.‘‖624 Speaking on the floor of the House, Rep. 
Kucinish also pointed out that ―Israel‘s use of ‗U.S.-provided F-16 jets, Apache helicopters and 
white phosphorus against the people of Gaza…imposes upon…Congress a moral obligation to 
speak out.‘‖625 He introduced H.Res.66 on Jan. 15 ―‗expressing the sense of the House… 
concerning the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.‘‖626 
 Additionally, on Jan. 28
th, Sen. Patrick Leahy described ―an Israeli atrocity against the 
family of a Palestinian recent graduate from Vermont‘s Middlebury College,‖ Amer Shurrab, 
and said that ―the case ‗cries out for an immediate, thorough, credible and transparent 
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investigation by the Israeli government.‘‖627 Further, On Feb. 4, 106 co-sponsors of H.Res.130 
―‗express[ed] support of the appointment of former Senator George Mitchell as Special Envoy 
for Middle East Peace…in [the] vigorous pursuit of a diplomatic resolution to the Israeli-
Palestinian and Israeli-Arab conflicts based on the establishment of two states, the State of Israel 
and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security, and with recognized borders.‘‖628 
Furthermore, at a House Foreign Affairs Middle East Subcommittee hearing on ―Gaza after the 
war,‖ Rep. Robert Wexler said ―‗the notion that Israel can continue to expand 
settlements…without diminishing the capacity of a two-state solution is both unrealistic 
and…hypocritical,‘‖ while chairman of the subcommittee Gary Ackerman ―specifically equated 
terrorism and the firing of rockets with ‗the march of settlements and outposts‘ and ‗the 
perpetuation of settler pogroms.‘‖629  
At a March, 2009 ―donor‘s conference to raise funds for Gaza recovery,‖ Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton announced plans to provide $300 million for reconstruction efforts of the 
Gaza Strip. However, the unconditional support of Israel in U.S. Congress still persisted as 
AIPAC‘s representatives Shelley Berkley, Eric Cantor, Mark Kirk, Mike Pence, Mike Coffman, 
Nita Lowey, and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, ―reflexively‖ opposed this aid package. ―Berkley wrote to 
Clinton demanding that the money be conditioned on the release of Israeli soldier Gilad 
Shalit…,‖ and Mike Coffman sent a letter to Clinton ―urging her to withhold the $300 million for 
Gaza because giving money to Palestinians in Gaza ‗is no different than giving the money 
directly to Hamas.‘‖630 Mike Kirk and Rose-Lehtinen, through their H.CON.RES.29 and 
H.R.557, even urged cutting aid for the Gaza refugee projects of the United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency (UNRWA).
631
  
Additionally, in reaction to the release of the Goldstone Report that accuses both Hamas 
and Israel, of committing ―‗war crimes as well as possible crimes against humanity‘‖ during 
Israel‘s latest war on the Gaza Strip, Senators Kristen Gillibrand and Johnny Isakson sent a letter 
to Hillary Clinton, signed by 29 others, ―urging that the U.S. ‗work very hard to block any 
punitive actions against Israel that this report mentions.‘‖632 Without even reading the more than 
450 page-long report, Representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Howard Berman also introduced 
H.Res.867, which ―‗call[ed] upon the president and secretary of state to oppose unequivocally 
any endorsement or further consideration of the Report…in multilateral fora.‘‖633 H.Res.867 
charges that ―the report is ‗irredeemably biased and unworthy of further consideration or 
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legitimacy,‘‖ and it was passed by a ―roll call vote‖ of 244-36.634 On the other hand, UNGA 
adopted the report by a vote of 114-18 countries with 44 abstentions and a ―no‖ vote by the 
U.S.
635
 In his statement before the House Floor on Nov. 3, 2009, Rep. Dennis Kucinich said ―‗if 
this Congress votes to condemn a report it has not read, concerning events it has totally ignored, 
about violations of law of which it is unaware, it will have brought shame to this great 
institution;‘‖ and he called H.Res.867 ―the ‗Down is Up, Night is day, Wrong is Right‘ 
resolution.‖636 
 As Shirl McArthur asserts, voting for this resolution was just an attempt by congressmen 
to pass AIPAC‘s ―Litmus Test.‖637 AIPAC requests from all new congressmen a ―position paper 
on Israel‖ to decide whether or not they should be supported.638 In such ―position paper‖ new 
Senator Scott Brown said that, among other things, the Goldstone Report is a ―‗blatant 
manifestation‘‖ of ―‗efforts worldwide aimed at undermining [Israel‘s] fundamental right‘‖ to 
defend itself, that he ―‗firmly supports‘ Israel‘s ‗security barrier,‘‖ and that he ―reaffirms 
Jerusalem as the undivided capital of Israel.‖639  
When Israel ―publicly humiliated‖ Vice President Joseph Biden during his March 2009 
visit to Israel, AIPAC-drafted letters were sent by members of Congress to Hillary Clinton 
urging her ―to ensure that the announcement of construction in East Jerusalem not derail U.S.-
Israel relations, and that any difference between the two countries be resolved privately rather 
than in public.‖640 Nine Senators and forty-nine Representatives also ―made statements on the 
House and Senate floor, or submitted statements for the record, reaffirming the U.S.-Israel 
relationship,‖ over U.S. attempts to resume the peace negotiations.641 The House letter was 
initiated by Majority Leader Steny Hoyer and Minority Whip Eric Cantor and was signed by a 
total of 333 Representatives, while the Senate letter was distributed by Barbara Boxer and 
Johnny Isakson, and was signed by 76 Senators.
642
  
Moreover, Rep. Doug Lamborn introduced H.Res.1191, ―reaffirming ‗that Jerusalem is 
and should continue to be the undivided capital of the State of Israel‘ and calling upon the 
president to fully implement the Jerusalem Embassy Act.‖643 Further, Rep. Scott Garrett 
introduced H.Res.1241, which ―‗support[ed] the right of Israel to defend itself against 
terrorists…;‘‖ and Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen introduced H.CON.RES.260, which ―‗recogniz[ed] 
the 62
nd
 anniversary of the independence of the State of Israel,… reaffirm[ed] unequivocal 
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support for the alliance and friendship between the U.S. and Israel,‘‖ and included statements 
from the Obama presidential campaign such as ―‗Jerusalem will remain the capital of Israel and 
it must remain undivided.‘‖644 It ignored the fact that Obama himself changed this position soon 
thereafter by stating that ―Jerusalem ‗is going to be up to the parties to negotiate.‘‖645 
As the Palestinian Authority announced its plans of seeking recognition for a Palestinian 
state through the United Nations and its agencies, three resolutions were passed in U.S. Congress 
in opposition to the Palestinian efforts. Other than the Israeli plan of giving the Palestinians a 
non-functioning entity, it is unclear which scenario such pro-Israel domestic forces in the U.S. 
would like to help implement. Republican Representative Ted Poe introduced both of 
H.Res.1731 and H.Res.1734, which call upon the administration ―to oppose 1) the unilateral 
declaration of a Palestinian state; and 2) any attempt to seek recognition of a Palestinian state by 
the U.N. or other international forums.‖646 Those two resolutions also demand that the U.S. ―veto 
any such U.N. Security Council resolution.‖647  
 
112
th
 Congress-First Session (2011) 
Meanwhile, with the Republicans‘ winning control of the House of Representatives as a 
result of 2010 congressional elections, Obama‘s efforts to retrieve the peace process were further 
undermined. As stated in Ch.3, the evangelical Christians‘ takeover of the Republican Party gave 
the Israeli policies of building settlements unwavering support since they believe the West Bank 
belongs to Israel according to a divine covenant; the influence of the pro-Israel lobby ―‗crosses 
party lines.‘‖648 White House spokesman during the Bush Administration, Ari Fleischer, ―noted 
gleefully that ‗The takeover of the House by Republicans is great news for Israel and her 
supporters,‖ and he pointed out that ―The House leadership and almost every GOP member is 
rock-solid behind Israel.‘‖649 A few days after the 2010 congressional elections, Netanyahu‘s 
government ―ordered the demolition‖ of an additional 88 Palestinian homes in East Jerusalem, 
and it announced ―plans to build 320 new units in the city‘s Ramot section and 1,000 in Har 
Homa.‖650 
On January 18, Kristen Gillibrand and 17 other Senators wrote to Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton urging her to veto the U.N. resolution that called Israeli settlements in East 
Jerusalem and elsewhere in the West Bank as ―illegal.‖651 Eric Cantor, Steny Hoyer, Gary 
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Ackerman, as well as other Representatives also wrote to President Obama ―urging that the U.S. 
veto the resolution‖ and demanding that Obama ―‗pledge[s] in response to thi[er] letter to veto 
any UNSC resolution that criticizes Israel regarding final status issues.‘‖652 To further support 
Netanyahu‘s settlement policies, and building on a long list of congressional actions that date 
back to 1990, Joe Wilson introduced H.CON.RES.5 that ―‗calls upon the President and the 
Secretary of State to repeatedly affirm publicly, as a matter of U.S. policy, that Jerusalem must 
remain the undivided capital of the State of Israel;‘‖ and reaffirms the congressionally-held 
perception of ―‗Israel‘s right to take necessary steps to prevent any future division of 
Jerusalem.‘‖653 Such congressional actions not only inhibit the Peace Process, but they also 
attempt to dictate the outcomes of future Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. 
On the other hand, in reaction to the PA decision to seek the international community‘s 
recognition of a Palestinian state, Chairwoman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Ileana 
Ros-Lehtinen, declared that Congress ―‗should finally hold PA leaders accountable, which is 
why…[she intended to] introduce legislation to clarify and tighten existing U.S. laws that deny 
funding to the PA until they meet their commitments.‘‖654 She claimed that, apparently, 
―Washington has given the PA ‗a blank check.‘‖655 Additionally, in March, 2011 forty-six 
representatives signed a letter to President Obama urging that he and his administration ―do all in 
[their] power to insist that President Abbas reenters peace talks, without preconditions, and 
demand that President Abbas eliminate all vestiges of incitement coming from his 
government.‖656 Moreover, Shelley Berkley and Eliot Engel introduced H.Res.1592, which says 
that ―‗no funds made available for assistance to the Palestinian Authority may be obligated or 
expended if the president determines and certifies that the Palestinian Authority has unilaterally 
declared a Palestinian state.‘‖657  
On one hand, pro-Israel congressional forces opposed the Palestinian international 
efforts; and on the other, they asserted their reservations on the main frameworks of the Peace 
Process. After President Obama said in a May, 2011 speech that ―‗the borders of Israel and 
Palestine should be based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps,‘‖ AIPAC reported that 
―500 lobbying meetings were held with members of Congress.‖658 As a result, on June 3, 
H.CON.RES.59 was introduced by Republican Rob Bishop and stated that ―‗it is contrary to U.S. 
policy and our national security to have the borders of Israel return to the armistice line that 
existed on June 4, 1967.‘‖659 S.CON.RES.23 asserted similar provisions, and soon thereafter 
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Robert Dold introduced H.Res.270, ―which would reaffirm the ‗principles regarding the security 
of Israel and peace in the Middle East‘ articulated in two resolutions passed in 2004.‖660 Such 
principles include the congressionally-held belief ―‗that it is unrealistic to expect that the 
outcome of final status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians will be a full and 
complete return to the armistice lines of 1949.‘‖661 
Meanwhile, additional resolutions were passed in opposition to the Palestinians‘ attempt 
to change the current status quo in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Both of H.Res.268 (357 co-
sponsors) that was introduced by Majority Leader Eric Cantor, and S.Res.185 (90 co-sponsors), 
which was introduced by Benjamin Cardin, condemned ―Palestinian efforts to unilaterally 
declare statehood and the reported inclusion of Hamas in a unity government.‘‖662 Further, 
H.Res.297, expressed the ―‗sense of the House‘ that the U.S. should withhold U.S. contributions 
to the regular U.N. budget ‗if the General Assembly adopts a resolution in favor of recognizing a 
state of Palestine outside of or prior to a final status agreement negotiated between‘ Israel and the 
Palestinians.‘‖663 At the same time, to ensure that such negotiations would never take place, 
H.Res.1006 called for cutting off ―some State Department funding unless the U.S. Embassy in 
Israel is established in Jerusalem no later than Jan. 1, 2013‖ and it removed the presidential 
waiver of the Jerusalem Act of 1995.
664
  
Moreover, Joe Walsh introduced the ―Palestinian Accountability Act‖ or H.Res.2457 of 
mostly Republican co-sponsors, which ―would prohibit U.S. government documents from 
referring to areas controlled by the PA as Palestine; would prohibit U.S. funds to the PA; would 
prohibit U.S. funds to the U.N. or any U.N. entity if it declares or recognizes statehood for the 
Palestinian territories; and would bar U.S. funding for UNRWA unless it meets the same 
conditions imposed on the Palestinians.‖665 H.Res.2261, introduced by Thaddeus McCotter 
would also ―‗withhold U.S. contributions to the U.N. or a U.N. agency if the U.N. or such 
agency supports the recognition of an independent Palestinian state.‘‖666  
Further, Chairman of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee Kay Granger 
and Ranking Democrat Nita Lowey wrote to PA President Mahmoud Abbas ―implicitly 
threatening to withhold aid if the PA seeks U.N. statehood recognition.‖667 Furthermore, to take 
advantage of such suppressed call of freedom, on Sept. 8, Rep. Joe Walsh and 42 other House 
Republicans introduced H.Res.394 in declarations of Congress‘ support of ―‗Israel‘s right to 
  
97 
 
annex Judea and Samaria in the event that the Palestinian Authority continues to press for 
unilateral recognition of statehood at the U.N.‘‖668 Rep. Steve Israel went as far as introducing 
H.Res.2893, ―‗to prohibit Foreign Military Financing program assistance to countries that vote in 
the U.N. General Assembly in favor of recognizing a Palestinian state in the absence of a 
negotiated border agreement‘ between Israel and the PA.‖669  
The occasion became an opportunity for the Republican conservatives to finally be able 
to apply extortive measures reflecting their long-held detestation of the U.N. Republican Senator 
Orrin Hatch and eighteen Republican co-sponsors introduced S.1595, which ―prohibit[s] funding 
for the U.N. if the Security Council or UNGA grants Palestine a change in status in the absence 
of a comprehensive peace agreement.‖670 Rep. Ileana Rose-Lehtinen argued that ―Washington 
not only should cut off aid to the Palestinians, but should also withhold funding to any U.N. 
entity that granted membership, any upgraded status, to the PA,‖ and she introduced H.Res.2829 
that, among other provisions, calls for this effect.
671
  
As former Foreign Service officer Shirl McArthur agrees, ―It is unclear why‖ the 
Palestinians‘ application for full U.N. membership was considered ―such a threat to Israel, except 
that it might hinder Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu‘s apparent strategy of pretending 
to want to negotiate, while relentlessly expanding Israeli colonies in the West Bank and 
Jerusalem.‖672 A few days before the 66th General Assembly meeting, ―58 House Democrats, led 
by Rep. Steny Hoyer, wrote to 40 European heads of state urging them to ‗stand with the United 
State‘ in opposing ‗unilateral‘ actions by the PA at the U.N.‖673  
Additionally, 14 Senators wrote to President Obama prior to his speech at that U.N. GA 
meeting, ―urging him that he uses his speech to restate strong U.S. support of Israel, which is just 
was he did.‖674 After the PA President Mahmoud Abbas officially submitted his application for 
full-membership of Palestine at the U.N., ―no fewer than 10 Senators and 35 House members 
spoke out in one forum or another denouncing the Palestinians and praising Israel.‖675 Further, ―a 
coalition of Israel-backing Democrats and conservative Republicans in both the House and the 
Senate were blocking about $200 million of aid to the Palestinians ‗until the Palestinian 
statehood issue is sorted out.‘‖676 
 On the other hand, by the end of 2011, a conservative estimate of total U.S. aid to Israel 
reached $123.202 Billion.
677
 This figure does not include the tax-exempt donations that are made 
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by more than 200 evangelical Christian and Jewish-American charities to Israel and Israel‘s 
settlements in the West Bank. The New York Times reported in July, 2010 that ―hundreds of 
millions of dollars have flowed [from those ‗charities‘] to settlers and settlement-related causes, 
including to support settler extremists in Hebron and East Jerusalem.‖678 In effect, ―since every 
tax-exempt dollar that goes to the colonies represents a loss of, conservatively, 20 cents to the 
U.S. Treasury, that means that the U.S. taxpayer has indirectly subsidized Israel‘s illegal colonies 
to the tune of tens of millions of dollars, or more.‖679 
 
III. JStreet and the Jewish-American Voter 
That said, an event of particular significance that occurred in the first half of the 2008 
congressional election cycle, was that of the establishment of JStreet, the Americans for Middle 
East Peace and Security, and its Political Action Committee, JStreetPAC. In the words of its 
Executive Director, Alon Ben-Ami, JStreet was launched as a counter force for ―AIPAC, and 
other Jewish groups that…do not reflect the more moderate views of the majority of American 
Jews.‖680 For instance, in reaction to the launching of the evangelical Christian/orthodox Jewish 
organization Stand for Israel in 2002, Rabbi David Saperstein of the Religious Action Center for 
Reform Judaism noted ―the idea that fundamentalist Christians would lobby Washington to reject 
‗land-for-peace‘ proposals…causes ‗discomfort among a significant majority of Jews who 
believe in a diplomatic solution.‘‖681 The launching of JStreet has been the most constructive of 
recent efforts to mobilize the voices of that majority of Jewish-Americans. 
The excessive Israeli response to the Palestinian uprising and the continued violence in 
the Middle East has caused a growing sense of alienation among liberal Jewish-Americans, due 
to the unconditional support given to Israel by its conservative-orthodox lobby in the U.S. In 
January 2004, 350 Rabbis representing the main Jewish denominations in the U.S. signed a letter 
to the Israeli embassy in Washington, D.C., by way of protesting Israeli demolishment of 
Palestinian houses in the West Bank to build settlements. They saw those Israeli policies as 
violating ―both Palestinian human rights and Jewish ideals. They charg[ed] that Israel 
discriminates by destroying Palestinian homes built without permits [which are impossible to 
obtain], while encouraging construction in Jewish neighborhoods [settlements] in the West Bank 
near Jerusalem.‖682  
  
99 
 
 In The Fate of Zionism, Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg argues that U.S. aid ―can and should be 
used as a way to move Israel toward peace.‖683 Hertzberg explains that ―The continuing effort to 
support and increase settlements in the West Bank and Gaza costs at least a billion dollar a 
year…An American government that is resolved to stop the settlements,‖ argues Hertzberg, 
―would not need to keep sending the Secretary of State and other emissaries again and again to 
Jerusalem…We could prove it by deducting the total cost of the settlements‖ from America‘s 
annual aid to Israel.
684
 Hertzberg acknowledges the fact that such approach would result in ―an 
outcry among the right-wing supporters of Israel;‖ however, he points out that ―an American 
government that would have the courage to force an end of settlement activity would find far 
greater support in the Jewish community, both in Israel and in America than many people in 
Washington imagine.‖685 This view, Hertzberg indicates, ―is much more popular than it appears 
to be in the statements by the pro-Israel lobbying establishments in America.‖686  
A Jan. 13, 2007 article in The Economist entitled ―Israel and the Jews: Diaspora Blues‖ 
explains that ―‗as the threat of genocide or of Israel‘s destruction has receded, a growing number 
of Diaspora Jews neither feel comfortable with always standing up for Israel, nor feel a need to 
invoke Israel in defining what makes them Jewish.‘‖687 In reference to the hard-line Jewish- 
American organizations, The Economist points out that ―‗often these lobbies have ended up 
representing not Israel, but its right-wing political establishment…[while] accusing critics of 
being ‗anti-Semitic‘ for saying things that are common place in Israel‘s own internal debate.‘‖688 
At the same time, an increasing number of Jewish-American ―critics of Israeli policies are 
speaking up, and refus[ing] to be silenced by pressure of mainstream groups...‖689 ―We find it 
impossible,‖ explains Letty Cottin Pogrebin, ―to Jewishly justify collective punishment, illegal 
settlements, house demolitions, …checkpoints…[and] a 20-foot wall that divides Arabs from 
their fields, schools and Jobs.‘‖690 
On the 2007 40
th
 anniversary of the 1967 War, the New York Times reported that this 
anniversary ignited a debate within the Jewish-American community regarding ―‗what kind of 
country Israel is, about the impact those 40 years of development, immigration, war, settlement 
and occupation have had on the dreams of those who chose to make their lives here [in the U.S.]. 
And there is a widespread feeling that both left and right are out of answers.‘‖691 Forward 
explained that up until 1967, Israel was the side seeking peace with its Arab neighbors, but soon 
after that war it annexed East Jerusalem and began building settlements in Gaza Strip and the 
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West Bank. ―‗In effect, Israel spent the first third of its existence seeking in vain nothing more 
than peace and recognition, and the second two-thirds of its existence hedging the offer;‘‖ this is 
becoming increasingly criticized by the younger generations of Jewish-Americans.
692
  
In reaction to AIPAC‘s invitation of CUFI‘s John Hagee, to speak at its March 2007 
national conference, Rabbi Erik Yoffie of the Union for Reform Judaism wrote:  
―‗We have learned from extensive research that these young people are more 
socially liberal than their baby-boomer parents. They are pluralistic in their 
thinking and they are tolerant of difference…They respond negatively to those 
who disparage other religious traditions and who make exclusive religious claims. 
They are inherently centrist in their political views on the Middle East. And they 
are suspicious of a Jewish establishment that they see as too focused on money 
and insufficiently focused on values. And so whom do we offer to these young 
people as a spokesman for Israel? John Hagee, who is contemptuous of Muslims, 
dismissive of gays, possesses a triumphalist theology and opposes a two-state 
solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. If our intention was to distance our young 
adults from the Jewish state, we could not have made a better choice.‘‖693 
 
During his 2008 presidential campaign, Barak Obama told a group of Jewish leaders 
meeting in Cleveland, ―‗I think there is a strain within the pro-Israel community that says unless 
you adopt an unwavering pro-Likud approach to Israel that you‘re anti-Israel, and that can‘t be a 
measure of our friendship with Israel. If we cannot have an honest dialogue about how do we 
achieve these goals, then we‘re not going to make progress.‘‖694 To this effect JStreet and 
JStreetPAC were launched during the first half of 2008. JStreet‘s Executive Director, Jeremy 
Ben-Ami, wrote in the April 25, 2008 issue of Forward, ―‗It is time for the broad sensible 
mainstream of pro-Israel American Jews and their allies to challenge those on the extreme right 
who claim to speak for all American Jews in the national debate about Israel and the Middle 
East—and who, through the use of fear and intimidation, have cut off reasonable debate on the 
topic.‘‖695 By the end of 2009, JStreet had 90,000 members.696 
Ben-Ami ―calls for a whole new definition of what it means to be ‗pro-Israel.‘‖697 He 
asserts that ―‗As long as Palestinians despair of a decent and dignified life, Israel will be at 
war…Helping the Palestinians achieve a viable, prosperous state is one of the most pro-Israel 
things an American politicians can do.‘‖698 At a June, 2009 address, Ben-Ami stated that the 
Israeli settlements are ―‗killing the future of the state of Israel and Palestine. If it continues, there 
will be no Palestinian state. If there is no Palestinian state, there will be no Israeli state, only a 
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one-state nightmare.‘‖699 According to Allan Brownfeld, ―Unlike AIPAC, JStreet intends to push 
aggressively for a two-state solution based on Israel‘s pre-1967 borders.‖700 
 Edward Witten wrote in the New York Review of Books that the rise of JStreet is filling 
the gap that ―‗has kept widening between the spectrum of views held by American Jews, 
especially those of the younger generation, and the far narrower range of views advocated 
by…particularly…AIPAC…‘‖701 According to JStreet, ―‗polling consistently shows that the vast 
majority of American Jews,‘‖ agree with its assertion that ―‗Israel‘s future as a Jewish 
democracy is inextricably tied to a two-state solution.‘‖702 Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud 
Olmert, himself has argued that Israel and its occupied Palestinian territories would be turned 
into a second Apartheid-South Africa if the two-state resolution collapses.
703
 During the Obama 
administrations‘ confrontation with Netanyahu over Israeli settlements, a JStreet poll found that 
by a margin of 82 percent to 18 percent Jewish-Americans ―support Washington in playing an 
active role in helping the parties to resolve the conflict; and by a 63 percent to 37 percent margin, 
those who support American activism say they would continue their support even ‗if it means the 
U.S. exerting pressure on Israel to make the compromise necessary to achieve peace.‘‖704 
JStreet opposed the Israeli war on Gaza Strip from December 2008-January 2009, as well 
as the Obama administration‘s veto of the February, 2011 UNSC resolution that condemned the 
settlements, prompting many harsh attacks from the majority of other Jewish-American 
groups.
705
 The Israeli Knesset even launched an investigation on JStreet because of its pro-peace 
and anti-settlement positions.
706
 At a Knesset hearing, JStreet‘s Chairman David Gilo said ―the 
contract that had long existed between Israel and Jews abroad—one of unconditional support—
was expiring and a new one being drafted…‗The new contract,‘‖ asserted Gilo, ―‗cannot be 
based on unilateral dictation of what is right, who is right and who is wrong.‘‖707 
JStreet‘s 2010 2nd Annual Conference was attended by more than 2,000 people, despite 
the fact that it was ―boycotted‖ by Netanyahu‘s government and the Israeli Embassy in 
Washington, D.C.
708
 The audience of that conference included more than 50 members of 
Congress as well as ―several liberal Knesset members.‖709 At JStreet‘s National Convention of 
2010, the Obama administration was represented by National Security Advisor, Gen. James 
Jones, who asserted that ―‗this administration will be represented at all future conferences.‘‖710 
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JStreet‘s leaders have also been ―invited to meetings the president has held with national Jewish 
leaders, and some of its leaders have close ties to senior policy makers.‖711  
In particular, as Douglas Bloomfield argued in the Oct.29, 2009 edition of the 
Washington Jewish Week, ―What sets JStreet apart…‗and so terrifies the hard-line establishment, 
is that it has a Political Action Committee that raises and contributes money for political 
campaigns, something essential to being an effective player today.‘‖712 JStreetPAC ―accepts 
recommendations for endorsements and allows those interested to contribute directly to those 
candidates it decides to endorse.‖713 During its first few months of operation, JStreetPAC ―raised 
over $565,000 to 41 House and Senate candidates, of which 32 won their races,‖ and JStreet 
―expects them to ‗provide a strong voice in Congress advocating peace and diplomacy in the 
Middle East.‘‖714 Eight of them were new comers to Congress, and according to Forward, ―some 
candidates were warned that if they accepted JStreetPAC‘s contributions, they would lose the 
support of other, more hawkish, Jewish PACs.‖715 Leader of the Union for Reform Judaism 
warned in an NPR interview that ―‗If this becomes an anti-AIPAC effort, then the American 
Jewish community will turn against it.‘‖716  
During the 2008 presidential elections, JStreet supported mostly Democrat candidates, 
but it also endorsed the Republican Arab-American Charles Boustany.
717
 Not only does this 
indicate the centrality of the Palestine question in relation to Israel‘s security, but it also 
increases the hope for a better U.S. foreign policy toward the region, and a better future. In a 
letter to Jimmy Carter after the publication of Palestine: Peace, Not Apartheid, Mitchell Plitnick 
of Jewish Voice for Peace wrote:  
―‗As American Jews, we‘re thrilled to hear a former U.S. president speaking with 
such courage about the suffering and loss of life Palestinians are enduring. We are 
heartbroken that our own government is making this immoral occupation 
possible...We know some Jewish organizations are upset about what you‘re 
saying, but we wanted you to know that a great many Jews in the U.S., Israel and 
around the world are not represented by these organizations. We share your 
outrage about U.S. tax dollars enabling human misery instead of freedom. We are 
working to make change in our own synagogues, schools, communities and 
families. We are speaking out so fellow Americans can be emboldened to speak 
honestly, without fear of offending Jewish friends, and knowing they have Jewish 
support.‘‖718 
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Conclusion 
Path-dependence theory suggests that once a policy has embarked in a certain direction, a 
major change in the very institutional capacities that have locked it in such a direction will be 
needed to make alternative points of view become heard. While the establishment of JStreet does 
not alter the institutional character of Congress or the U.S. electoral system, its establishment has 
marked a major turning point in the path-dependency of U.S. unconditional support of Israel. If 
JStreet becomes successful at mobilizing the majority of Jewish-Americans who disagree with 
the hard-line politics of most other Jewish-American organizations, congressmen and U.S. 
presidents would have more freedom to enforce a ―tough love‖ approach towards Israel; an 
approach that supports Israel while pressuring it to make the land compromises that are 
necessary to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Additionally, as the May 17, 2007 issue of the London Economist stated, ―An even 
greater threat to AIPAC comes from the general climate of opinion.‖719 The current U.S. 
domestic debates on issues relating to Israel are no longer monopolized by AIPAC and its 
supporters in the evangelical Christian community. ―It is suddenly becoming possible for serious 
people—politicians and policymakers as well as academics—to ask hard questions about 
America‘s relationship with Israel.‖720 At the same time, if it has taken decades to lock the policy 
path of unconditional U.S. support of Israel in its current direction, it will take an even longer 
time to deviate it towards a more balanced direction.  
The influence of the Israeli lobby and its allies in the evangelical Christian community on 
U.S. role as a mediator between the Israelis and the Palestinians has left long-lasting impacts. 
The current path-dependency of U.S. support of Israel has not only undermined the Palestinians‘ 
right to live free in a state of their own, but it has also put the U.S. in a collision course with the 
United Nations and its affiliated organizations. U.S. economic sanctions on UNESCO have 
already been implemented following the admittance of Palestine as a full member state of that 
international organization in late 2011. The Palestinian quest for statehood through the U.N. and 
its affiliated organizations has exposed the Israeli pretention to accept a two-state resolution to 
the conflict, while the right-or-wrong support that Israel enjoys in the U.S. has made the 
Palestinian U.N. application become the spark of a potential clash between morality, the role of 
international law, and the coercive economic and political clout of the world‘s main superpower.  
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The Palestinians‘ insistence to go forward with their plans of seeking an international 
recognition of a Palestinian state could indirectly result in the isolation of the U.S. from the rest 
of the world. Any international organization that admits Palestine as a full member state will lose 
U.S. financial contributions. The question is, would such an outcome be representative of the 
U.S. national interest? Would it be solely a reflection of the interest of pro-Israel U.S. lobbying 
groups? Would the Palestinian leadership continue to take such bold and assertive decisions? 
In their support of the Israeli policy of creating a sub-administrative Palestinian entity 
rather than a state, pro-Israel U.S. special interest groups have subsidized the creation of new 
facts on the ground, the settlements, which are ensuring that there would be no Palestinian state 
through peace negotiations, and leaving the PA no option but to pursue statehood through other 
diplomatic channels. Yet, as the Palestinians pursued other venues to enforce the call of a two-
state resolution, pro-Israel U.S. special interest groups have created many obstacles on such 
alternative efforts that would negatively affect the U.S. more than any other ―entity‖ or a state. 
At the same time, such obstacles may forever prevent the creation of a Palestinian state since the 
U.N. and its affiliated organizations cannot simply afford to lose the significant financial 
contributions that the U.S. makes to their budgets.  
Additionally, pro-Israel special interest groups have ensured that any possible U.S. 
involvement in future Israeli-Palestinian negotiations would be undermined. To mobilize the 
support of evangelical Christians, the current Republican presidential candidate and former 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Newt Gingrich, has gone as far as describing the 
Palestinians as an ―invented people.‖721 Pro-Israel U.S. interest groups have influenced the 
passage of congressional legislations such as the Jerusalem Embassy Act and its subsequent 
resolutions, which guarantee that all future U.S. administrations will be faced with having to 
make a decision that dictates the outcomes of any Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, namely that of 
recognizing Jerusalem as the united capital of Israel. They have provided their supporters with 
generous campaign contributions, mobilized U.S. public opinion to further their interests, 
targeted their opponents for political defeat, provided the financial means for building 
settlements in the West Bank, and lobbied Congress and the White House to prevent the U.S. 
from demanding an Israeli withdrawal back to the 1967 border.  
  
105 
 
From the early stages of the Peace Process during the Clinton administration, those 
groups have ensured that the Israeli vision of giving the Palestinians an entity that governs the 
Palestinians‘ civil affairs, while being economically and militarily controlled by Israel, would be 
the end result of the Peace Process. Their influence has made the Clinton administration refrain 
from applying any economic pressure on Israel and to mobilize their support, the Clinton 
administration‘s economic aid to Israel overrode the conditions of Bush Sr.‘s loan guarantees to 
Israel. President Clinton‘s facilitation of the Oslo Accords, the Wye River Memorandum as well 
as the Camp David Summit was always undermined by the continuation of Israel‘s confiscation 
of Palestinian land for building settlements. It was simply counterproductive for the Clinton 
administration to mediate between the Israelis and the Palestinians while evangelical Christian 
groups, and U.S. aid to Israel, were subsidizing the Israeli building of settlements and bypass 
roads to connect them, at a rate that significantly surpassed the pre-Peace Process levels. 
Additionally, as the second Palestinian intifada broke out in objection to the failure of the 
Peace Process to deliver a viable and independent Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders, 
pro-Israel U.S. special interest groups ensured that the demands of that populous uprising for 
such a solution would not be addressed. They worked tirelessly and successfully to link the 
Israeli tactics to putdown that Intifada to the U.S. War on Terror, and by lobbying Congress and 
the executive branch of U.S. government to add Palestinian militant groups that target Israel to 
U.S. list of foreign terrorist organizations, they have also jeopardized U.S.-Palestinian relations 
significantly. In their efforts to support Israel, pro-Israel U.S. special interest groups have acted 
as an ―anti-Palestinian‖ force722 that has prevented the Palestinians from even having a 
functioning Palestinian entity.  
 Rather than being aimed at enforcing a two-state resolution to the conflict, the policies of 
the George H.W. Bush administration towards the Palestinians ignited a Palestinian civil war. 
The outcome of the Palestinian democratic elections of 2006-2007 were rejected by the U.S. and 
U.S. economic aid to the Palestinians became pursued through microscopic lenses that 
scrutinized even U.S. support of humanitarian organization in Gaza Strip and the West Bank, 
such as UNRWA. On the other hand, U.S. direct and indirect aid to Israel continued to flow at an 
annual rate of nearly $6 billion. Coupled with the fact that U.S. involvement in the Peace Process 
during the Bush administration was a means towards the end of winning the heart and minds of 
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people in the Middle East, the Peace Process stopped at the Camp David summit and never went 
passed it.  
Even after the Bush doctrine of the War on Terror became replaced by the more moderate 
policies of the Obama administration, Obama‘s status as a first term President has made him 
hesitant to effectively, through economic means, pressure Netanyahu‘s government to stop 
building settlements in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Pressuring Israel to comply with its 
agreements with the Palestinians and to withdraw from Palestinian land became marginal under a 
U.S. administration that entered the White House already campaigning for a second term and 
attempting to fix the severe U.S. economic crisis. In effect, the support of the Israeli lobby and 
evangelical Christians to Benjamin Netanyahu‘s efforts to prevent the creation of a Palestinian 
state has prevailed over the long term objectives, of the so called Peace Process, to establish an 
independent Palestinian state.  
The unconditional and unwavering support of Israel‘s settlement policies by the 
particularity of evangelical Christian and hard-line Jewish-American organizations has made the 
U.S. lose its credibility as the main facilitator of the Middle East Peace Process. By mid-
December, 2011 at least 112 countries have recognized Palestine as a state within the 1967 
borders of Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem and the West Bank, while more than 150 countries have 
maintained diplomatic relations with the Palestinian Authority.
723
 According to a public opinion 
poll by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC), more than 51% of the 
Palestinians support the PA‘s decision to suspend its negotiations with Israel and pursue the 
venue of international organizations.
724
 A second poll by the West Bank Al Najah University 
found that more than %77 of the Palestinians support the PA‘s U.N. application and find it very 
helpful for the Palestinian cause.
725
  
The U.N. has recently passed a resolution by a vote of 167 countries endorsing the 
Palestinians‘ right to self-determination and having a state of their own based on U.N. 
resolutions. The United States and Israel were two out of the only five countries that opposed 
that resolution.
726
 Even if the United States vetoes the Palestinians‘ application for full U.N. 
membership at the United Nations Security Council, the Palestinian Authority would still be able 
to upgrade the status of Palestine in the U.N. General Assembly from an observer to a non-
member observer ―state.‖ Thereafter, Palestine would be able to join international organizations 
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such as the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice, which would 
enable the PA to further expose the Israeli building of settlements as illegal under international 
law.  Moreover, war crimes committed by the Israeli army in the Palestinian Territories would be 
brought for trials in international tribunals, based on U.N. documents such as the Goldstone 
Report.  
The support of pro-Israel U.S. special interest groups to the Israeli policy of maintaining 
the current status-quo, and the subsequent application of the PA for full U.N. membership of a 
Palestinian state, have brought the question of Palestinian statehood back to the international 
community to resolve. Despite the fact that the U.N. system lacks the enforcement mechanism to 
settle a conflict, Israel‘s continued suppression of the Palestinians is bringing her a permanent 
state of regional and international isolation. In such a situation, the Arab Peace initiative for 
giving Israel full diplomatic recognition in exchange for a total withdrawal from Palestinian land 
will be among the only options that future Israeli governments have at improving their foreign 
relations with the rest of the world.  
By the end of 2011, the latest proposal of the Quartet for bringing about a Palestinian 
state through negotiations with Israel remained ineffective, as Netanyahu‘s government 
responded to the PA application with expediting the completion of its settlement projects in East 
Jerusalem. At the same time, the U.S. has become but one member of the Quartet, rather than 
occupying the central rule of a peace broker between the Israelis and the Palestinians. With the 
increasing influence of other members of the Quartet such as the E.U., the effect of domestic 
forces in the U.S. on U.S. role as a peace facilitator has ensured that the U.S. no longer has the 
credibility to be the ―mutual mediator.‖ For instance, the European Parliament is currently 
blocking the ratification of agreements ―aimed at upgrading relations between E.U. and Israel‖ in 
order to pressure Israel at changing the current stalemate in the Peace Process;
727
 a stance that is 
highly unlikely to be expressed by the U.S. 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is really not as complicated as it seems to be. Bringing a 
final settlement that is both in Israel‘s interest as well as in the interest of global peace and 
security is primarily dependent on an Israeli withdrawal back to the 1967 borders, and its 
recognition of East Jerusalem as the capital of a Palestinian state. Other issues such as the return 
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of Palestinian refugees who were forced to leave their homes as a result of the creation of Israel 
could be much easier to negotiate once the land and borders issues have been resolved.  
Taking such an Israeli initiative would not only bring an end to a decades-long conflict, 
but it would usher in a long-awaited period of peace in the region where human lives would be 
respected rather than squandered; where Israel would become integrated into the region rather 
than being seen as the possessive, oppressive and merciless enemy; where the U.S. would start a 
new contract with the Arab street based on mutual respect rather than hatred, recognition of the 
right of the Palestinians to self-determination rather than dictation; and where the war-torn 
Palestinian society would be reconstructed, Palestinian lives would be improved, and resorting to 
armed violence among the Palestinian population would not be contemplated. At the same time, 
while one hopes for the sound of rationality and reasonableness to echo in the ears of the strong 
and powerful, the advocates of the battle royal might reach their goals of driving the region into 
additional chaos, before reasonableness and rationality could find their way into the hearts of the 
decision makers.  
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Index – Ch. 2 
The Following two tables represent a compilation of FEC records that were bi-annually 
published by the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs (* = Data not Available). 
 
Table 1: Pro-Israel PACs Contributions Totals (1990-2000) 
 
 
Election Year 
Number of 
Active PACs 
Candidates 
Supported 
Total Raised ($) 
Total Donated 
($) 
Arab/Muslim-
American PACs 
Outspent 
1990 95 402 10,700,000 4,800,000 105-1 
1992 76 
403: 281D and 
122R 14,015,509 3,963,007 103-1 
1994 61 
358: 246D and 
109R 6,084,639 2,529,573 247-1 
1996 61 
203: 116D and 
87R 5,471,630 2,738,647 133-1 
1998 58 
249: 160D and 
89R 5,228,998 2,090,857 23-1 
2000 35 
196: 120D and 
75R ** 1,062,209 52-1 
            
Table 2: Top Recipients of Campaign Contributions from Pro-Israel PACs (1990-2000) 
 
Chamber Member of Congress  Party-State 1990 Elections ($) Career Total ($) 
House Howard Wolpe D-MI 51,200 172,100 
House Wayne Owens  D-UT 48,900 117,050 
House David Obey D-WI 42,950 105,050 
House Lee Hamilton D-IN 9,500 by June 30, 1989 * 
House Ron Wyden D-OR 15,500 by June 30, 1989 * 
House  Benjamin Gilman R-NY 16,000 by June 30, 1989 * 
House Les Aspin D-WI 13,000 by June 30 1989 * 
House Mel Reynolds D-IL 38,300 * 
House Jeffrey Hutter D-KY 13,500 * 
Senate Paul Simon D-IL 262,655 580,794 
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Senate Tom Harkin D-IA 245,550 359,980 
Senate Carl Levin D-MI 243,000 422,038 
Senate Claiborne Pell D-RI 103,350 * 
Senate James Exon  D-NE 37,000 * 
Senate J. Bennette Johnston D-LA 59,300 * 
Senate Howell Heflin D-AL 84,850 * 
Senate Mitch McConnell R-KY 75,600 * 
Senate Larry Pressler R-SD 49,500 * 
Senate Joseph Biden D-DE 44,000 by June 30, 1989 * 
Senate Max Baucus D-MT 25,500 by June 30, 1989 * 
Senate Rudy Boschwitz R-MN 144,150 * 
Senate Ron Twilegar D-ID 55,500 * 
Chamber Member of Congress Party-State 1992 Elections ($) Career Total ($) 
Senate Arlen Specter R-PA 86,600 265,023 
Senate Packwood R-OR 87,850 139,350 
Senate Kasten R-WI 73,000 205,300 
Senate Alfonse D'Amato R-NY 26,000 52,705 
Senate Dan Coats R-IN 34,000 * 
Senate Christopher Dodd D-CT 42,000 110,678 
Senate Barbara A. Mikulski D-MD 56,900 104,340 
Senate Alan Keyes R-MD 75,250 247,650 
Senate Rechard Shelby  D-AL  61,300 by end of 1991  * 
Senate Harris Wofford D-PA 53, 500 by end of 1991  * 
Senate Timothy Wirth  D-CO 49, 215 by end of 1991  * 
Senate Kent Conrad D-ND 48,000 by end of 1991  * 
Senate Christopher Bond R-MO 47, 500 by end of 1991  * 
Senate Daniel Inouye  D-HI 42,000 by end of 1991  * 
Senate Harry Reid  D-NV 38,250 by end of 1991  * 
Senate Thomas Daschle D-SD * 382,630 
House Stephen Solarz D-NY 1,750 7,600 
House Sam Gejdenson D-CT 6,500 175,604 
House Tom Lantos D-CA 1,500 46,700 
House Mel Levine D-CA 108,000 * 
House Richard Gephardt D-MO 22,000 by end of 1991  * 
House James Bilbray D-NV 17,000 by end of 1991  * 
House Sander Levin D-MI 16,500 by end of 1991  * 
House  Robert Torricelli D-NJ 15,000 by end of 1991  * 
House Newton Gingrich R-GA 14,500 by end of 1991  * 
House Henry Waxman D-CA 11,000 by end of 1991  * 
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House Roland Coleman D-TX 10,750 by end of 1991  * 
House Nita Lowey D-NY 9,500 by end of 1991  * 
House Dick Swett  D-NH 8,250 by end of 1991  * 
Chamber Member of Congress Party-State 1994 Elections ($) Career Total ($) 
Senate Frank Lautenberg  D-NJ 127, 056 417, 306 
Senate Charles Robb D-VA 111,872 147,872 
House  Sam Gejdenson D-CT 41,854 269,408 
House  Eric Fingerhut  D-OH 33,990 51,390 
Chamber Member of Congress Party-State 1996 Elections ($) Career Total ($) 
Senate Carl Levin D-MI 136,320 558,358 
Senate Ron Wyden D-OR 93,352 164,045 
Senate Mitch McConnell R-KY 83,625 280,425 
Senate Max S. Baucus D-MT 77,998 232,748 
Senate Tom Harkin D-IA 93,500 461,700 
Senate John Rockefeller  D-WV 52,000 172,200 
Senate William Cohen R-ME 40,094 162,462 
Senate Larry Pressler R-SD 48,500 167,000 
Senate John William Warner R-VA 42,300 48,800 
Senate John F. Reed R-RI 49,750 181,050 
Senate James Inhofe R-OK 33,500 56,750 
Senate Robert Torricelli D-NJ 28,352 113,152 
Senate Rudy Boschwitz R-MN 27,452 304,650 
Senate Ted Stevens  R-AK 17,200 49,700 
Senate Richard Durbin D-IL 67,222 229,421 
Senate Larry Craig R-ID 15,000 20,750 
Senate Jesse Helms R-NC 14,000 26,000 
Senate Phil Gramm R-TX 59,500 80,500 
House Newton L. Gingrich L-GA 24,562 95,434 
House Bob Filner D-CA 27,100 63,700 
House Jane Harman D-CA 30,549 55,227 
House John Edward Porter R-IL 13,230 64,180 
House Lee Hamilton D-IN 15,500 100,950 
House Jerry Thomas Estruth  D-CA 12,000 12,000 
House Martin Frost D-TX 29,889 110,289 
House Benjamin Gilman R-NY 12,700 59,575 
House Vic Fazio D-CA 20,652 72,504 
House John Lewis D-GA 10,500 57,150 
House Peter King R-NY 10,500 14,500 
  
123 
 
House Bill Paxon R-NY 10,500 44,200 
House Richard A. Gephardt  D-MO 14,000 85,130 
House David R. Obey D-WI 9,000 135,300 
House Thomas Delay R-TX 11,500 19,850 
House Robert L. Livingston R-LA 7,000 27,750 
House Susan Molinari R-NY 7,000 18,750 
House Louis Stokes D-OH 15,500 26,800 
House Lynn Rivers D-MI 14,250 18,250 
House John Fox R-PA 12,500 13,000 
House Maurice Hinchey D-NY 12,250 14,850 
House  Lee James Bunn D-OR 10,350 16,213 
House Elizabeth Furse D-OR 10,000 16,213 
Chamber Member of Congress Party-State 1998 Elections ($) Career Total ($) 
Senate Barbara Boxer D-CA 58,202 * 
Senate Alfonse D'Amato R 58,700 * 
Senate Sander Levin D-MI 10,578 71,578 
Senate Carl Levin D-MI 5,000 563,358 
House Shelley Berkeley D-NV 12,032 * 
Chamer Member of Congress Party-State 2000 Elections ($) Career Total ($) 
Senate Frank Murkowski R-AK 1,000 63,000 
Senate Ted Stevens R-AK 1,000 47,200 
Senate Jon Kyl R-AZ 44,925 77,025 
Senate Dianne Feinstein D-CA 32,250 112,842 
Senate Christopher Dodd D-CT 1,000 182,928 
Senate Joseph Lieberman D-CT 86,000 226,508 
Senate Daniel Akaka D-HI 5,000 93,500 
Senate Richard Durbin D-IL 16,000 245,671 
Senate Richard Lugar R-ID 10,500 43,200 
Senate Thomas Harkin D-IA 1,000 423,895 
Senate Mitch McConnell R-KY 3,000 285,425 
Senate Olympia Snowe R-ME 32,750 71,000 
Senate Paul Sarbanes D-MD 42,250 159,963 
Senate Carl Levin D-MI 1,500 564,858 
Senate Sander Levin D-MI 1,500 86,527 
Senate Trent Lott R-MS 4,500 67,200 
Senate Max Baucus D-MT 2,000 232,248 
Senate Conrad Burns R-MT 52,960 165,010 
Senate Robert J. Kerrey D-NE 8,000 198,500 
Senate Harry Reid  D-NV -3,000 253,802 
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Senate Robert Torricelli D-NJ 5,000 125,652 
Senate Jeff Bingaman D-NM 32,500 261,425 
Senate Hillary Clinton D-NY 17,000 17,000 
Senate Kent Conrad D-ND 43,000 195,689 
Senate Arlen Specter R-PA -250 366,123 
Senate Richard Licht D-RI 2,005 245,605 
Senate Claiborne Pell D-RI -2,500 180,950 
Senate Ernest Hollings D-SC 1,000 73,275 
Senate Tim Johnson D-SD 1,000 51,000 
Senate Charles Robb D-VA 102,821 255,093 
Senate Slade Gorton R-WA 64,250 180,000 
House Tom Lantos D-CA 12,250 68,650 
House Elton Gallegly R-CA 4,000 41,250 
House Howard Berman D-CA 10,000 55,450 
House Adam Schiff D-CA 11,417 11,417 
House Jane Herman D-CA 14,491 57,071 
House Sam Gejdenson D-CT 29,500 335,601 
House Clay E. Shaw, Jr R-FL 16,100 42,600 
House John Porter R-IL 6,500 70,680 
House Richard Gephardt D-MO 16,500 134,880 
House Shelley Berkley D-NV 66,951 100,410 
House James H. Saxton R-NJ 13,800 53,650 
House Frank Pallone, Jr. D-NJ 4,000 44,400 
House Gary Ackerman D-NY 1,000 40,500 
House Eliot Engel D-NY 17,968 98,668 
House Nita Lowey D-NY 7,500 84,088 
House Benjamin Gilman R-NY 10,468 80,543 
House Barton Gordon D-TN 1,000 55,400 
House Tom DeLay R-Tx 14,200 39,050 
House Martin Frost D-TX 10,000 126,864 
House David Obey D-WI 4,500 147,100 
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Map 2: The West Bank after the Signing of Oslo II Interim Agreement (Source: United Nations 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). 
  
126 
 
Index-Ch 3 
The Following two tables represent a compilation of FEC records that were bi-annually 
published by the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs (* = Data not Available). 
 
Table 3: Campaign Contributions Totals (2002-2010) 
 
  
Pro-Israel PACs 
2002 ($) 2004 ($) 2006 ($) 2008 ($) 2010 ($) 
1,865,223 1,910,197 3,277,693 2,530,590 3,310,490 
1978- 36,472,405 39,532,465 44,284,654 46,815,244 51,160,333 
  
  
Muslim/Arab-American PACs 
2002 ($) 2004 ($) 2006 ($) 2008 ($) 2010 ($) 
** 109,000 80,500 35,605 36,500 
1978- 430,815 539,815 620,315 655,920 692,420 
 
Table 4: Top Recipients of Campaign Contributions from Pro-Israel PACs (2002-2008) 
 
Chamber Member of Congress  Party-State 2002 Elections ($) Career Total ($) 
Senate Carl Levin D-MI 84,529 649,387 
Senate Max Baucus D-MT 84,100 316,348 
Senate Mitch McConnell R-KY 62,000 347,425 
Senate Richard Durbin D-IL 76,000 321,671 
Senate Max Cleland D-GA 69,750 73,000 
Senate Tim Johnson D-SD 86,165 137,165 
Senate Gordon Smith R-OR 39,839 49,339 
Senate Susan Collins R-ME 35,500 45,000 
Senate Tom Harkin D-IA 44,750 506,450 
Senate Jack Reed D-RI 25,886 100,936 
Senate Tom Daschle D-SD 1,000 463,135 
Senate Arlen Specter R-PA 15,500 381,623 
Senate Jeff Bingaman D-NM ** 261,425 
Senate Charles Robb  D-VA ** 255,093 
Senate Harry Reid D-NV ** 253,802 
House Dennis J. Hastert R-IL 22,000 57,350 
House Shelley Berkley D-NV 39,345 139,755 
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House Tom DeLay R-TX 12,000 51,050 
House Mary Ann McConnell R-PA 10,000 10,000 
House Richard Gephardt D-MO 23,415 158,295 
House Roy Blunt R-MO 7,000 12,000 
House Robert Menendez D-NJ 9,843 21,608 
House Eliot Engel D-NY 10,000 108,668 
House Joseph Crowley D-NY 7,500 10,500 
House Ira Shapiro D-MD 5,000 5,000 
House Denise Majette D-GA 52,000 ** 
House Artur Davis D-AL 61,567 61,567 
House Sam Gejendson D-CT ** 335,600 
House David Obey D-WI 2,000 149,100 
House Martin Frost D-TX 4,500 131,364 
House Nita Lowey D-NY 4,000 88,088 
House Sander Levin D-MI 13,500 100,027 
House Benjamin Gilman R-NY 4,000 84,543 
House Lane Evans D-IL 4,836 79,629 
Chamber Member of Congress  Party-State 2004 Elections ($) Career Total ($) 
Senate Wayne Allard R-CO ** 50,500 
Senate Barbara Boxer D-CA 78,000 228,794 
Senate Jeff Bingaman D-NM ** 261,425 
Senate Robert Byrd D-WV ** 67,500 
Senate James Jeffords IVT ** 34,050 
Senate Patrick Leahy D-VT ** 118,200 
Senate Evan Bayh D-IN 59,00 86,250 
Senate Barbara Mikulski D-MD 47,00 177,599 
Senate Patty Murray D-WA 89,495 163,200 
Senate Harry Reid D-NV 66,499 320,301 
Senate Charles Schumer D-NY 25,000 57,635 
Senate Tim Johnson D-SD 3,000 161,837 
Senate Max Cleland D-GA 95,150 ** 
Senate Ronald Wyden D-OR 77,000 277,562 
Senate Robert Bennett R-UT 57,250 99,250 
Senate Kent Conrad D-ND 5,250 201,939 
Senate Christopher Dodd D-CT 50,250 233,178 
Senate Joseph Lieberman D-CT 3,250 227,758 
Senate Joseph Biden D-DL -500 101,000 
Senate Samuel Brownback R-KS 61,350 105,800 
Senate Carl Levin D-MI 93,029 657,887 
Senate Mitch McConnell R-KY 83,250 368,675 
Senate Mary Landrieu D-LA 92,250 ** 
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Senate Jean Carnahan D-MO 87,422 ** 
Senate Susan Collins R-ME ** 53,500 
Senate Norm Coleman R-MN 9,000 35,980 
Senate Saxby Chambliss R-GA 18,500 27,500 
Senate Jim Bunning R-KY 47,900 89,750 
Senate Richard Durbin D-IL 3,500 327,671 
Senate Tom Harkin D-IA 58,750 520,450 
Senate Gordon Smith R-OR 58,589 68,089 
Senate Tom Daschle D-SD 129,375 592,510 
Senate Frank Lautenberg D-NJ 14,272 434,078 
Senate Arlen Specter R-PA 106,350 487,973 
House Shelley  Berkley  D-NV 40,600 206,955 
House  Artur Davis D-AL 16,500 78,060 
House Denise Majette D-GA 5,000 57,000 
House Richard Gephardt  D-MO 1,000 173,295 
House Eric Cantor R-VA 34,500 85,730 
House Dennis J. Hastert  R-IL 18,500 80,850 
House Sander Levin D-MI 5,700 116,227 
House Eliot Engel D-NY 23,000 141,918 
House Jane Harman D-CA ** 87,271 
House Joseph Crowley D-NY 23,000 ** 
House Evan Lane D-IL ** 87,375 
House Tom DeLay R-TX 28,000 86,050 
House Martin Frost D-TX 54,900 189,014 
House Nita Lowey D-NY 22,150 111,238 
House Nancy Pelosi D-CA 26,650 63,450 
House Steny Hoyer D-MD 37,500 92,275 
House Howard Berman D-CA 3,500 63,550 
House Gary Ackerman D-NY ** 45,500 
House David Price D-NC ** 50,827 
House Christopher Smith R-NJ 7,000 51,750 
House Frank Pallone D-NJ 10,150 55,550 
House Donald Payne D-NJ 500 21,750 
House Ilena Ros-Lehtinen R-FL 47,000 88,490 
House Tom Lantos D-CA 34,600 110,250 
House Lane Evans D-IL 9,750 89,379 
House Joseph Hoeffel D-PA ** 24,454 
Chamber Member of Congress  Party-State 2006 Elections ($) Career Total ($) 
Senate Jon Kyl R-AZ 87,000 ** 
Senate Bill Nelson R-FL 89,861 ** 
Senate Kent Conrad D-ND 62,600 ** 
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Senate Joseph Lieberman D-CT 127,093 363,851 
Senate Debbie Stabenow D-MI 85,796 ** 
Senate James Talent R-MO 69,510 ** 
Senate Benjamin E. Nelson D-NE 59,500 ** 
Senate Rick Santorum R-PA 75,500 ** 
Senate Mike DeWine R-OH 74,000 ** 
Senate Robert Menendez D-NJ 84,835 ** 
Senate Benjamin L. Cardin D-MD 66,565   
Senate Sheldon Whitehouse II D-RI 72,000   
Senate Carl Levin D-MI ** 658,887 
Senate Tom Harkin D-IA ** 520,950 
Senate Arlen Specter R-PA ** 489,973 
Senate Frank Lautenberg D-NJ ** 434,078 
Senate Mitch McConnell R-KY ** 377,185 
Senate Richard Durbin D-IL ** 330,421 
Senate Max Baucus D-MI ** 327,648 
Senate Harry Reid D-NV ** 320,301 
Senate Ronald Wyden D-OR ** 277,562 
House Mark Kirk R-IL 76,564 129,882 
House Brad Ellsworth D-IN 48,750 ** 
House Dennis J. Hastert R-IL 38,700 ** 
House Shelley Berkley D-NV 39,250 246,205 
House Steny Hoyer D-MD 44,500 129,882 
House Ileana Rose-Lehtinen R-FL 36,500 120,990 
House Eliot Engel D-NY 38,000 179,918 
House Deborah Pryce R-OH 30,000 ** 
House Brad Ellsworth D-IN 38,000 ** 
House Tom DeLay R-TX 26,000 ** 
House Joseph Crowley D-NY 24,000 ** 
House Eric Cantor R-VA 43,000 128,730 
House Chet Edwards D-TX 28,600 ** 
House Martin Frost D-TX ** 190,014 
House David Obey D-WI ** 152,100 
Hpuse Tom Lantos C-CA ** 121,250 
House Sander Levin D-MI ** 122,227 
House Nita Lowey D-NY ** 117,738 
Chamber Member of Congress  Party-State 2008 Elections ($) Career Total ($) 
Senate Mitch McConnell R-KY 107,956 485,141 
Senate Norm Coleman R-MN 105,000 ** 
Senate Frank Lautenberg D-NJ 73,500 507,578 
Senate Carl Levin D-MI 69,850 728,737 
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Senate Susan Collins R-ME 57,500 ** 
Senate Mark Pryor D-AR 53,500 ** 
Senate Gordon Smith R-OR 52,000 ** 
Senate Jack Reed D-RI 50,500 ** 
Senate Mary Landrieu D-LA 50,000 ** 
Senate Katrina Swett D-NH 49,000 ** 
Senate Thomas Harkin D-IA ** 546,950 
Senate Arlen Specter R-PA ** 503,473 
Senate Richard Durbin D-IL ** 372,421 
Senate Joseph Lieberman Ind-CT ** 366,351 
Senate Max Baucus D-MT ** 352,648 
Senate Harry Reid D-NV ** 320,301 
Senate Ronald Wyden D-OR ** 277,562 
House  Mark Kirk R-IL 62,000 191,882 
House Steny Hoyer D-MD 58,000 197,275 
House Eric Cantor R-VA 47,500 176,230 
House Shelley Berkley D-NV 45,350 291,555 
House John Boehner R-OH 37,500 ** 
House Eliot Engel D-NY 36,500 216,418 
House Mike Pence R-IN 32,500 ** 
House Ileana Rose-Lehtinen R-FL 29,750 155,740 
House Ron Klein D-FL 25,000 ** 
House Nita Lowey D-NY 23,000 141,738 
House David Obey D-WI ** 159,600 
House Sander Levin D-MI ** 123,727 
House Tom Lantos D-CA ** 123,250 
 
Letter From President Bush to Prime Minister Sharon  
His Excellency 
Ariel Sharon 
Prime Minister of Israel  
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:  
Thank you for your letter setting out your disengagement plan.  
The United States remains hopeful and determined to find a way forward toward a resolution of 
the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. I remain committed to my June 24, 2002 vision of two states 
living side by side in peace and security as the key to peace, and to the roadmap as the route to 
get there.  
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We welcome the disengagement plan you have prepared, under which Israel would withdraw 
certain military installations and all settlements from Gaza, and withdraw certain military 
installations and settlements in the West Bank. These steps described in the plan will mark real 
progress toward realizing my June 24, 2002 vision, and make a real contribution towards peace. 
We also understand that, in this context, Israel believes it is important to bring new opportunities 
to the Negev and the Galilee. We are hopeful that steps pursuant to this plan, consistent with my 
vision, will remind all states and parties of their own obligations under the roadmap.  
The United States appreciates the risks such an undertaking represents. I therefore want to 
reassure you on several points.  
First, the United States remains committed to my vision and to its implementation as described in 
the roadmap. The United States will do its utmost to prevent any attempt by anyone to impose 
any other plan. Under the roadmap, Palestinians must undertake an immediate cessation of 
armed activity and all acts of violence against Israelis anywhere, and all official Palestinian 
institutions must end incitement against Israel. The Palestinian leadership must act decisively 
against terror, including sustained, targeted, and effective operations to stop terrorism and 
dismantle terrorist capabilities and infrastructure. Palestinians must undertake a comprehensive 
and fundamental political reform that includes a strong parliamentary democracy and an 
empowered prime minister.  
Second, there will be no security for Israelis or Palestinians until they and all states, in the region 
and beyond, join together to fight terrorism and dismantle terrorist organizations. The United 
States reiterates its steadfast commitment to Israel's security, including secure, defensible 
borders, and to preserve and strengthen Israel's capability to deter and defend itself, by itself, 
against any threat or possible combination of threats.  
Third, Israel will retain its right to defend itself against terrorism, including to take actions 
against terrorist organizations. The United States will lead efforts, working together with Jordan, 
Egypt, and others in the international community, to build the capacity and will of Palestinian 
institutions to fight terrorism, dismantle terrorist organizations, and prevent the areas from which 
Israel has withdrawn from posing a threat that would have to be addressed by any other means. 
The United States understands that after Israel withdraws from Gaza and/or parts of the West 
Bank, and pending agreements on other arrangements, existing arrangements regarding control 
of airspace, territorial waters, and land passages of the West Bank and Gaza will continue. The 
United States is strongly committed to Israel's security and well-being as a Jewish state. It seems 
clear that an agreed, just, fair, and realistic framework for a solution to the Palestinian refugee 
issue as part of any final status agreement will need to be found through the establishment of a 
Palestinian state, and the settling of Palestinian refugees there, rather than in Israel.  
As part of a final peace settlement, Israel must have secure and recognized borders, which should 
emerge from negotiations between the parties in accordance with UNSC Resolutions 242 and 
338. In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli populations 
centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and 
complete return to the armistice lines of 1949, and all previous efforts to negotiate a two-state 
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solution have reached the same conclusion. It is realistic to expect that any final status agreement 
will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities.  
I know that, as you state in your letter, you are aware that certain responsibilities face the State of 
Israel. Among these, your government has stated that the barrier being erected by Israel should 
be a security rather than political barrier, should be temporary rather than permanent, and 
therefore not prejudice any final status issues including final borders, and its route should take 
into account, consistent with security needs, its impact on Palestinians not engaged in terrorist 
activities.  
As you know, the United States supports the establishment of a Palestinian state that is viable, 
contiguous, sovereign, and independent, so that the Palestinian people can build their own future 
in accordance with my vision set forth in June 2002 and with the path set forth in the roadmap. 
The United States will join with others in the international community to foster the development 
of democratic political institutions and new leadership committed to those institutions, the 
reconstruction of civic institutions, the growth of a free and prosperous economy, and the 
building of capable security institutions dedicated to maintaining law and order and dismantling 
terrorist organizations.  
A peace settlement negotiated between Israelis and Palestinians would be a great boon not only 
to those peoples but to the peoples of the entire region. Accordingly, the United States believes 
that all states in the region have special responsibilities: to support the building of the institutions 
of a Palestinian state; to fight terrorism, and cut off all forms of assistance to individuals and 
groups engaged in terrorism; and to begin now to move toward more normal relations with the 
State of Israel. These actions would be true contributions to building peace in the region.  
Mr. Prime Minister, you have described a bold and historic initiative that can make an important 
contribution to peace. I commend your efforts and your courageous decision which I support. As 
a close friend and ally, the United States intends to work closely with you to help make it a 
success.  
Sincerely, 
George W. Bush  
(White House Archives: 
 http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040414-3.html    
(Accessed January 7, 2012)). 
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Index – Ch. 4 
The Following table represents a compilation of FEC records, published by the Washington 
Report on Middle East Affairs (* = Data not Available). 
Table 5: Top Recipients of Campaign Contributions from Pro-Israel PACs (2010) 
 
Chamber Member of Congress  Party-State 2010 Elections ($) Career Total ($) 
Senate Richard C. Shelby R-Al 6,000 200,825 
Senate John McCain R-AZ 35,500 206,000 
Senate Bill Nelson D-FL 10,000 137,221 
Senate Christopher Dodd D-CT 8,000 242,178 
Senate Joseph Lieberman Ind-CT 2,500 368,851 
Senate Richard Durbin D-IL 1,000 373,421 
Senate Mark S. Kirk R-IL 115,304 336,386 
Senate Barbara Mikulski D-MD 35,500 213,099 
Senate Susan Collins R-ME 3,000 111,000 
Senate Charles E. Grassley R-IA 19,000 160,323 
Senate Jim Bunning R-KY 10,940 100,690 
Senate Harry Reid D-NV 72,700 393,001 
Senate Max Baucus D-MT 1,000 349,648 
Senate Jon Kyl R-AZ 1,000 166,525 
Senate Patrick Leahy D-VT 27,711 145,911 
Senate Frank Lautenberg D-NJ 1,000 503,578 
Senate Ronald Wyden D-OR 67,400 344,962 
Senate Kristen Gillibrand D-NY 46,200 62,450 
Senate Charles Schumer D-NY 26,750 84,385 
Senate John Thune R-SD 40,500 54,730 
Senate Arlen Specter D-PA 46,000 549,473 
Senate Robert Bennett R-UT 42,000 141,250 
Senate Byron Dorgan D-ND 21,000 172,350 
Senate Russell Feingold D-WI 69,128 213,438 
Senate Patty Murray D-WA 32,000 195,293 
Senate Carl Levin D-MI 200 728,937 
Senate Barbara Boxer D-CA 50,250 279,044 
House Nancy Pelosi D-CA 19,500 122,300 
House Howard Berman D-CA 35,500 124,550 
House Jane Harman D-CA 20,000 123,771 
House Ileana Rose-Lehtinen R-FL 45,000 208,740 
House Daniel K. Inouye D-HI 57,000 262,425 
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House Dan L. Burton R-IN 22,836 143,336 
House Steny Hoyer D-MD 42,000 235,275 
House Sander Levin D-MI 4,000 132,727 
House Ike Skelton D-MO 51,000 139,450 
House Shelley Berkley D-NV 36,000 326,055 
House Joseph Crowley D-NY 12,000 105,657 
House Eliot Engel D-NY 34,000 269,418 
House Nita Lowey D-NY 28,000 177,238 
House Eric Cantor R-VA 41,500 217,730 
House David Obey D-WI 4,000 164,600 
House Ron Klein D-FL 42,650 90,174 
House Theodore Deutch D-FL 43,600 43,600 
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